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Catala, Amandine (Ph.D., Philosophy) 
Beyond Political Legitimacy: Reframing the Normative Question of Secession 
Thesis directed by Professor Alison Jaggar 
 
I shift the current philosophical debate on secession by arguing for a new framework to 
analyze the normative question of secession. The normative question of secession asks 
under what conditions it is morally permissible for a group to secede. I argue that an 
adequate normative theory of secession ought to be based primarily not on the question of 
political legitimacy, but on the prior, more fundamental values most salient in the 
normative question of secession, namely self-determination, justice, and flourishing. I 
show that this axiological approach, which I develop in this project, yields a morally 
more plausible answer to the normative question of secession. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction: Situating the Normative Question of Secession 
 
 
1. The normative question of secession 
Since 1945, the number of independent states has more than doubled, from less than a 
hundred to almost two hundred. This is partly the result of decolonization processes, 
through which former European colonies gained their independence, and partly the result 
of the dissolution of states such as the USSR and Yugoslavia, the partition of states such 
as India and Czechoslovakia, and the secession of states such as Bangladesh and Eritrea. 
Many current states also contain secessionist movements, for example Catalonia in Spain, 
Flanders in Belgium, and not so long ago, Quebec in Canada (Beran 1998, 43). 
These events and the violence that has at times accompanied them have generated an 
increased interest in the topic of secession. Philosophical literature on the subject has 
developed especially since the 1990‘s. Through this literature, political philosophers have 
tried to answer the normative question of secession, i.e. to identify the conditions under 
which secession is morally permissible. As will become clearer in the rest of this chapter, 
this project will contribute to the current philosophical debate on secession by developing 
a new, and I will argue, more successful approach to the normative question of secession, 
which I call the axiological approach. Before introducing this new approach (sections 4-
6), it will be useful to clarify some central concepts (section 2) and to set the normative 
question of secession against some historical background (section 3). 
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2. Some terminological clarifications 
Secession occurs when a territorially concentrated group of people (usually a national 
minority) unilaterally decides to break away from an existing state to form its own 
independent state, thereby taking away that part of the existing state‘s territory which it 
occupies. This, for example, would be the case if Quebec were to break away from the 
rest of Canada and to form its own independent state on its current territory. The fact that 
the group‘s decision is unilateral means that secession occurs without the consent of the 
existing state and without constitutional sanction. 
As a unilateral decision, secession is controversial because it calls into question both the 
existing state‘s sovereignty and its legitimacy. The concepts of state, sovereignty, and 
legitimacy are of course essentially contested ones. Conceptually, there are multiple 
competing interpretations of what it means for a state to be sovereign or legitimate. 
Normatively, there are likewise numerous challenges to how such claims to sovereignty 
or legitimacy might be morally justified, independently of the specific interpretation of 
those concepts one might adopt. It is not my goal here to review these conceptual 
interpretations or normative challenges. Rather, my present goal is simply to offer some 
working definitions of those concepts, which are neither exhaustive nor definitive, but 
which are nonetheless useful in addressing the normative issues that secession raises. 
With this in mind, I offer the following definitions of some central concepts in the 
normative question of secession. 
A state is a politically organized, politically independent, and territorially bounded entity 
that is sovereign. State sovereignty refers to a state‘s territorial integrity, or a state‘s 
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claim to and exercise of supreme control over its territory, and to a state‘s political 
authority, or a state‘s claim to and exercise of supreme control over its people. Secession 
calls a state‘s sovereignty into question because it challenges both its territorial integrity 
(by removing part of that state‘s territory – the territory that is breaking away – from that 
state‘s control) and its political authority (by removing part of that state‘s population – 
the residents of the territory that is breaking away – from that state‘s control). 
State legitimacy refers to what the moral grounds are for state sovereignty. Thus a state is 
legitimate ―if and only if it is morally justified in wielding political power, where to wield 
political power is to attempt to exercise a monopoly, within a jurisdiction, in the making, 
application, and enforcement of laws‖ (Buchanan 2002, 689-690). Secessionists 
challenge a state‘s legitimacy because they deny that the grounds on which the state bases 
its sovereignty are morally justified. 
Secession, which is the result of a unilateral decision of a territorially concentrated group 
to break away from an existing state to form its own independent state, should be 
distinguished from partition, irredentism, and separatism. Partition is a process whereby 
an existing state splits into two new states, the split being the result of a mutually 
consensual decision between the two new states (as in the case of the partition of 
Czechoslovakia into the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1993). Irredentism is a process 
whereby one state claims part of the territory of a neighboring state because that territory 
is occupied by a minority in the neighboring state that belongs to the same national group 
as the majority in the state claiming the territory (as in the case of Germany claiming the 
territory occupied by ethnic Germans living in Poland at the beginning of the Second 
World War). Separatism is a process whereby a group (usually a national minority) 
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demands a certain degree of political autonomy while remaining within the boundaries of 
the existing state, that is, short of independent statehood (as in the current case of Quebec 
in Canada), though separatist demands can sometimes lead to secessionist claims (as in 
the current case of Flanders in Belgium). Thus secession is different from partition in that 
the latter is the result of a mutually consensual, rather than unilateral, decision; from 
irredentism in that the latter is an external, rather than internal, initiative; and from 
separatism in that the latter seeks political autonomy within existing, rather than new, 
state borders. 
In connection to the definition of secession offered above, two particular types of cases 
might be noted. First, imagine a group that is territorially concentrated but, because of the 
way borders were drawn, is spread across several different states. This group could 
collectively decide that each portion of the group is going to secede from the state in 
which it is currently included, so that the group as a whole can form a new independent 
state of its own. This, for example, would be the case if the Kurdish population of 
Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran seceded from those states to form their own independent 
state of Kurdistan. Second, though secessionists typically aim to create their own 
independent state, they could also, upon seceding, join another already existing 
neighboring state, if both the seceding group and the neighboring state agreed to merge. 
This, for example, would be the case if the Flemish seceded from Belgium and then 
joined their northern neighbors in The Netherlands. 
These two types of case are variations of the case of secession described above with the 
example of Quebec (if it were to break away from the rest of Canada to form its own 
independent state), and they may or may not be morally equivalent to this latter type of 
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case. For the purposes of this project, I will leave this question open. As cases of 
secession, they certainly raise the normative issues on which this project will focus. Still, 
seceding from multiple existing states to form one new independent state or seceding 
from a state to merge with an already existing independent state might raise additional 
normative issues. This project will not be concerned with these. For brevity‘s sake, 
however, I will hereafter continue to refer to secessionist claims as claims from a group 
in one existing state to create its own independent state. 
Finally, secessionists often justify their claims by invoking the right of peoples to self-
determination. This principle is recognized in several major international legal 
documents. Article 21 (3) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that ―The 
will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government‖ (Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights), and Article 1 of both the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights states that ―All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right 
they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development‖ (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights). Articles 1 (2) and 55 
of the U.N. Charter likewise both refer to ―the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples‖ (Charter of the United Nations). What ―self-determination‖ 
means and who the ―peoples‖ are to which it applies are, as the next section will show, 
once again contested matters, both in international law and in political philosophy. What 
should be noted for the time being is that the right of peoples to self-determination is 
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sometimes also referred to as the right to national self-determination (Margalit and Raz 
1990). 
Having clarified the main concepts secession involves and explained why secessionist 
claims are likely to be controversial, I now offer some historical background for the 
normative question of secession. 
3. Some historical background 
Though secessionist claims abound in the real world, international law is far from having 
adequately resolved the question of when secession should be permissible, and much 
normative work remains to be done to answer this question. The conditions for 
articulating the normative question of secession indeed arose only relatively recently. 
First, a shift in the mid-twentieth century in the conception of the moral status of states 
and their interrelations took place, within which normative issues of secession made 
sense for the first time. Second, processes of decolonization, which appealed to the 
principle of self-determination of peoples, raised the question of the applicability of the 
principle of self-determination to justify secessionist claims. I will look at each of these 
of these two shifts in turn. 
3.1. The shift in the conception of states and their interrelations 
From the mid-sixteenth up until the mid-twentieth century, states and their interrelations 
were conceived according to the Westphalian model (Held 1992). On the Westphalian 
model,
1
 states have absolute sovereignty or control over their own territories and peoples. 
No higher political authority (and often no higher moral authority) is recognized. 
                                                 
1
 Based on the Treaty of Westphalia, signed in 1648, bringing an end to the Thirty Years‘ War. 
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International relations are characterized by minimal cooperation between states, 
motivated exclusively by self-interested concerns, and by the principle of ―might makes 
right,‖ which equates effective power with legitimate power. Thus the Westphalian 
model reflects the realist (or Realpolitik) view that interstate relations are characterized 
by a Hobbesian state of nature
2
 (though, in the background, just war theory did postulate 
some minimal international moral order, derived from an earlier, pre-modern view of 
God‘s kingdom on earth supposedly reflecting a higher moral order). Conflicts between 
states are resolved through force, the use of which, in the absence of any higher authority, 
is not regulated. Thus state sovereignty is the primary principle, and rulers‘ power is left 
unchecked by any universal principle (except sometimes by historically specific and 
nationally limited agreements, such as Magna Carta). The Westphalian maxim ―Cuius 
regio, eius religio‖ (―Whose realm, his religion‖) indicates that unless the state willingly 
chose otherwise, there would be no room on the Westphalian model for minority 
religious (or cultural) rights, let alone secessionist claims: both types of demand could be 
domestically repressed, and the international ―community,‖ being not only virtually 
nonexistent but essentially nonsensical in this context, would have no authority, moral or 
legal, to intervene. 
As a result of the First and Second World Wars, however, states became increasingly 
aware of the enormous costs and dangers of war, and of the need for greater interstate 
cooperation and for the international regulation of some aspects of sovereign states‘ 
conduct. This realization gave rise to the United Nations Charter model of states and their 
interrelations (Held 1992). The United Nations Charter model of international relations 
                                                 
2
 Hobbes‘ Leviathan was published in 1651, just three years after the Treaty of Westphalia. 
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introduces normative considerations of legitimacy and accountability, both of which were 
virtually absent on the Westphalian model. On the United Nations Charter model, states 
are sovereign but may subject themselves voluntarily to certain norms of international 
law by signing treaties, and thereby become accountable to international institutions (for 
example, the International Criminal Court). International law and institutions are 
concerned with the preservation of peace and the protection of human rights, both of 
which entail the regulation of the use of domestic and interstate force, as had been 
anticipated in just war theory. Colonized peoples are granted rights of recognition and 
self-determination. Thus legitimate power is no longer equated with effective power. The 
United Nations Charter model therefore provides a context for raising the normative 
question of secession, even if it does not thereby automatically provide a clear answer to 
that question. 
3.2. The shift in the conception of self-determination 
Secessionists usually argue that the right to secede is grounded in the right of peoples to 
self-determination, as secession, they claim, constitutes one way of exercising self-
determination. But many international lawyers and political theorists dispute the claim 
that the right of peoples to self-determination automatically entails that peoples have a 
right to secede. The principle of self-determination of peoples, recognized in articles 1(2) 
and 55 of the Charter of the United Nations, was originally invoked to justify the right of 
colonized peoples to free themselves from the rule of colonial powers. Based on the 
premises that ―it is as essential to abolish slavery of peoples and nations as of human 
beings‖ and that ―such slavery exists where an alien people hold power over the destiny 
of a people,‖ the right of peoples to self-determination, in the context of decolonization, 
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was defined as ―the right [for peoples] freely to determine their political, economic, 
social, and cultural status‖ (Commission on Human Rights, quoted in Buchheit 1978, 78). 
This formulation of the principle of self-determination seems at first glance to imply that 
national groups in multinational states have a right to secede. But this would be a hasty 
and decontextualized reading of the principle of self-determination as formulated above. 
Indeed, the principle was originally intended to apply only to the case of colonized 
peoples and territories. National minorities in existing multinational states were to be 
protected, not by a general right to secede from an existing state, but by specific minority 
rights implemented within the existing state, such as the right ―to enjoy their own culture, 
to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language‖ (Moskowitz, 
quoted in Buchheit 1978, 84). Thus the right of peoples to self-determination, as set forth 
by the United Nations, is to be understood as the right of colonized peoples to self-
determination, which rules out the possibility of a secessionist interpretation of the 
principle of self-determination (Buchheit 1978, 76-94; Welengama 2000, 255-288). 
This latter point is made even clearer by the historical shift in the understanding of who 
―the peoples‖ are in the right of peoples to self-determination (Moore 1998). To some 
extent, this shift follows the shift from the Westphalian model to the United Nations 
Charter model. Throughout the nineteenth century and up until the end of the First World 
War, the peoples who could exercise self-determination were understood to be ethnic 
groups (i.e. groups sharing a common language, history, culture, etc.) who were 
nationally mobilized (i.e. who wished to be self-governing in virtue of their ethnic or 
national identity).
3
 This ethnic or national conception of peoples gave rise, after the First 
                                                 
3
 In this context, I am using ―ethnic‖ and ―national‖ interchangeably. 
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World War, to the creation of new states, such as Austria and Hungary, whose boundaries 
were fixed along ethnic or national lines. Thus the principle of self-determination of 
peoples was then understood as a principle of national self-determination which entails 
political independence (i.e. independent statehood in virtue of a national identity). By 
contrast, after the Second World War, the peoples who could exercise self-determination 
were no longer taken to be ethnic or national communities. Instead, they were understood 
to be multiethnic or multinational peoples under colonial rule, or majorities within 
discrete political units whose boundaries were drawn regardless of ethnic or national 
criteria. Thus the principle of self-determination of peoples became understood as a 
principle of civic self-determination which entails political independence. In other words, 
in the case of national self-determination, the (ethnic or national identity of the) people 
determines where the boundaries of the political unit should be drawn; whereas in the 
case of civic self-determination, the boundaries of the political unit determine who the 
people is (regardless of ethnic or national identities). Otherwise put, in the case of 
national self-determination, the people exercising self-determination is an ethnos, and 
ethnos and demos are made to coincide; whereas in the case of civic self-determination, 
the people exercising self-determination is a demos, and this demos often comprises 
various ethne. 
Thus the shift from a national to a civic understanding of self-determination reinforces 
the point made earlier that, from the international legal point of view at least, the 
principle underlying the self-determination or political independence of colonized 
peoples (civic self-determination) neither entails nor can be invoked to justify the self-
determination or political independence of national peoples (national self-determination). 
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That is, as far as international law is concerned, the principle of self-determination is to 
be understood as civic self-determination, or self-determination by a demos, and not as 
national self-determination, or self-determination by an ethnos. In other words, self-
determination can be invoked only by peoples in political units whose boundaries are 
already established, not to change the boundaries of existing political units, as is the case 
in secession. 
3.3. The historical and normative importance of self-determination 
That the principle of self-determination was originally intended to apply only to 
colonized peoples and territories, however, does not mean that it could not plausibly be 
extended to apply to secessionist claims. Indeed, the situation of some national minorities 
in existing multinational states is strikingly similar to that of colonized peoples under 
alien rule prior to decolonization: domination by a foreign government, lack of political 
autonomy, economic exploitation, and human rights violations (Buchheit 1978, 18). If 
this is the case, it is unclear why such minorities should not be able to invoke the 
principle of self-determination to free themselves from such rule. As Lee Buchheit puts 
it: 
One searches in vain [...] for any principled justification of why a colonial people 
wishing to cast off the domination of its governors has every moral and legal right 
to do so, but a manifestly distinguishable minority which happens to find itself, 
pursuant to a paragraph in some medieval territorial settlement or through a fiat of 
the cartographers, annexed to an independent State must forever remain without 
the scope of the principle of self-determination. [...] International law is thus 
asked to perceive a distinction between the historical subjugation of an alien 
population living in a different part of the globe and the historical subjugation of 
an alien population living on a piece of land abutting that of its oppressors. The 
former can apparently never be legitimated by the mere passage of time, whereas 
the latter is eventually transformed into a protected status quo. (1978, 17-18) 
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Much of the literature on secession suggests that the restricted use of the principle of self-
determination endorsed by international lawyers and political theorists is motivated 
mainly by the fear of the chaos and violence that would supposedly ensue were 
secessionist claims satisfied (Lehning 1998; Macedo and Buchanan 2003; McKim and 
McMahan 1997; Moore 1998). Thus international lawyers and political theorists tend to 
favor a strong presumption against secession because secessions have historically been 
extremely violent affairs. This is true (at least partly), of course. Still, several things 
should be noted in response to this claim. 
First, there have also been instances of peaceful secession or partition, such as the 
secession of Norway from Sweden in 1905, or the partition of Czechoslovakia in 1993. In 
other words, though secession has in some instances led to much violence (as in the case 
of the dissolution of former Yugoslavia), it need not do so. Second, where the risk of 
violence is real, it is unclear that preventing a group from seceding will cause much less 
violence (as the contemporary case of Sudan illustrates). Third, the creation of new 
international institutions, or the ascription of new functions to existing ones, to arbitrate 
or regulate secession claims, could possibly prevent such violence (Copp 1998). That is, 
the risk of violence might be due less to the mere possibility of satisfying secessionist 
claims when warranted than to the lack of appropriate international institutions and 
processes to handle secessionist claims adequately. Fourth, the question of whether a 
group has a right to secede is distinct from the question of whether it would be 
permissible for that group to exercise that right. That is, the right to secede may in certain 
circumstances be overridden by certain considerations that would make it impermissible 
for the group to exercise that right. Thus even if secession is not inherently violent, the 
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risk of violence should be taken into account when determining the permissibility of 
secession. This latter observation, however, does nothing to undermine the claim that 
international lawyers‘ and political theorists‘ recommendations regarding secession tend 
to be too restrictive, and might even reinforce it. Indeed, in cases where the risk of 
violence is minimal or altogether absent (as it would presumably be in the event of 
Flanders‘ secession from the rest of Belgium, for example), opposing secession seems 
simply to amount to a lack of respect for a group‘s right to self-determination and 
becomes much more difficult to justify. 
What appears from this historical overview is that much normative work remains to be 
done to determine when, if ever, secession is permissible. Such normative work could 
then serve as a guide to international institutional reform, in order to make secessionist 
processes as morally uncontroversial and as peaceful as possible. It is precisely with this 
normative work that I will be concerned in this project. To introduce it, I now turn to its 
methodological underpinnings. 
4. Methodology 
4.1. Project overview 
My goal in this project is to develop a normative theory of secession, i.e. a theory that 
offers a systematic or principled answer to the normative question of secession. As 
mentioned above, secession occurs when a territorially concentrated group breaks away 
from an existing state to form its own independent state, thereby taking away that part of 
the existing state‘s territory which it occupies. The normative question of secession, then, 
asks when it is morally permissible for a group to secede. 
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Current normative theories of secession frame this question as one of political legitimacy: 
i.e. they take it to ask what the moral grounds are for state sovereignty, understood as 
political authority (a state‘s supreme control over its people) and territorial integrity (a 
state‘s supreme control over its territory). This is because these theories focus on the 
challenges that secession raises with regard to state sovereignty, insofar as secession 
removes part of a sovereign state‘s territory and population from that state‘s control, to 
form a new sovereign state. Thus current theories assume that the normative question of 
secession is reducible to the question of political legitimacy, or that determining when it 
is morally permissible for a group to secede depends on determining what makes a state 
legitimate or illegitimate. 
In this project, I challenge the approach taken by all these theories by showing that 
reducing the question of secession to a matter of political legitimacy fails to consider the 
deeper moral values most salient in secession, and therefore yields unconvincing answers 
to the normative question of secession. In contrast to current theories, I argue that an 
adequate theory of secession ought to be based primarily not on the question of political 
legitimacy, but on the moral significance of the more fundamental values most salient in 
the normative question of secession, namely self-determination, justice, and flourishing. 
This is the axiological approach I develop in this project. Through my axiological 
analytical framework, I reframe the normative question of secession in the following 
way: In order to answer the question ―When is it morally permissible for a group to 
secede?‖ I ask not, as current theories of secession do, ―What makes a state legitimate or 
illegitimate?‖ but rather ―What deeper moral values are most salient in the normative 
 15 
 
question of secession?‖ This will become clearer in the rest of this chapter and in Chapter 
2. 
Having briefly described how my axiological approach differs from current normative 
theories of secession, I now turn to the criteria I use to critique these theories, and then 
proceed to my critique of these theories. 
4.2. Criteria for a successful theory of secession 
A philosophical theory of secession seeks to identify the conditions under which it is 
morally permissible for a group to secede. To be successful, such a theory should be 
normatively plausible. I contend that to be normatively plausible, a philosophical theory 
of secession should meet two criteria: comprehensiveness and normative support. 
The criterion of comprehensiveness is a logical requirement. By it, I mean that the theory 
should address all the specific normative questions raised by secession, and not leave out 
any significant issues. Thus the theory should take into account the relevant parameters in 
secession, or be consistent with what secession involves, namely the taking of territory to 
form a new, viable state. This means that a theory of secession should address the 
questions of territorial justification and state viability (both the political and economic 
aspects of state viability). I will return to these questions in more detail in Chapter 2. 
The criterion of normative support is a substantive requirement. By it, I mean that the 
theory should be consistent with, and perhaps even derivable from, core normative 
principles and values of liberal political philosophy. In the case of a normative theory of 
secession, it will be useful to draw from liberal normative principles already embodied in 
international law but whose implications have not yet been fully articulated, and from 
 16 
 
liberal normative values whose significance is already generally acknowledged, but 
whose scope has not yet been fully clarified. For example, some of the reasons that 
justify decolonization further seem to justify certain secessionist claims; framing the 
issue of secession in terms of human rights makes some of its salient aspects more 
evident when determining its permissibility. Similarly, emphasizing the value of self-
determination, to name but one, further helps to establish the permissibility of secession. 
This is true even if principles and values such as human rights and self-determination are 
essentially contested ones, subject to multiple and sometimes divergent interpretations. 
Thus in order to be successful, or normatively plausible, a philosophical theory of 
secession will have to meet the criterion of comprehensiveness (i.e. be consistent with 
what secession involves) and the criterion of normative support (i.e. be consistent with 
key principles and values of liberal political philosophy). In light of these criteria, I now 
turn to the critical assessment of current theories of secession. 
5. Critical assessment of current theories 
Political philosophers have so far offered three main types of normative theory of 
secession: choice theories, just-cause theories, and nationalist theories.
4
 In order to 
identify the conditions under which it is morally permissible for a group to secede, all 
three types of theory start from an account of political legitimacy. Thus all current 
theories reduce the question of secession to the question of legitimacy. 
For choice theories, a state is legitimate if it is viable and respects human rights. Thus 
according to choice theories, any territorially concentrated group that wishes to do so 
                                                 
4 For an example of choice theory, see Wellman 2005. For an example of just-cause theory, see Buchanan 
1991. For an example of nationalist theory, see Margalit and Raz 1990. 
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may secede, regardless of national, ethnic, religious, or other form of identity, provided 
that the new state is viable and respects human rights, i.e. is legitimate. For example, if 
San Fernando Valley wanted to become its own independent state and were able to be 
viable and respect human rights, it would be allowed to secede, because it would form a 
legitimate state. From this we can see that in their account of legitimacy, choice theories 
emphasize the value of political self-determination, or the right a group has to decide who 
will govern it. Thus choice theories approach the question of secession from the point of 
view of the seceding group. This is by far the most permissive type of theory, as it asserts 
that any territorially concentrated group in general (potentially) has a right to secede. 
For just-cause theories, a state is illegitimate if it commits a major injustice, namely, 
severe human rights violations, forcefully seized territory, or discrimination in 
redistribution of resources. Thus according to just-cause theories, a group may secede 
only if it has suffered such an injustice under the larger state, i.e. only if the state from 
which the group wishes to secede is illegitimate. For example, if the Baltic States had 
wanted to secede while they were forcefully included in the former USSR, they would 
have been allowed to do so, because their territory had been forcefully seized by the 
former USSR. Just-cause theories are also called remedial theories because they allow 
secession in order to remedy an unjust situation created by the larger state. Thus just-
cause theories approach the question of secession from the point of view of the remainder 
state, and whether or not it is acting justly. From this we can see that in their account of 
legitimacy, just-cause theories emphasize the value of justice, or the right not to suffer 
tyranny. This is the most restrictive type of theory, as it asserts that only under very 
special circumstances would a group have a right to secede. 
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For nationalist theories, a state is legitimate if the state and its citizens share a common 
national identity. Thus according to nationalist theories, any national group
5
 that wishes 
to do so may secede, in order to create a state whose cultural and political boundaries 
coincide, i.e. to create a legitimate state. For example, if Quebec wanted to secede from 
Canada, it would be allowed to do so, because the Québécois share a national identity. 
From this we can see that in their account of legitimacy, nationalist theories emphasize 
the value of flourishing, which national identity is said to foster. Thus nationalist theories 
approach the question of secession from the point of view of the seceding group. 
Nationalist theories are more restrictive than choice theories (because they ground 
secessionist claims specifically in nationality) but they are more permissive than just-
cause theories (because they regard some secessionist claims as legitimate even in the 
absence of major injustice). 
Based on the criteria of normative support and comprehensiveness laid out above, a 
successful or plausible normative theory of secession must be (1) consistent with the 
basic principles and values of liberal political philosophy; and (2) consistent with what 
secession involves. 
In light of these criteria, choice theories offer two main advantages. First, they emphasize 
the value of self-determination (criterion of normative support: key principle of liberal 
political philosophy). Second, they require that the state be viable (criterion of 
comprehensiveness: consistent with what secession involves, namely the creation of a 
                                                 
5
 Nationalist theories offer several definitions of a national group; but some overlap may be captured by 
understanding a national group as a group that shares a common language, culture, history, territory – 
though all of these elements may not be exhaustive or sufficient, and each of these elements may not be 
necessary. Examples of national groups include the Québécois in Canada, the Flemish in Belgium, or the 
Catalans in Spain. 
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viable state) and respect human rights (criterion of normative support: key principle of 
liberal political philosophy). The main problem of choice theories is that they cannot 
justify the seceding group‘s claim to appropriate the territory that it is taking away 
(criterion of comprehensiveness: inconsistent with what secession involves, namely 
taking a territory; and criterion of normative support: territorial integrity as key principle 
of liberal political philosophy).
6
 
Just-cause theories offer two main advantages. First, they emphasize the value of justice, 
understood as respect of human rights (criterion of normative support: key principle of 
liberal political philosophy). Second, they are able to justify the territorial claim of the 
seceding group, by arguing that, because of its injustice, the current state loses 
jurisdiction over the territory (criterion of comprehensiveness: consistent with what 
secession involves, namely taking a territory; and criterion of normative support: 
territorial integrity as key principle of liberal political philosophy). The main problems of 
just-cause theories are (1) their neglect of the question of state viability (criterion of 
comprehensiveness: inconsistent with what secession involves, namely the creation of a 
viable state); and (2) their reliance on a very minimal or narrow definition of justice to 
determine when it is permissible for a group to secede. Only when a group has suffered a 
major injustice (such as major human rights violations) is its secession permissible. This 
means that the secessionist claims of groups that have not suffered that kind of injustice 
(for example, the Québécois) are automatically dismissed as unwarranted. Yet to claim 
that those groups have not suffered an injustice is to beg the question, since precisely 
                                                 
6
 One might suggest that territorial integrity is not necessarily a liberal principle, i.e. that it might likewise 
be claimed by other philosophical traditions. This observation is compatible with my present analysis, as 
the criterion of normative support requires consistency with principles that are (also) liberal, not necessarily 
with principles that are only liberal. 
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what is at issue is whether such groups might have suffered an injustice in being denied 
the right to secede. Thus the minimal or narrow conception of justice that just-cause 
theories use is arguably inconsistent with the liberal principle of self-determination 
(criterion of normative support: self-determination as key principle of liberal political 
philosophy). 
Nationalist theories offer two main advantages. First, they emphasize the value of 
flourishing (criterion of normative support: widely recognized value). Second, they are 
able to justify the territorial claim of the seceding group, by legitimating acquisition of 
the land on the grounds of having lived on it and shaped it (criterion of 
comprehensiveness: consistent with what secession involves, namely taking a territory; 
and criterion of normative support: territorial integrity as key principle of liberal political 
philosophy). The main problems of nationalist theories are: First, their neglect of the 
question of economic viability, which undermines a group‘s ability to flourish, for 
example through the creation or maintenance of cultural or political institutions (criterion 
of comprehensiveness: inconsistent with what secession involves, namely the creation of 
a viable state; and criterion of normative support: flourishing as key principle of liberal 
political philosophy). Second, nationalist theories risk encouraging nationalist extremism, 
for example ethnic cleansing or forced assimilation of minorities – both of which violate 
the principle of protection of universal human rights (criterion of normative support: 
human rights as key principle of liberal political philosophy). 
To review, assessed in terms of comprehensiveness and normative support, current 
theories offer two main types of advantage. First, they respectively emphasize certain 
moral values: namely, self-determination (choice theories), justice (just-cause theories), 
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and flourishing (nationalist theories). Second, they respectively attend to certain 
normative constraints: namely, state viability (choice theories), respect of human rights 
(choice and just-cause theories), and territorial justification (just-cause and nationalist 
theories). Each theory focuses on one of those moral values and on one or two of those 
normative constraints. The problems of current theories are that they each neglect at least 
one of the normative constraints and thereby yield inadequate answers to the normative 
question of secession (choice theories neglect territorial justification; just-cause theories 
neglect state viability and non-remedial claims; and nationalist theories neglect state 
viability and human rights). 
6. Beyond political legitimacy: The axiological approach 
In this project, I argue that the problems the theories face are due to their misconstruing 
the moral values on which they respectively rely; and that this in turn is due to the fact 
that they reduce the normative question of secession to the question of political 
legitimacy, which they associate with only one moral value. In other words, by starting 
from the question of political legitimacy, each theory focuses primarily on only one 
particular moral value, and thus either ignores or does not give due weight to the other 
two values. As a result, each theory ends up with an inadequate conception of the 
particular moral value it does invoke. This inadequate conception in turn gives rise to the 
problems each theory faces, i.e. pushes each theory to neglect at least one of the 
normative constraints. 
This points to the desirability of reframing the philosophical debate on secession. In other 
words, in starting from the question of political legitimacy, the respective perspectives of 
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current theories are partial and incomplete, and this is why they yield morally inadequate 
answers to the normative question of secession. Thus we need a theory that takes all three 
values into account, and gives due weight to each of them. That is, we need an account 
that treats the normative question of secession within a more comprehensive and 
adequate moral framework. In this project, I argue that developing such an account, i.e. 
providing a morally more plausible answer to the normative question of secession, 
requires starting not from an account of political legitimacy, but instead from the three 
values of self-determination, justice, and flourishing (even if an account of political 
legitimacy might subsequently be derived from them). 
Thus in this project I develop an axiological theory of secession, which focuses primarily 
on the values of self-determination, justice, and flourishing as they relate to the normative 
question of secession. In providing its answer to the normative question of secession: 
―When is it morally permissible for a group to secede?‖ this axiological analytical 
framework shifts the focus away from the question: ―What makes a state legitimate or 
illegitimate?‖ to the prior, more fundamental question: ―What deeper moral values are 
most salient in the normative question of secession?‖ 
Chapter 2 specifies the way in which the three values of self-determination, justice, and 
flourishing are most salient in the question of secession. It identifies the conditions under 
which it would be permissible for a group to secede (territorial justification, adequate 
protection of basic rights, and economic viability); and it articulates the link between 
these three permissibility conditions and the three values. It shows that the three 
conditions are ultimately grounded in the three values, and that, conversely, fulfilling the 
permissibility conditions in turn promotes those three values. 
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Because the normative question of secession should be analyzed primarily in terms of 
those three values, Chapters 3, 4, and 5 focus primarily on the values of self-
determination (choice theories), justice (just-cause theories), and flourishing (nationalist 
theories) as they relate to the normative question of secession. My axiological approach 
analyzes all three values in terms of two guiding questions: (i) What is the adequate 
conception of each value as it relates to the normative question of secession? (ii) What is 
the appropriate weight of each value vis-à-vis the other two as it relates to the normative 
question of secession? Chapters 3, 4, and 5 show that the answer to (i) is contingent on 
the answer to (ii): i.e. that adequately conceptualizing each value, in order to offer a 
morally plausible answer to the normative question of secession, requires balancing it 
against the other two, so that no one value is ever prioritized over the other two. More 
precisely, these three chapters show that focusing on any one of the three values without 
also considering the other two results in the unequal treatment of certain groups or 
people. In other words, self-determination, justice, and flourishing, in the context of 
secession, are most adequately conceived as requiring equal consideration of different 
groups‘ rights and interests.  
Thus in conceptualizing the three values most salient in secession in a morally more 
plausible way, Chapters 3, 4, and 5 show that equal participation and consideration in a 
group‘s decision-making process provides a criterion for assessing competing 
interpretations of self-determination, justice, and flourishing. In Chapter 6, I sketch a 
democratic axiological theory of secession, i.e. suggest that a democratic framework, 
because of its fundamental commitment to equality, seems most promising to give due 
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weight to the three values that justify secession, as they are conceptualized in the 
previous chapters. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Determining the Permissibility of Secession: Toward an Axiological Approach 
 
 
1. The desirability of a new analytical framework 
The critical assessment of current theories of secession in Chapter 1 showed that the 
philosophical debate on secession ought to be reframed, i.e. that the normative question 
of secession ought to be analyzed in different terms. I suggested that a normative theory 
of secession ought not to start from the question of political legitimacy, because this type 
of approach provides only a partial and incomplete perspective on the question of 
secession.  Instead, I suggested that a normative theory of secession ought to start from 
the deeper moral values that are most salient in secession (self-determination, justice, and 
flourishing), because this axiological approach offers a more comprehensive and 
adequate perspective on the question of secession. 
In this chapter, I turn to the axiological approach and show how the three values of self-
determination, justice, and flourishing are most salient in the normative question of 
secession. To do so, I go back to this question, which asks under what conditions it is 
morally permissible for a group to secede. I argue that there are three conditions that are 
each necessary and jointly sufficient for secession to be permissible: territorial 
justification, adequate protection of basic rights, and economic viability. In other words, I 
argue that it is morally permissible for a group to secede if and only if it has a valid 
territorial claim and is able to protect its citizens‘ basic rights and to be economically 
viable, without undermining the remainder state‘s ability to protect its citizens‘ basic 
rights and to be economically viable. I show that these three conditions are required 
because if we do not require them, we will hinder certain groups‘ ability to exercise self-
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determination and to flourish in just circumstances. In other words, the three conditions 
that determine the permissibility of secession are grounded in the three values of self-
determination, justice, and flourishing. That is what I mean when I say that those three 
values are most salient in secession. 
Let‘s start with my thesis in this chapter, namely that it is morally permissible for a group 
to secede if and only if it has a valid territorial claim and is able to protect its citizens‘ 
basic rights and to be economically viable, without undermining the remainder state‘s 
ability to protect its citizens‘ basic rights and to be economically viable. This thesis is 
justified by the two criteria of comprehensiveness and normative support, introduced in 
Chapter 1. I start with the criterion of comprehensiveness, and then turn to the criterion of 
normative support. 
2. Comprehensiveness: The logical relevance of the permissibility conditions 
Recall that according to the criterion of comprehensiveness, a successful theory of 
secession must address all the relevant parameters in secession, i.e. start from what 
secession logically involves. Because secession by definition involves the taking of 
territory to form a new, viable state, a theory of secession should address the questions of 
territorial justification and state viability (and both the political and economic aspects of 
state viability). Following the criterion of comprehensiveness, then, secession cannot be 
permissible unless three conditions are met: 
 (1) Territorial justification: The seceding group must show that it has a legitimate claim 
to the territory it is taking, which the remainder state does not have. Without such a 
claim, it would violate that state‘s territorial integrity by taking away part of its territory.  
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(2) Adequate protection of basic rights: Both new and remainder states must provide 
adequate protection of their citizens‘ basic rights. This protection requirement is 
grounded in the equal moral value of individuals. It is the equal moral value of 
individuals that grounds their basic rights, and these rights warrant protection. Because 
each individual deserves to have her rights protected, justice requires the equal protection 
of all individuals‘ basic rights. 
(3) Economic viability: Both new and remainder states must be economically viable. 
Adequate protection of rights requires appropriate institutions to ensure effective 
protection of all citizens‘ rights. This in turn requires economic means. It would therefore 
be morally unacceptable for a group to secede, if by seceding it undermined its own or 
the remainder state‘s economic viability. 
I want to argue that the three conditions of territorial justification, adequate protection, 
and economic viability are each necessary and jointly sufficient for secession to be 
permissible, not only because (1) requiring those three conditions meets the criterion of 
comprehensiveness, i.e. addresses the relevant parameters in secession (namely the 
territorial, political, and economic aspects of secession); but also because (2) requiring 
those three conditions meets the criterion of normative support, i.e. ensures that different 
groups are able to exercise self-determination and to flourish in just circumstances. 
This will become clearer in the next section, which is concerned with elucidating the 
substantive meaning (as opposed to the mere logical relevance) of each of the three 
conditions. Doing so will show how requiring those three conditions fosters those three 
values, or how the three conditions (territorial justification, adequate protection, and 
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economic viability) are grounded in the three values (self-determination, justice, and 
flourishing). For logical progression purposes, I begin with economic viability, then turn 
to adequate protection, and finally to territorial justification. 
3. Normative support: The substantive meaning of the permissibility conditions 
3.1. Economic viability 
Secessionists must show that by seceding, they undermine neither their own nor the 
remainder state‘s economic viability. This is because justice or adequate protection of 
rights requires appropriate institutions to ensure effective protection of all citizens‘ rights, 
and this in turn requires economic means. Economic viability is further required by a 
group‘s ability to exercise self-determination, for example with regard to the creation or 
maintenance of political or cultural institutions, on which a group‘s flourishing directly 
depends. 
Economic viability means that the state is able to have an economy that allows it to 
sustain the institutions needed for adequate protection. Thus economic viability should 
not be understood as economic autarky (economic independence and self-sufficiency). 
Economic autarky would be both a mostly unrealistic and unnecessary expectation. Even 
if the remainder state‘s economy will almost inevitably be affected by secession, since 
secession involves the taking of territory and thus of people and resources, this will not 
necessarily affect the remainder state‘s economic viability. This is important because, as 
Buchanan explains, there is no right to any particular economic status quo (1991, 92). If 
there were such a right, then secession would hardly ever be permissible: such a 
condition would automatically bias the procedure for determining the permissibility of 
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secession in favor of the status quo. Likewise, Gauthier argues that changes in economies 
of scale are to be expected after secession, but that such changes, by themselves, do not 
warrant opposing secession (1994, 366). Similarly, a drop in overall levels of economic 
well-being would not in itself constitute a valid reason against the permissibility of 
secession. Only in cases where drops in overall levels of wealth are such that the state is 
thereby unable to sustain the institutions required for adequate protection should 
secession be impermissible, at least until arrangements have been made to prevent the 
remainder state‘s economic and political non-viability. Finally, even if the remainder 
state is economically viable, it should be given economic compensation if it invested 
many resources in the territory that is now breaking away (for example, building a port in 
a coastal area that now wishes to secede), much like a couple getting a divorce would 
have to split between both spouses all assets acquired during marriage as fairly as 
possible. 
One important qualification to the condition of economic viability might arise when the 
seceding group has suffered a major injustice under the larger state (for example, severe 
human rights violations). To show why such circumstances might warrant qualifying the 
requirement of economic viability, let‘s again use the analogy between secession and 
divorce. If a wife seeks a divorce in order to escape an abusive husband, it would seem 
absurd to say that she may get a divorce only if her husband will be able to make it 
financially on his own after the divorce, and only if she will be able to make it financially 
on her own after the divorce. Yet requiring both new and remainder states to be 
economically viable even in cases where the seceding group has been the victim of a 
major injustice in the state it is seeking to leave would be tantamount to forcing a wife to 
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remain with an abusive husband on the grounds that either one or both of them would not 
be able to make it financially on their own after the divorce – and this clearly seems 
mistaken. 
Therefore, in cases where the seceding group has suffered a major injustice under the 
larger state, the requirement of economic viability needs to be approached differently, 
both for the new and for the remainder state. I want to suggest that in such circumstances, 
international institutions should play a special role if the new state were to be 
economically non-viable on its own after secession. One reasonable option in this case 
would be for international institutions to lend economic support appropriately to the new 
state for a given period of time, during which the new state would have to make every 
effort possible to become economically viable. Such a temporary arrangement would 
avoid forcing the victims of injustice to remain at the hands of their abuser, while at the 
same time securing their economic viability, which is crucial since it is necessary for 
adequate protection. 
What about the economic viability of the remainder state, which in this case would have 
committed a major injustice toward the secessionist group? As was just mentioned, in 
cases of remedial secession, requiring that the remainder state be economically viable on 
its own after secession for secession to be permissible, would amount to forcing an 
abused partner to remain with an abusive partner on the grounds that the latter‘s finances 
would be precarious after the divorce. At the same time, however, extending international 
support to the (injustice-perpetrating) remainder state, in the same way as was just 
suggested for the new state, would seem to reward the remainder state‘s injustice in a 
―perverse-incentive‖ sort of way. In order to avoid both of these types of problematic 
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situation, one reasonable exception to the condition of economic viability must be made, 
even if this might undermine the remainder state‘s economic viability. The lack of 
international assistance might here be compared to the way that individual states punish 
individual citizens for violating the rights of others, or to the use of certain economic 
sanctions in the international arena.
7
 
3.2. Adequate protection of basic rights 
For a state to provide adequate protection is for it to protect all its citizens‘ basic rights 
equally. As mentioned earlier, because those basic rights are grounded in the equal moral 
value of individuals, they warrant protection and such protection is a matter of justice. 
However, individuals whose basic rights are violated not only suffer an injustice, but an 
injustice that hinders them in their ability to flourish and to exercise self-determination. 
Western liberal political philosophers further overwhelmingly consider adequate 
protection of basic rights to be the primary justification and function of an entity like the 
state.
8
 Because seceding involves creating a new state, secessionists must show that by 
seceding, they undermine neither their own nor the remainder state‘s ability to provide 
adequate protection of rights. 
Given this requirement, what are we to make of cases where a group‘s secession results 
in rendering minorities left behind in the remainder state particularly vulnerable to 
oppression by the remainder state? If the minority left in the remainder state belongs to 
                                                 
7
 This is not to say that economic sanctions as an international mechanism do not themselves raise a host of 
issues. One important such issue arises when such sanctions have an impact only on an innocent population 
rather than on the actual target of such sanctions, namely the regime in power. If a similar situation were to 
present itself in the case of remedial secession, international support of the remainder state might then be 
justifiable, perhaps contingent on a change of regime. 
8
 See all social contract theories from Hobbes and Locke to Rawls and Nozick; Mill 1972 (1861), 1989 
(1859); Buchanan 1991, 2002; Christiano 2006; Wellman 2005; Wellman and Altman 2009. 
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the same group as the one that seceded, or if there is at least no hostility between the 
minority and the seceded group, then a possible, if not ideal, solution would be for the 
minority to join the seceded group in its new independent state, and thereby escape 
oppression from the remainder state. If, however, there also is hostility between the 
minority and the seceded group, or if the minority is otherwise unable to join the seceded 
group in its new independent state, then matters become more complicated. On the one 
hand, if the minority‘s situation in the remainder state gets worse as a result of the 
group‘s secession, then it would seem that the seceding group is at least indirectly (or 
causally) responsible for worsening the minority‘s situation in the remainder state. On the 
other hand, however, it would seem unjust to prevent a group from seceding because of 
what the remainder state might do to the minority left behind (this would seem to be a 
problem between the remainder state and the minority, not involving the seceding group), 
especially if the seceding group is itself trying to escape oppression in the larger state. 
This sort of considerations should be taken into account when determining the 
permissibility of secession, especially with regard to adequate protection, which, in the 
type of case under consideration, is not being properly provided by the state. 
In such circumstances, one reasonable option would be that it would still be morally 
permissible for the group to secede (especially if it is trying to escape oppression), but 
that international institutions would have a responsibility to ensure that the situation of 
the minority left behind in the remainder state does not get worse.
9
 And perhaps the 
seceding group, which presumably would be in the international spotlight, would have a 
special obligation to call international attention to the situation of the minority in the 
                                                 
9
 This is not to say that the R2P doctrine has been fully worked out or might not be problematic in some 
respects. 
 33 
 
remainder state. This type of solution (international support in providing adequate 
protection) is consistent with Article 24 of the UN Charter, which confers upon the 
Security Council the ―primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace 
and security,‖ in order ―to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations‖ 
(Charter of the United Nations). We moreover find similar international involvement in 
the transitional UN administration of Kosovo; NATO‘s K-FOR peacekeeping force in 
Kosovo (started in 1999 with 10,000 troops); and the European Rule of Law Mission in 
Kosovo (EULEX) to assist Kosovo in its rule of law (started in 2008 with 2,000 
civilians).
10
 This type of solution would avoid forcing the secessionists to remain within a 
state they wish to leave (especially if they are being oppressed) while at the same time 
securing adequate protection for minorities left behind in the remainder state. 
Having clarified this aspect of the condition of adequate protection, I now turn to another 
aspect of that condition, namely the relation between adequate protection and statehood. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, a state is a politically organized, politically independent, and 
territorially bounded entity that is sovereign; and state sovereignty refers to a state‘s 
supreme control over its territory and the people who live on that territory. Thus there is a 
central territorial dimension to the state, and this territorial dimension is directly related 
to the state‘s function of adequate protection. 
Indeed, to be able to enforce respect of rights effectively, the state must be territorially 
defined. This is because disputes often arise between parties within a certain spatial 
proximity, and to adjudicate between the claims of the parties involved, the competent 
entity must have legitimate authority over both parties. Thus territoriality circumscribes 
                                                 
10
 For more on K-FOR and EULEX see http://www.nato.int/kfor/ and http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/en/front/ 
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the legitimate jurisdiction of the state, or the territory within which the state can 
legitimately enforce respect of rights, thereby making it possible for the state to provide 
adequate protection. That is, the territoriality of the state is not a mere incidental 
contingency, it is a necessary condition for the state to be able to provide adequate
 
protection (Wellman 2005, 14-15).
11
 
To review, the state‘s function is to protect all its citizens‘ basic rights, and such 
protection in turn requires that states be territorially defined. Therefore, if secessionists 
wish to create their own state, they will have to show that their new state is able to 
provide adequate protection, which requires having a legitimate claim to the territory. 
The fact that adequate protection requires territoriality of course does not mean that the 
ability to justify the territorial claim necessarily entails the ability to provide adequate 
protection, nor that, conversely, the ability to provide adequate protection necessarily 
entails the ability to justify the territorial claim.
12
 
3.3. Territorial justification 
Secession is controversial importantly because it challenges a state‘s territorial integrity. 
Yet in a post-Westphalian state order, a state‘s territory is no longer viewed as belonging 
to the ruler (the king or the prince), but rather to the people (Bishai 2004, 74-75). The 
state, then, with regard to its territory, is acting merely as the agent of the people 
(Buchanan 1991, 108-109). In this sense, territorial integrity should be understood not as 
a state‘s property right, but as a state‘s jurisdictional power over its territory, a power 
granted to the state by the people. Thus what grounds legitimate control over the territory 
                                                 
11
 This is why even a libertarian like Nozick turns the dominant protection agency into the minimal state 
(see Nozick 1974). 
12
 For more on this question, see Chapter 3. 
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is legitimate authority over the people. In other words, if a state does not have legitimate 
authority over some of its people, it also does not have legitimate control over some of its 
territory. If it can be shown that the state does not have legitimate authority over some of 
its people, then it would seem that this group should be able to leave with its territory if it 
so wishes. I now offer two different justifications for taking part of a state‘s territory, 
each corresponding to one way in which a state does not have legitimate political 
authority over some of its population: one is the argument from injustice, the other the 
argument from self-determination and flourishing. 
3.3.1. The argument from injustice 
According to the argument from injustice, when the state commits a severe injustice 
toward a territorially concentrated part of its population, the state fails to fulfill its 
function or to provide adequate protection to that group. The state therefore loses 
legitimate political authority over that group, and thus its control over the territory that 
this group occupies. Because the territory really belongs to the people, the group in turn 
acquires or recovers legitimate control over its territory, and so would be able to justify 
its territorial claim, should it want to secede (Buchanan 1991, 44-45). 
Here one might ask whether groups that are not territorially concentrated but that are the 
victims of state-perpetrated injustice might also have certain legitimate territorial claims, 
as a result of the injustice suffered (consider, for example, the argument made in the 
1960‘s by Black Power advocates that a separate Black State should be established in the 
US South). Thus far I have been assuming that the secessionist group is an already 
territorially concentrated group. Insofar as the argument from injustice relies on the 
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injustice suffered by the group, however, it seems that the argument from injustice could 
also apply to non-territorially concentrated groups who have been the victims of similar 
injustice. Indeed, it is the injustice suffered, rather than the fact that the group happens to 
be territorially concentrated, that gives the group a legitimate territorial claim. 
To this one might object that it is the injustice suffered in addition to the fact that the 
group is territorially concentrated, that gives the group a legitimate claim to a certain 
territory. To see why this objection is mistaken, that is, why it is only the injustice 
suffered, regardless of the fact that the group is territorially concentrated, that gives the 
group a legitimate claim to a certain territory, it is useful to frame the issue from the 
position of the existing state, rather than from the position of the group. That is, it is first 
and foremost because the state commits a major injustice toward a part of its population 
that it loses legitimate political authority over that group, and thereby forfeits its right to 
the territory which that group occupies. Whether or not the group is territorially 
concentrated does not in any way alter the fact that the injustice committed by the state 
means that the state loses legitimate political authority over that group. 
Of course, if the group is already territorially concentrated, that is, if it already occupies a 
discrete portion of the existing state‘s territory, this will make it easier to determine to 
which part of the state‘s territory the group has a legitimate claim, should it wish to 
secede due to major injustice. But it is important to keep in mind that the state sometimes 
commits major injustice toward non-territorially concentrated groups, and that if, as a 
result of this injustice, such a group wished to form its own independent state in order to 
enjoy adequate protection, the state, having lost its legitimate authority over that group 
which occupies parts of its territory, would thereby forfeit its right to a contiguous part of 
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its territory equivalent to the different non-contiguous parts of its territory occupied by 
the group toward which it has committed an injustice. This is because, as explained under 
the condition of adequate protection, independent statehood requires adequate protection, 
which in turn requires territorial contiguity. Thus if a group that has been the victim of 
state injustice wished to form its own independent state in order to enjoy adequate 
protection, it would (at least in theory) be owed a contiguous part of that state‘s territory, 
since adequate protection requires territorial contiguity. 
This is not to say that this will always be actually feasible in practice, however. One 
obvious major difficulty is that no (minimally attractive or viable) territory today is 
unoccupied, and that the interests of current occupants also need to be taken into account. 
This means that finding a piece of territory on which the non-territorially concentrated 
victims of state-perpetrated injustice might create their own independent state might turn 
out to be impossible. Still, this empirical, contingent fact should not make us lose sight of 
the normative issue presently at stake: namely, that for a state to lose legitimate authority 
over a part of its population means for it to forfeit its right over the territory, whether 
contiguous or not, which that group occupies. The lack of practical applicability just 
mentioned by no means erases the injustice that non-territorially concentrated groups 
may have suffered, nor does it imply that these groups are therefore not owed other forms 
of compensation or reparation. Rather, this lack of practical applicability simply means 
that these groups‘ territorial claim, legitimate though it may otherwise be, is overridden 
by current occupants‘ territorial claim. 
In any event, a territorially concentrated group that has not suffered a major injustice (e.g. 
Quebec) might nonetheless deem that it should no longer be included in the larger state, 
 38 
 
for example because it would better flourish if it had its own independent state, because 
independent statehood would allow the group more fully to enjoy self-determination. 
This brings me to the argument from self-determination and flourishing. 
3.3.2. The argument from self-determination and flourishing 
Even in the absence of major human rights violations, the state arguably may not have 
legitimate authority over such groups. Here one might point to an important similarity 
between the situation of such groups and that of colonized peoples: namely, being 
prevented from fully exercising political self-determination because of questionable 
boundaries. In other words, both types of groups are being prevented from exercising the 
fullest degree of political self-determination because of the way boundaries were drawn. 
Here it might be objected, following a passage from Rawls‘ Law of Peoples regarding the 
character and role of boundaries, that: 
It does not follow from the fact that boundaries are historically arbitrary that their 
role […] cannot be justified. On the contrary, to fix on their arbitrariness is to fix 
on the wrong thing. In the absence of a world-state, there must be boundaries of 
some kind, which when viewed in isolation will seem arbitrary, and depend to 
some degree on historical circumstances. (1999, 39, emphasis in original) 
But note that Rawls‘ argument is merely a justification for the existence of boundaries in 
general (―there must be boundaries…‖), not a justification for any specific set of 
boundaries (―…boundaries of some kind‖). By contrast, my present point regarding the 
analogy between non-remedial secessionists and colonized peoples targets not the very 
existence of boundaries in general, but rather specific current boundaries. Indeed, 
secession involves redrawing boundaries, not dispensing with them altogether. Moreover, 
Rawls seems to conflate the historically contingent character of boundaries with their 
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arbitrary character, suggesting that the former automatically results in the latter. Yet 
different historical circumstances may yield different sets of boundaries that are more or 
less arbitrary. Indeed, at least some (historically contingent) cases of secession can 
plausibly be viewed as attempts to redraw boundaries in a less arbitrary or morally more 
justifiable way. Thus the Rawlsian objection is both irrelevant and inaccurate in the 
context of my analogy. 
In light of this analogy between non-remedial secessionists and colonized peoples, the 
secessionist group might have a valid claim to the territory it currently occupies if it 
already occupied it before the current political unit was formed.
13
 In this case, the state 
loses its authority over the territory not because of a major injustice, but because that 
portion of territory was ―always‖ that group‘s to begin with, and that group now wishes 
to be self-governing in that territory. This is the principle that the territory really belongs 
to the people, rather than to the state (Bishai 2004, 74-75; Buchanan 1991, 108-109). 
But does this principle mean that the entire territory belongs to the entire population, in 
virtue of the political union, or rather that each portion of territory belongs to each 
portion of the population that occupies it? If the latter, secessionists could easily justify 
their territorial claims; but if the former, then secessionists might be unable to justify 
                                                 
13
 Here one might ask what makes a secessionist group the ―same‖ group over time. The individual 
members of a group may of course change without thereby affecting the existence of the group over time. 
This is clear if one looks at the continuity of various groups over time, such as states (the United States), 
universities (the University of Colorado), corporations (AT&T), or sports teams (the Rockies). These 
groups persist despite the changing composition of their membership. The same is true of secessionist 
groups (Quebec or Flanders). Now one might point out that membership in a state, university, corporation, 
or sport team depends on certain objective criteria or relations such as living in, studying at, working for, or 
playing for; and ask what the equivalent criteria or relations would be for secessionist groups. I want to 
suggest that the relevant criterion or relation in this case is mutual recognition as members of group X 
(ancestry, birth, residence, or cultural identity may be additional factors, but I believe that none of them are 
necessary or sufficient to determine membership in a group X through time). 
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their territorial claims, as it is highly unlikely that the remainder of the population will let 
them leave with a part of territory that also belongs to them. 
Since secession is famously referred to as political divorce, we might illuminate this 
question by looking at marriage. The claim is that because of the political union, the 
entire territory belongs to the entire population. This is much like the principle of 
community property in marriage, which regards the property acquired in marriage as 
belonging to both spouses. But the principle of community property also stipulates that 
whatever property was acquired respectively by each spouse before their union remains 
their separate property, even if they may otherwise decide to enjoy it jointly in virtue of 
their union. Thus if the couple were to divorce, they may have to split as fairly as 
possible all property acquired during marriage, but whatever they had respectively 
acquired on their own before their union would remain theirs and they would have the 
right to exit the union and go their separate ways with their respective pre-marriage 
property.
14
 
Thus even if the entire territory is said to belong to the entire population in virtue of the 
political union, if secessionists can show that they already occupied their territory before 
entering the political union, then it is unclear that the remainder of the population would 
have a right to prevent the secessionists from taking a piece of territory that was already 
                                                 
14
 One might object that using the principle of community property to build this analogy is question-
begging: Why pick this principle rather than other possible principles of marriage contracts? Here I can 
only point to the fact that, in liberal democracies, the principle of community property is most often the 
default type of marriage contract, because it constitutes a middle-ground between the two extremes of 
complete merging and complete separation of assets. Thus the burden of proof here is on those claiming 
that a more extreme principle should be used. (Of course, opting for complete separation of assets would 
only reinforce the secessionists‘ case.) 
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theirs before the political unit was formed. Secessionists, then, would have a valid 
territorial claim. 
This of course would only apply to cases where it is relatively clear which group 
occupies (and has occupied) which part of the territory – for example, the Québécois 
occupy the province of Quebec, the Flemish the region of Flanders (and the same was 
true of Norway before it seceded from Sweden in 1905, or of the Czechs and the Slovaks 
before they parted ways in 1993). Such groups already occupied their territory before the 
larger country in which they were included was formed, and have continuously occupied 
the same territory, which makes those territorial claims much easier to justify. In cases 
where populations are intermingled, or where more ancient and more recent occupants 
each claim to have a valid claim to the same territory, matters become more complicated. 
If possible, the two groups might try to divide the territory as fairly as possible, perhaps 
through the help of international mediation. Where territorial division is no longer 
feasible (as in the case of the entire American continent), compensation or reparation 
toward the native populations is probably the next best option. This is not to say that the 
native group does not have a legitimate claim to the territory it once occupied, but simply 
that its claim is overridden by the interests of the people who currently live on the land, 
namely, all the descendants of European and other migrants for whom that land is the 
only home they know and have. This in turn is not to say that the injustice the group 
suffered is thereby erased, or that it no longer warrants compensation or reparation; but 
rather that restitution of the exact territory is, for better or worse, no longer a feasible 
option. 
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3.3.3. Some objections 
To review, then, legitimate authority over the people is what grounds legitimate control 
over the territory. In the two previous sections, I offered two types of justification for 
taking away part of an existing state‘s territory: the argument from injustice and the 
argument from self-determination and flourishing. Each argument corresponds to one 
way of denying the legitimacy of a state‘s authority over part of its population. According 
to the argument from injustice, the territorial claim is justified because perpetration by the 
state of a major injustice toward a group makes the state forfeit its authority over that 
group and thereby over the territory that this group occupies. According to the argument 
from self-determination and flourishing, the territorial claim is justified because the group 
has continuously occupied that portion of territory since before the political unit in which 
it is currently included was formed, and this group now wishes to be self-governing in 
that territory, because independent statehood would allow the group better to flourish and 
more fully to enjoy self-determination. 
Looking at these two possible types of justification of territorial claims (the argument 
from injustice and the argument from self-determination and flourishing), one might 
object that the latter, according to which a group that has suffered no major injustice 
would have a legitimate claim to its territory if it already occupied it before the current 
political unit was formed, seems to rely on a rather weak conception of sovereignty. I will 
call this objection the weak-sovereignty objection. According to the weak-sovereignty 
objection, state sovereignty can be viewed in either one of two ways. Either the state acts 
as a landlord and the people, then, are just the tenants of the land, in which case a group 
seeking to secede would automatically be unable to justify its territorial claims; or the 
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people are the owners of the land and the state, then, simply acts as a steward or 
watchman, in which case a group seeking to secede would automatically be able to justify 
its territorial claims (as seems to be the case with the argument from self-determination 
and flourishing). Each account, then, seems automatically biased either against or in 
favor of secession. On either account, the problem of secession is automatically solved. 
In other words, the ―problem‖ of secession is not truly a problem. 
I want to argue that the weak-sovereignty objection fails, for three reasons. First, I rebut 
the claim that, if the objection is correct, the problem of secession turns out to be a non-
problem. Second, I address the claim that the conception of sovereignty invoked to 
support the argument from self-determination is problematically weak. Third, I refute the 
claim that the ―weak‖ conception of sovereignty automatically settles the question of 
territorial justification. Let‘s look at each of these three reasons in turn. 
First, recall that the question of sovereignty arises in the context of justifying territorial 
claims. Yet territorial justification is but one of three conditions which I have argued 
must be met for secession to be morally permissible. Thus even if the question of 
territorial justification seems to be automatically settled by accepting a ―weak‖ 
conception of sovereignty, this would not yet establish the permissibility of secession, as 
the two further conditions of adequate protection and economic viability must equally be 
fulfilled for secession to be permissible. This means that even on a ―weak‖ conception of 
sovereignty, the question of secession would not automatically be settled. Thus the 
problem of secession remains. 
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Second, as mentioned above, the landlord model of the state, according to which the land 
belongs to the ruler or ruling entity, corresponds to a Westphalian conception of 
sovereignty. By contrast, the steward-watchman model of the state, according to which 
the land really belongs to the people, and the state is just the agent of the people, 
corresponds to a post-Westphalian conception of sovereignty. Moreover, as mentioned in 
Chapter 1, a post-Westphalian model introduces normative considerations of legitimacy 
and accountability, which are virtually absent on the Westphalian model. I therefore favor 
the post-Westphalian model over the Westphalian model. That a consequence of the post-
Westphalian conception of sovereignty, or of the steward-watchman model of the state, is 
that it makes it possible or easier for secessionists to justify their territorial claims, does 
not seem to warrant rejecting that model. Of course, within the post-Westphalian model, 
we must specify under what conditions the land is said to belong to the people, or under 
what conditions a people can claim that a land belongs to them. A group‘s ability to show 
that it already occupied that portion of the land before the political unit was formed (as is 
required in the argument from self-determination and flourishing, which is the target of 
the weak-sovereignty objection), however, seems to provide one plausible such 
condition.
15
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 Here it might be asked whether people who occupied the land before the political unit was formed but 
who have since then been displaced or otherwise been the victims of injustice (as in the case of the native 
populations of North America) would have a legitimate claim to the land that was once theirs. My answer 
here would have to be both affirmative and negative. It is affirmative because, as I explained earlier (see 
section 3.3.1. on the argument from injustice), having been the victims of a major injustice (regardless of 
whether the group is currently territorially concentrated), is a sufficient condition for the justification of 
territorial claims. It is negative because what the affirmative part shows is that the group would have a 
legitimate claim to a part of the state‘s territory. In cases where the group is still currently territorially 
concentrated, the territory to which it would have a legitimate claim might be easier to determine. In cases 
where the group is no longer territorially concentrated, determining whether the group would have a right 
to take back the exact part of territory it once occupied requires taking into account the interests of the 
people who currently live on the land (in North America, all the descendants of European and other 
migrants for whom that land is the only home they know and have). This is not to say that the group does 
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Perhaps more importantly, questioning the post-Westphalian conception of sovereignty as 
a weak model of sovereignty would commit the objector to reject not just the argument 
from self-determination, but also the argument from injustice. Both arguments are indeed 
equally grounded in the post-Westphalian conception of sovereignty. The argument from 
injustice (according to which a state that commits a major injustice toward a part of its 
people loses legitimate authority over those people and the territory they occupy) relies 
on the understanding that state sovereignty is not inalienable, because sovereignty is 
contingent upon the state treating its citizens justly. This is a post-Westphalian 
understanding of sovereignty, as it relies on normative considerations of legitimacy and 
accountability. Likewise, the argument from self-determination and flourishing 
(according to which a group that has suffered no major injustice, but that nonetheless 
deems that it should no longer be included in the larger state, might have a legitimate 
territorial claim if it already occupied the territory before the political unit was formed) 
also relies on a post-Westphalian understanding of sovereignty, as it views a state‘s 
territory not as belonging to the ruler (the king or the prince), but rather to the people. 
This means that the state, with regard to its territory, is only acting as the agent (steward-
watchman) of the people. This in turn means that a state‘s territorial integrity should be 
understood as a jurisdictional power over the territory, a power granted to the state by the 
people – not as the state‘s inalienable property right. In other words, what grounds 
legitimate control over the territory is legitimate authority over the people. So the 
conception of sovereignty underlying each type of justification of territorial claims is no 
                                                                                                                                                 
not have a legitimate claim to the territory it once occupied, but simply that its claim is overridden by other 
considerations, including current inhabitants‘ territorial claims. This in turn is not to say that the injustice 
the group suffered is thereby erased, or that it no longer warrants compensation or reparation. Rather, it is 
simply to say that restitution of the exact territory is, for better or worse, no longer a feasible option. 
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weaker for the second type (the argument from self-determination and flourishing) than it 
is for the first type of justification (the argument from injustice), since it is the same, 
post-Westphalian conception in both cases. And if this conception is an asset for the first 
argument, there is no reason why it should suddenly become a liability for the second 
argument. 
Still, I would like to suggest one reason why the weak-sovereignty objection might at 
first seem like a valid concern. Even in a post-Westphalian state order, sovereignty 
retains some of its sacrosanct aura, maintaining emphasis on the importance of respecting 
existing borders. Yet I want to suggest that this emphasis on respecting borders has more 
to do with a concern to prevent undue external interference in a state‘s internal affairs, 
than with a concern to prevent part of a state‘s population from attempting to change their 
situation in that state‘s internal affairs, which are also their own. This is reflected in the 
intuition, underlying the argument from injustice, that it is morally permissible for a 
group to secede when it has suffered a major injustice under the larger state. This shows 
that state sovereignty is not inalienable, but contingent upon the state treating its citizens 
justly. And arguably, such just treatment would consist not merely in not committing any 
major human rights violations, but also in respecting a group‘s right to self-
determination, including secession, if the group can show that it already occupied the 
territory before the political unit was formed (and meet the further conditions of adequate 
protection and economic viability). 
Of course, the argument from injustice is particularly compelling because of the sense of 
urgency that it conveys, a sense of urgency that is perhaps not as powerful in the 
argument from self-determination and flourishing. The weak-sovereignty objection, 
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however, is not about which argument conveys a stronger sense of urgency; it is about the 
claim that the argument from self-determination and flourishing relies on a weak 
conception of sovereignty. But as I explained a moment ago, the conception of 
sovereignty underlying the argument from self-determination and flourishing is the same 
as that underlying the argument from injustice. Thus however weak or strong the post-
Westphalian conception of sovereignty is taken to be, what should matter is that it 
introduces normative considerations of legitimacy and accountability, and if those 
considerations legitimize the argument from injustice, there is no reason why the same 
considerations should count against the argument from self-determination and 
flourishing. 
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the weak-sovereignty objection seems to rely on a 
misunderstanding of the justification of territorial claims. According to the weak-
sovereignty objection, if the people are seen as the owners of the land and the state 
simply as a steward or watchman, then a group seeking to secede would automatically be 
able to justify its territorial claims. Thus, the objection goes, this approach seems 
automatically biased in favor of secession. Yet not only is the question of secession not 
settled (as the two further conditions of adequate protection and economic viability must 
equally be fulfilled for secession to be permissible), the question of territorial 
justification, contra the objector, is not settled either. Indeed, what a post-Westphalian 
conception of sovereignty ultimately shows is that the question of territorial justification 
arises not so much between the state and the people as between the people and the 
people, that is, between the different parts of the people or between the different parties 
to the political union (as suggested by the divorce analogy). In other words, even if a 
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post-Westphalian conception of sovereignty precludes the automatic impermissibility of 
secession, it does not thereby entail the automatic permissibility of secession, because the 
question of territorial justification remains to be settled between the different parts of the 
people (as would the division of assets between both spouses in the case of a divorce). 
To sum up, according to the weak-sovereignty objection, to argue (as does the argument 
from self-determination and flourishing) that it is morally permissible for a group to 
secede even when it has not been the victim of any major state-perpetrated injustice is to 
rely on a weak conception of sovereignty, a conception so weak indeed that it turns the 
problem of secession into a non-problem, because the secessionist group would 
automatically be able to justify its territorial claims and thus to secede. I have argued that 
the weak-sovereignty objection fails, for three reasons. First, the question of sovereignty 
arises in the context of justifying territorial claims, which is but one of three necessary 
conditions to determine the permissibility of secession; adequate protection and economic 
viability are equally required. Thus even if the question of territorial justification seems 
to be automatically settled, the question of secession would not automatically be settled. 
Thus the problem of secession remains. Second, however weak or strong the post-
Westphalian conception of sovereignty is taken to be, what should matter is that it 
introduces normative considerations of legitimacy and accountability, and if those 
considerations legitimize the argument from injustice, there is no reason why the same 
considerations should count against the argument from self-determination and 
flourishing. Third, what a post-Westphalian conception of sovereignty ultimately shows 
is that the question of territorial justification arises not so much between the state and the 
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people as between the people and the people, which means that even the question of 
territorial justification remains to be settled, between the different parts of the people. 
One final point should be noted with regard to the weak-sovereignty objection. As I have 
already suggested and as the next section will make even clearer, the core argument 
underlying the axiological approach I develop in this project is that the normative 
question of secession is primarily not so much about the question of political legitimacy 
or state sovereignty as it is about certain deeper moral values (namely, self-determination, 
justice, and flourishing). If this argument is correct, then a normative theory of secession 
ought to be guided by those values, rather than by the question of political legitimacy or 
state sovereignty. Indeed, a normative account of secession ought to be guided by those 
values, whatever the implications for the question of political legitimacy or state 
sovereignty might be. In other words, instead of proceeding from a certain conception of 
political legitimacy or state sovereignty to a normative account of secession, we should 
proceed from the latter to the former. This, then, gets rid of the weak-sovereignty 
objection altogether. 
4. The axiological approach 
4.1. The logical priority of the three values 
To review, I have argued that it is morally permissible for a group to secede if and only if 
it has a valid claim to the territory it is taking, and if it is able to provide adequate 
protection and to be economically viable without thereby undermining the remainder 
state‘s ability to provide adequate protection and to be economically viable. According to 
my theory, then, those three conditions of territorial justification, adequate protection, 
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and economic viability are each necessary and jointly sufficient for secession to be 
permissible. This is because (1) requiring those three conditions meets the criterion of 
comprehensiveness, i.e. addresses the relevant parameters in secession (namely the 
territorial, political, and economic aspects of secession); and because (2) requiring those 
three conditions meets the criterion of normative support, i.e. ensures that different 
groups are able to exercise self-determination and to flourish in just circumstances. 
This in turn is because all three conditions are indeed grounded in all three values. Thus 
the condition of territorial justification is required because a group claiming a territory to 
which it does not have a legitimate claim interferes with another group‘s exercise of self-
determination and constitutes an unjust taking, both of which would likely affect this 
other group‘s ability to flourish. The condition of adequate protection of basic rights is 
required because of the equal moral value of individuals. It is the equal moral value of 
individuals that grounds their basic rights, and these rights warrant protection. Because 
each individual deserves to have her rights protected, justice requires the equal protection 
of all individuals‘ basic rights. Individuals whose basic rights are violated not only suffer 
an injustice, they are thereby also hindered in their ability to flourish and to exercise self-
determination. Finally, the condition of economic viability is required because effectively 
providing adequate protection requires creating and maintaining certain institutions, and 
this in turn requires economic means. Economic viability is further required to protect a 
group‘s ability to exercise self-determination, for example with regard to the creation or 
maintenance of political or cultural institutions, on which a group‘s flourishing directly 
depends. 
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In other words, if we do not require the three conditions of territorial justification, 
adequate protection, and economic viability, we will end up with a theory that hinders 
certain groups‘ ability to exercise self-determination and to flourish in just circumstances 
(as current theories do). By requiring the three conditions, my axiological approach is 
able to incorporate the three values (self-determination, justice, flourishing), because the 
three values are logically prior to (or motivate) the three conditions. Meeting the three 
conditions thus respects and fosters the three values. 
4.2. Some challenges 
Because the conditions that determine the permissibility of secession are grounded in the 
three values of self-determination, justice, and flourishing, a theory of secession ought to 
analyze the normative question of secession primarily in terms of those three values, i.e. 
ought to be axiological. Section 5 will outline how this axiological commitment will be 
carried out in the remainder of this project. But first, in light of this axiological 
commitment, it will be useful to address certain challenges regarding the questions of 
statehood and political legitimacy. 
Some might suggest that addressing the question of secession in empirically relevant 
terms entails working within the framework of statehood, i.e. recognizing that the 
international order is made up of states and that what defines secessionist claims to begin 
with is a desire for independent statehood. Others may argue that concepts such as the 
state or sovereignty are obsolete, and that one ought instead to consider alternative 
frameworks to contain issues of secession. An axiological approach, however, avoids this 
apparent conflict altogether; it renders it irrelevant. Indeed, since the focus is on the 
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importance of the three values of self-determination, justice, and flourishing, what 
matters first and foremost is that they be respected or fostered, whether this be through 
the apparatus of a state or, say, some anarchist community. Therefore, the present project 
is simply not concerned with assessing the respective merits of the statehood model 
versus the anarchist or other types of model, and it need not be. 
None of this is to say that we may or should therefore ignore the fact that secessionists 
formulate their claims in terms of statehood. Rather, it is simply to say that if the aim of 
secessionists is to create their own state, then, in light of the axiological analysis of 
secession, that state will first have to meet the three conditions of territorial justification, 
adequate protection, and economic viability (so as to ensure groups‘ ability to exercise 
self-determination and to flourish in just circumstances). Here an account of political 
legitimacy might be derived from the axiological analysis of secession, but this is only 
because, following the secessionists‘ aim of independent statehood, we would be 
―plugging‖ the statehood model into our matrix of conditions. (An anarchist model or 
community – which by definition does away with the state, and thereby with the very 
question of political legitimacy – would also have to satisfy the three conditions, because 
they are necessary to respect and foster the three values.) 
Still, because secessionist claims are formulated in terms of independent statehood, I will 
in the remainder of this project assume the empirical framework of statehood. As I 
suggested a moment ago, however, the reference to the statehood framework should not 
be interpreted as normative. That is, this project purports to remain neutral with regard to 
the normative assessment of the statehood framework (though we might derivatively use 
an axiological account of political legitimacy in assessing the question of secession). 
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Thus the use of terms such as state, sovereignty, etc., should not be understood as 
prescriptive, but rather as descriptive. That is, the use of statehood terminology should 
merely signal that we are ―plugging‖ the statehood model into our normative matrix of 
conditions, not that the latter require the former (as I suggested above, we might imagine 
an anarchist community meeting the three conditions). 
Otherwise put, even if such questions as whether we should do away with the state 
system altogether, or whether a state can ever be legitimate, or whether there even are 
such things as land rights, are good and interesting ones to consider, they also are, 
ultimately, irrelevant to this project. Thus claiming that it is pointless or problematic to 
argue for a normative theory of secession because we should do away with the state 
system altogether, or because a state can never be legitimate, or because there are no such 
things as land rights, would be tantamount to claiming that it is pointless or problematic 
to argue for gender justice because gender is a social construction or because we should 
undo gender altogether. Some of these observations might be correct, but until we are 
altogether rid of gender or the state system, we are going to have to work within certain 
parameters (namely, gender or the state system). 
To put this yet another way, letting skepticism or doubts about the very possibility of 
state legitimacy or land rights stop our attempts to formulate a normative theory of 
secession would be akin to letting skepticism or doubts about the very possibility of the 
external world stop our attempts to know anything at all. Much like one can recognize 
that it is not a settled question whether we can ever know there is an external world, but 
nonetheless assume that we can know something about the external world; one can 
likewise recognize that it is not a settled question whether a state can ever be legitimate, 
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or whether there even are such things as land rights, and yet assume that both are possible 
for the purposes of formulating a normative theory of secession. 
Having addressed those potential challenges to the axiological approach, I now outline 
how it will be carried out in the rest of this project. 
5. Chapter outline 
In this chapter, I have argued that the three conditions of territorial justification, adequate 
protection, and economic viability are each necessary and jointly sufficient for secession 
to be permissible. This is not only because (1) requiring those three conditions meets the 
criterion of comprehensiveness, i.e. addresses the relevant parameters in secession 
(namely the territorial, political, and economic aspects of secession); but also because (2) 
requiring those three conditions meets the criterion of normative support, i.e. ensures that 
different groups are able to exercise self-determination and to flourish in just 
circumstances. This in turn is because all three conditions are grounded in all three 
values, i.e. because the three values are logically prior to the three conditions. That is, if 
we do not require the three conditions of territorial justification, adequate protection, and 
economic viability, we will end up with a theory that hinders certain groups‘ ability to 
exercise self-determination and to flourish in just circumstances, as current theories do. 
In the next three chapters, I develop my axiological approach further. I look at the way in 
which each current type of theory, based on its respective account of political legitimacy, 
has addressed or failed to address the three conditions, and at the way in which each 
current type of theory has thereby conceptualized one of the three values in its relation to 
the question of secession. 
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Chapter 3 examines the value of self-determination, and how choice theories have 
conceived it as it relates to secession and the three conditions. It shows that a normative 
theory of secession based exclusively on self-determination is too permissive, and that 
the significance of self-determination must therefore be balanced against the significance 
of the other two values of justice and flourishing. The result of this critical analysis is a 
more plausible conception of the value of self-determination as it relates to the question 
of secession. 
Chapter 4 examines the value of justice, and how just-cause theories have conceived it as 
it relates to secession and the three conditions. It shows that that a normative theory of 
secession based exclusively on justice is too restrictive, and that the significance of 
justice must therefore be balanced against the significance of the other two values of self-
determination and flourishing. The result of this critical analysis is a more plausible 
conception of the value of justice as it relates to the question of secession. 
Chapter 5 examines the value of flourishing, and how nationalist theories have conceived 
it as it relates to secession and the three conditions. It shows that that a normative theory 
of secession based exclusively on flourishing is too permissive, and that the significance 
of flourishing must therefore be balanced against the significance of the other two values 
of self-determination and justice. The result of this critical analysis is a more plausible 
conception of the value of flourishing as it relates to the question of secession. 
In conceptualizing the three values most salient in secession in a morally more plausible 
way, Chapters 3, 4, and 5 show that equal participation and consideration in a group‘s 
decision-making process provides a criterion for assessing competing interpretations of 
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self-determination, justice, and flourishing. In Chapter 6, I sketch a democratic 
axiological theory of secession, i.e. suggest that a democratic framework, because of its 
fundamental commitment to equality, seems most promising to give due weight to the 
three values that justify secession, as they are conceptualized in the previous chapters. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Self-Determination 
 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter examines the way in which choice theories, based on their account of 
political legitimacy, have addressed or failed to address the three conditions of territorial 
justification, adequate protection of rights, and economic viability, as well as the way in 
which choice theories have thereby conceptualized the value of self-determination in its 
relation to the question of secession. 
Thus this chapter examines how choice theories have conceived the value of self-
determination as it relates to secession and the three conditions. It shows that a normative 
theory of secession based exclusively on self-determination (as choice theories are) is too 
permissive, because relying only on the value of self-determination when developing a 
normative theory of secession yields an implausible conception of the value of self-
determination, and thereby an implausible answer to the normative question of secession.  
In this chapter, I argue that reaching a morally more plausible conception of the value of 
self-determination (and thereby a more plausible answer to the normative question of 
secession) requires introducing considerations of justice and flourishing, in addition to 
considerations of self-determination. In doing so, I show that balancing the value of self-
determination against the other two values of justice and flourishing requires starting not 
from an account of political legitimacy (as choice theories do), but directly from the three 
values of self-determination, justice, and flourishing. 
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2. Political vs. cultural self-determination 
Two distinct senses of ―self-determination‖ are used in the philosophical literature on 
secession: political self-determination and cultural self-determination. 
- Political self-determination refers to a group‘s ability to decide freely its political status. 
Political self-determination is a matter of degree, and does not necessarily require full 
political independence or sovereignty: political self-determination may also be exercised 
within the borders of a larger state. This is the case in federalism, whereby different 
regional units within the larger state enjoy some degree of self-government regionally 
(for example, the different states within the United States, or the different provinces in 
Canada). Thus for a group to exercise political self-determination is for that group to 
determine the degree of political autonomy it will enjoy. 
- Cultural self-determination refers to a group‘s ability to set and pursue freely its cultural 
aspirations. Cultural self-determination might take the form of certain cultural events, 
celebrations, holidays, and symbols, as well as the language in which official 
administration and business are conducted, and the primary language used and taught in 
education and the media (for example, the three different linguistic-cultural communities 
in Belgium). Thus for a group to exercise cultural self-determination is for that group to 
determine the degree of cultural autonomy it will enjoy. 
For a group to exercise (political or cultural) self-determination freely means (1) that the 
group has a reasonable range of available options, and (2) that the group is not coerced to 
choose one option over another. By (1), I mean that in the case of political self-
determination, the group should be able to choose between different levels of government 
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(e.g. central, regional, or both); and that in the case of cultural self-determination, the 
group should be able to benefit from a certain degree of cultural protection (e.g. minority 
or cultural rights). By (2), I mean that the group further should not have to choose 
between more (political or cultural) autonomy and, for example, a continued exchange of 
goods and services between the region and the rest of the state. This would simply 
amount to a form of blackmail by the central government, and would compromise the 
group‘s ability to exercise self-determination freely. 
When choice theories invoke self-determination in developing their normative account of 
secession, they refer to political self-determination. Some political philosophers argue 
that cultural self-determination motivates or justifies political self-determination,
16
 but 
choice theories are not concerned with the relation between cultural and political self-
determination. Indeed, choice theorists explicitly exclude cultural self-determination from 
the morally relevant criteria to be taken into account when determining the permissibility 
of secession.
17
 Choice theorists thus focus solely on political self-determination to make 
their philosophical case for secession. In this chapter, I will therefore likewise focus 
solely on political self-determination, and I will refer to it simply as self-determination. 
3. Choice theories’ normative account of secession 
For choice theories, a state is legitimate if it is viable and respects human rights. Thus 
according to choice theories, any territorially concentrated group that wishes to do so 
                                                 
16
 For more on this type of argument on the relation between cultural and political self-determination, see 
Chapter 5. 
17
 Cultural identity is neither necessary nor sufficient for secession to be permissible, on a choice account. 
Thus if it is morally permissible for a cultural group to secede on a choice account, it will be because it 
meets certain necessary conditions, and not in virtue of the fact that it is a cultural group (Beran 1998, 42; 
Copp 1997, 278, 289; Copp 1998, 224-225; Philpott 1995, 365-366; Wellman 2005, 112; Wellman and 
Altman 2009, 47). 
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may secede, regardless of national, ethnic, religious, or other form of identity, provided 
that the new state is viable and respects human rights, i.e. is legitimate. For example, if 
San Fernando Valley wanted to become its own independent state and were able to be 
viable and respect human rights, it would be allowed to secede, because it would form a 
legitimate state. From this we can see that in their account of legitimacy, choice theories 
emphasize the value of political self-determination, or the right a group has to decide who 
will govern it. Thus choice theories approach the question of secession from the point of 
view of the seceding group. This is by far the most permissive type of theory, as it asserts 
that any territorially concentrated group in general (potentially) has a right to secede. 
Contemporary proponents of choice theories include Andrew Altman (2009), Harry 
Beran (1998), David Copp (1997, 1998), Daniel Philpott (1995, 1998), and Christopher 
Wellman (2005, 2009). 
Based on the criteria of normative support and comprehensiveness laid out in Chapter 1, 
in order to be successful or normatively plausible, a philosophical theory of secession 
must be (1) consistent with the basic principles and values of liberal political philosophy; 
and (2) consistent with what secession involves. 
In light of these criteria, choice theories offer two main advantages. First, they emphasize 
the value of self-determination (criterion of normative support: key principle of liberal 
political philosophy). Second, they require that the state be viable (criterion of 
comprehensiveness: consistent with what secession involves, namely the creation of a 
viable state) and respect human rights (criterion of normative support: key principle of 
liberal political philosophy). The main problem of choice theories is that they cannot 
justify the seceding group‘s claim to appropriate the territory that it is taking away 
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(criterion of comprehensiveness: inconsistent with what secession involves, namely 
taking a territory; and criterion of normative support: territorial integrity as key principle 
of liberal political philosophy). These advantages and problems will become clearer in 
the rest of this chapter. 
In what follows, I look at the way in which choice theories, based on their account of 
political legitimacy, have addressed or failed to address the three conditions of territorial 
justification, adequate protection of rights, and economic viability spelled out in Chapter 
2, and at the way in which choice theories have thereby conceptualized the value of self-
determination as it relates to secession. Because choice theorists‘ views on the question 
of territorial justification depend directly on their views on the questions of adequate 
protection and economic viability, I begin with the latter and then turn to the former. 
4. Choice theories and the three permissibility conditions 
4.1. Adequate protection and economic viability 
As mentioned above, in light of the criteria of normative support and comprehensiveness, 
the advantages of choice theories are their emphasis on the value of self-determination 
and their requirement that the new state be viable and respect human rights (this 
requirement corresponds to their account of political legitimacy). These two advantages 
are connected: Choice theorists should indeed require the new state to be viable and to 
respect human rights, because of their emphasis on the value of self-determination. That 
is, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for a group to exercise self-
determination if, in its new state, it did not have sufficient political or economic 
resources, or suffered major human rights violations. In this section, I look at the way in 
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which choice theories, based on their account of political legitimacy, have addressed the 
conditions of adequate protection of rights and economic viability, and at the conception 
of the value of self-determination that they adopt as a result. 
According to choice theorists, a state‘s legitimacy depends on its viability and respect of 
human rights. Thus Beran argues that ―a community‘s right of secession, if exercised in 
order to oppress minorities in its midst, may be overridden by the right of these minorities 
not to be oppressed‖ (1998, 54). He further argues that for a group to have the right of 
self-determination, the group must be viable as an independent entity, both politically and 
economically, because ―rights presuppose the ability to exercise them‖ (1998, 36): 
It is unclear how a community can have the right of self-determination if it is 
permanently unable to govern itself. […] There is some plausibility to the claim 
that for a community to have the right of self-determination it must not only be 
able to govern itself but also to sustain itself economically; it must be 
economically viable [because] a community ought to be able to meet at least the 
basic needs of its members to have the right to form an independent political 
entity. (1998, 37) 
Beran therefore concludes that ―A group has the right of political self-determination if it 
is […] politically and economically viable as an independent entity‖ (1998, 37). 
Likewise, Copp argues that a ―plausible‖ normative theory of secession should require 
that, in order to be able to secede, ―the group have sufficient resources […] to be capable 
of constituting a viable state‖ (1998, 224). He adds: 
A society lacking a stable and widespread desire to form a state might well have 
difficulty achieving the kind of stable support for the new legal system and other 
state institutions that the longevity of the new state will require. And to justify 
forcing the original larger state to undergo the kind of institutional change that 
would be required to enable secession, the seceding group would have to have 
some significant chance of success in building a new state for itself. (1998, 230) 
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According to Copp, such success or state viability requires that the group be both 
politically united (i.e. wish collectively to exercise political self-determination in virtue 
of a shared political identity)
18
 and territorially bounded (i.e. share a contiguous 
territory). Therefore, groups that have suffered a major injustice under the larger state but 
that are not either politically united or territorially bounded do not have a right to secede: 
The interesting question is whether my account needs to recognize a remedial 
right to secede in certain cases where a group that has suffered injustice does not 
qualify as a political and territorial society. I believe it does not, for I believe that 
even if a group has suffered injustice, it does not have a right to secede unless it is 
a territorial and political society. (Copp 1998, 230, emphasis in original) 
I take issue both with Copp‘s political requirement that a group that has suffered a major 
injustice under the larger state must have a shared political identity in order for its 
secession to be permissible, and with his territorial requirement that a group that has 
likewise suffered an injustice under the larger state must be territorially concentrated in 
order for its secession to be permissible. Both requirements betray a lack of consideration 
for the value of justice, i.e. for the adequate protection of the secessionists‘ basic rights, 
since both requirements would force a group that has suffered a major injustice in the 
larger state to remain within that state, unless the secessionist group formed a ―territorial 
and political society.‖ I begin with Copp‘s territorial requirement and then turn to his 
political requirement. In each case, I show that considerations of justice need to be 
introduced and balanced against considerations of self-determination. 
Against Copp‘s territorial requirement, I argued in Chapter 2 that groups that are not 
territorially concentrated but that are the victims of state-perpetrated injustice might also 
have certain legitimate territorial claims, as a result of the injustice suffered (and I cited, 
                                                 
18
 Copp does not specify what he means by ―political identity.‖ 
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as an example, the argument made in the 1960‘s by Black Power advocates that a 
separate Black State should be established in the US South). I argued that it is the 
injustice suffered, rather than the fact that the group happens to be territorially 
concentrated, that gives the group a legitimate territorial claim. I considered the objection 
that it is the injustice suffered in addition to the fact that the group is territorially 
concentrated, that gives the group a legitimate claim to a certain territory. In order to 
show why it is only the injustice suffered, regardless of the fact that the group is 
territorially concentrated, that gives the group a legitimate claim to a certain territory, I 
framed the issue from the position of the existing state, rather than from the position of 
the group. I argued that it is first and foremost because the state commits a major injustice 
toward a part of its population that it loses legitimate political authority over that group, 
and thereby forfeits its right to the territory which that group occupies. Whether or not the 
group is territorially concentrated does not in any way alter the fact that the injustice 
committed by the state means that the state loses legitimate political authority over that 
group. Thus if a group that has been the victim of state injustice wished to form its own 
independent state in order to enjoy adequate protection, it would (at least in theory) be 
owed a contiguous part of that state‘s territory, since adequate protection requires 
territorial contiguity. 
Of course, I also added in Chapter 2 that this will not always be actually feasible in 
practice, because of one obvious difficulty, namely that no (minimally attractive or 
viable) territory today is unoccupied, and that the interests of current occupants also need 
to be taken into account. This means that finding a piece of territory on which the non-
territorially concentrated victims of state-perpetrated injustice might create their own 
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independent state might turn out to be impossible. Still, this empirical, contingent fact 
should not make us lose sight of the normative issue presently at stake: namely, that for a 
state to lose legitimate authority over a part of its population means for it to forfeit its 
right over the territory, whether contiguous or not, which that group occupies. The lack of 
practical applicability just mentioned by no means erases the injustice that non-
territorially concentrated groups may have suffered, nor does it imply that these groups 
are therefore not owed other forms of compensation or reparation. Rather, this lack of 
practical applicability simply means that these groups‘ territorial claim, legitimate though 
it may otherwise be, is overridden by current occupants‘ territorial claim. 
Having addressed Copp‘s territorial requirement that a group that has suffered an 
injustice under the larger state must be territorially concentrated in order for its secession 
to be permissible, I now turn to his political requirement that a group that has likewise 
suffered a major injustice under the larger state must have a shared political identity in 
order for its secession to be permissible. 
Copp requires that a group that is seeking to secede in order to escape a major injustice in 
the state in which it is currently included (or remedial secession) form a ―political 
society,‖ or wish collectively to exercise political self-determination in virtue of a shared 
political identity. Though he does not specify what such a political identity might consist 
in, Copp suggests that it is this political identity that motivates the group‘s claim to 
political self-determination, and indeed ―guarantees‖ the new state‘s stability or viability. 
More precisely, Copp suggests that a shared political identity constitutes the only valid 
justification, or is a necessary condition, for permissible secession. Yet this requirement 
amounts to a taxonomic confusion. 
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Remedial cases of secession by definition arise because the group suffers a major 
injustice under the larger state, and secession constitutes the only or most effective way 
to escape such injustice. Thus the group‘s motivation in cases of remedial secession 
arises first and foremost from the urgency of trying to escape severe oppression, and not 
necessarily from some political identity that the group might (incidentally) share and in 
virtue of which the group wishes to exercise political self-determination. In other words, 
self-determination in the form of secession is in this case a means for the group to escape 
injustice and to secure for itself more just circumstances in its new state, not an end that 
the group pursues in light of a shared political identity. (The end, here, would rather be to 
secure justice in the minimal sense of adequate protection of basic rights.) To argue that 
remedial secession is impermissible because it does not stem from a shared political 
identity is tantamount to arguing that seeking divorce in order to escape an abusive 
partner is impermissible because the victim does not have the right sort of personal 
character (whatever that might be). This type of consideration (political identity of the 
secessionist group; personal character of the abused partner) is simply irrelevant to the 
type of case under discussion (remedial secession; fault divorce). To introduce such 
considerations as necessary conditions for remedial secession is to be taxonomically 
confused. Thus requiring (as Copp does) that a group that has suffered a major injustice 
share a political identity for its secession to be permissible is unwarranted. 
Copp, however, introduces this political requirement in order to secure the new state‘s 
stability or viability. As Chapter 2 showed, the concern for state viability should be taken 
seriously since secession by definition aims at creating a viable state. Yet state viability 
need not be understood as requiring a shared political identity. A weaker or thinner 
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formulation of the political requirement might consist in requiring the adequate 
protection of citizens‘ basic rights. As mentioned in Chapter 2, Western political 
philosophers overwhelmingly consider adequate protection of basic rights to be the 
primary function of an entity like the state. Thus on this account, state or political 
viability consists in the state‘s ability to perform its function, i.e. to protect its citizens‘ 
basic rights adequately. We might then replace Copp‘s strong political requirement of 
state viability understood as shared political identity by a more minimal political 
requirement of state viability understood as adequate protection of citizens‘ basic rights. 
Would this conception of the political requirement, unlike Copp‘s, be compatible with 
cases of remedial secession? 
By drawing an analogy with fault divorce (involving an abusive partner and an abused 
partner), I argued in Chapter 2 that the condition of economic viability is compatible with 
cases of remedial secession, even when the secessionist group might be economically 
non-viable on its own after secession, and this thanks to the possibility of international 
support. The same is true of the condition of adequate protection. This condition is 
likewise compatible with cases of remedial secession, even when the new state might be 
unable to provide adequate protection on its own after secession, because of the 
possibility of international support. Without thereby asserting that the Responsibility to 
Protect (or R2P doctrine) has been fully worked out or might not be problematic in some 
respects, I noted in Chapter 2 that this type of solution (international support in providing 
adequate protection) is consistent with Article 24 of the UN Charter, which confers upon 
the Security Council the ―primary responsibility for the maintenance of international 
peace and security,‖ in order ―to ensure prompt and effective action by the United 
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Nations‖ (Charter of the United Nations). We moreover find similar international 
involvement in the transitional UN administration of Kosovo; NATO‘s K-FOR 
peacekeeping force in Kosovo (started in 1999 with 10,000 troops); and the European 
Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) to assist Kosovo in its rule of law (started in 
2008 with 2,000 civilians).
19
 Thus a more minimal political requirement of state viability 
understood as adequate protection of citizens‘ basic rights is compatible with cases of 
remedial secession, and thereby avoids forcing the victims of injustice to remain within a 
state in which they are suffering abuse or oppression while at the same time securing 
political viability. 
Thus Copp‘s requirements that a group that has suffered a major injustice under the larger 
state form a ―territorial and political society‖ for its secession to be permissible ignore 
certain considerations of justice, i.e. neglect the adequate protection of secessionists‘ 
basic rights, since these requirements would force a group suffering abuse to remain at 
the hands of its abusers unless it formed a territorial and political society. This lack of 
consideration for remedial secessionists‘ basic rights is also inconsistent with choice 
theorists‘ own emphasis on the protection of human rights. Thus we need to introduce 
considerations of justice in cases of remedial secession that do not yield the implausible 
conclusion that a group suffering abuse must remain at the hands of its abusers unless it 
forms a territorial and political society. Factoring in the possibility of international 
assistance avoids this problematic result. 
Philpott endorses Copp‘s political requirement that to qualify for permissible secession a 
group should have a certain political identity, i.e. an identity in virtue of which the group 
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 For more on K-FOR and EULEX see http://www.nato.int/kfor/ and http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/en/front/ 
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wishes to govern itself (1995, 358). Like Copp, Philpott requires a shared political 
identity as a necessary condition for self-determination or permissible secession, to 
bolster the chance of the new state‘s viability (1995, 361), and like Copp, Philpott does 
not specify what a shared political identity might consist in. Philpott adds that to be 
viable as an independent entity, ―there are certain functions that a state must perform: 
maintain its roads and utilities, educate its children, preserve minimal domestic order, and 
provide basic public goods‖ (1995, 366). 
Philpott is concerned not only with the new state‘s viability, but also with the remainder 
state‘s. Not only may a group not secede if it itself would not be viable; in addition, it 
may not secede if, by doing so, it undermined the remainder state‘s viability. This is 
because, Philpott contends, undermining the remainder state‘s viability would interfere 
with the remainder state‘s exercise of self-determination. In order to avoid the latter 
situation, Philpott explains, economic arrangements should be made for secession to be 
permissible, otherwise secession would be unjust (1995, 363-364, 368, 377-378, 382). 
Thus Philpott considers not only the value of self-determination but also that of justice. 
All groups have a right to self-determination, and when two different groups‘ rights to 
self-determination seem to conflict, considerations of justice must be introduced to 
resolve the conflict. In other words, though the value of self-determination is still the 
primary concern, the value of justice is introduced when that of self-determination alone 
leads to the apparent dilemma of having to choose between two groups‘ rights to self-
determination. At that point, the value of justice must be taken into account to determine 
the proper scope of each group‘s exercise of self-determination, thereby dissolving the 
apparent dilemma. In other words, an adequate understanding of the value of self-
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determination requires taking into account the value of justice. This is confirmed in 
another one of Philpott‘s passages: ―Self-determining groups are required to be at least as 
liberal and democratic as the state from which they are separating, to demonstrate a 
majority preference for self-determination, to protect minority rights, and to meet 
distributive justice requirements‖ (1998, 80). 
Among choice theorists, Wellman and Altman perhaps most explicitly emphasize the 
requirement of adequate protection of citizens‘ basic rights: ―a moral right of self-
determination is held by groups that are willing and able to protect and respect human 
rights‖ or what Wellman and Altman call ―the requisite political functions‖ (2009, 43, 
45) This requirement applies to both new and remainder states: 
The larger state that contains the secessionist territory has a right of self-
determination based on the ability and willingness of its population to perform the 
requisite political functions. But the population of the secessionist territory has the 
same right if it too is willing and able to perform those same sorts of functions 
within its narrower borders. (2009, 53) A legitimate state‘s right to political self-
determination is, accordingly, qualified and limited by the right to secede of 
internal populations that are able and willing to perform the requisite political 
functions, while the right to secede is itself qualified by the condition that the 
remainder state must be able to continue to perform the requisite functions. (2009, 
46) 
Thus it would be morally impermissible for a group to secede if it thereby left the 
remainder state ―in a condition of political instability‖ or ―in a harmful state of affairs‖ 
(Wellman 2005, 13, 30). Therefore, ―a group has a right to secede just in case it and its 
remainder state would be able and willing to perform the requisite political functions‖ 
(Wellman 2005, 36). This is because, according to Wellman, ―states derive their 
legitimacy from the crucial functions they perform‖ (2005, 36). In other words, Wellman 
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frames the normative issue of secession as one of political legitimacy, understood as 
adequate protection of rights: 
To ignore reliable predictions about whether a new, secessionist state would 
uphold rights, then, would have the effect of treating the legitimacy or 
illegitimacy of the new state as irrelevant to the question of whether the 
secessionist group has a right to form the state. That position does not seem 
plausible to us. […] Rather, the justification [of the right to secede] lies in the 
moral importance of human rights and the role that such rights play as a basis for 
political legitimacy. The rights requirement is justified because adequate 
protection of, and respect for, human rights is necessary for the legitimacy of any 
state. […] The human rights requirement is a way of ensuring that secession does 
not result in a state – either the new state or the rump state – that lacks legitimacy. 
(Wellman and Altman 2009, 51) 
What is problematic about framing the question of secession as one of political 
legitimacy (here understood simply as adequate protection of basic rights and associated 
only with the value of self-determination) is that it makes it impossible for choice 
theorists to recognize the condition of territorial justification. This is because, according 
to choice theorists, (i) a state is legitimate if it protects its citizens‘ basic rights, and (ii) 
any group has the right to political self-determination, or the right to decide who will 
govern it. More precisely, (ii) is contingent on (i): that is, the justified exercise by a group 
of its right to political self-determination through secession is contingent upon that 
group‘s ability to protect citizens‘ basic rights in its new state, i.e. upon the legitimacy of 
the new state. Thus as long as adequate protection of basic rights would be secured in the 
new state, the secessionist group has a right to exercise political self-determination 
through secession, and thereby to take a certain territory. This is because choice theorists 
focus solely on the self-determination of the seceding group. 
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Yet if it is certainly necessary for a group to demonstrate ability to protect basic rights, it 
is also not sufficient. To make a compelling moral case for secession, a group must 
further show that it has a valid claim to the territory that it is taking away to form its new 
state. Without this further condition, the seceding group will be interfering with another 
group‘s exercise of self-determination in its own territory. A secessionist group taking a 
territory to which it does not have a valid claim further constitutes an unjust 
appropriation, which would likely hinder another group‘s ability to flourish.  
By focusing on political legitimacy and associating it only with the value of self-
determination, choice theories offer an implausible answer to the normative question of 
secession. Providing a plausible answer to this question thus requires adequately 
addressing the condition of territorial justification. This in turn will require introducing 
considerations of justice and flourishing, in addition to considerations of self-
determination. Though Philpott‘s, along with Wellman‘s and Altman‘s, requirement that 
the new state not undermine the viability of the remainder state introduces considerations 
of justice to balance competing claims to self-determination, these same considerations of 
justice are, surprisingly, and inconsistently, entirely absent from their account of 
territorial claims, as will become apparent in the next section. 
4.2. Territorial justification 
As mentioned above, the main problem of choice theories is that they cannot justify the 
territorial claim by definition centrally involved in secession. This lack of territorial 
justification is the result of two related beliefs: first, the belief that adequate protection of 
basic rights automatically creates a valid territorial claim, i.e. the belief that political 
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legitimacy is sufficient to have a valid claim to the territory; and second, the belief that 
the normative question of secession is therefore one of self-government, rather than one 
of territory. 
According to Beran, if a secessionist group (i) is territorially concentrated, (ii) contains a 
majority in its territory in favor of secession, and (iii) would protect basic rights in its 
new state, i.e. would be legitimate, it has a right to secede (1998, 32, 36, 38-39). The 
problem with Beran‘s account is that it conflates a group‘s rightful occupation of a given 
territory with that group‘s rightful claim to that territory, should the group want to 
secede: ―Any theory of rightful secession has to specify what sorts of groups have the 
right not only to leave their state but to leave it with their territory: in other words, have 
the right of continuing occupation of their territory (the right of habitation)‖ (1998, 39). It 
is clear from this passage that Beran equates legitimate territorial occupation (the right of 
habitation) with legitimate territorial claim (the right to secede). 
Yet it is just as clear that simply because a group has a right to live on a certain territory 
does not automatically give that group the right to exit the existing state with that portion 
of territory. For example, if a group of recent immigrants to the U.S. or U.S. permanent 
residents settle in Nevada‘s Great Basin Desert, they may very well have the right to live 
on that territory (the right of habitation), but it is unclear how that right of habitation 
therefore gives them the further right to create their own independent state in that 
territory (the right to secede).  
It might be objected that the seceding group in this example is not made up of U.S. 
citizens, and that is why their secession on U.S. land would be impermissible. Yet if the 
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entire population of Vermont suddenly moved to the Great Basin Desert, and then 
likewise decided to secede, thereby taking away the Great Basin Desert from legitimate 
U.S. jurisdiction, it is unclear that their being U.S. citizens would make their secessionist 
claims any more legitimate. Thus rightful habitation does not entail rightful secession. 
But what if the current population of the current state of Vermont wanted to secede from 
the U.S. and become its own independent state? This, perhaps, is closer to what Beran 
has in mind when equating rightful habitation with rightful secession. To back up his 
claim that rightful habitation entails rightful secession, Beran refers to Buchanan‘s 
argument that in a post-Westphalian world the state, with regard to its jurisdiction over its 
territory, is only the agent of the people that live on that territory, i.e. that the territory 
really belongs to the people, rather than to the state: 
[I]n liberal theory it cannot plausibly be claimed that this agency relationship is 
irrevocable. Therefore, all rights the state holds, including the right to the state‘s 
territory, must be derived from the people whose agent it is. There are no good 
arguments to show that this right is irrevocably held collectively by all the people 
of an existing state. Therefore, if a substantial part of a state‘s population no 
longer wishes the present state to be its agent, it may terminate the agency 
relationship and remove itself from the state with its land. (Beran 1998, 35) 
Yet contra Beran, I argued in Chapter 2 that even if one agrees with Buchanan‘s claim 
that a state‘s territory belongs to the people, rather than to the state, it still remains to be 
established what this latter claim means: Does it mean that the entirety of the territory 
belongs to the entirety of the population, in virtue of the political union, or does it mean 
that each portion of territory belongs to each portion of the population that occupies it? 
By drawing an analogy with divorce and the principle of community property in 
marriage, I argued in Chapter 2 that only in cases where secessionists can show that they 
 75 
 
already occupied that portion of territory before they entered the political union, does it 
become unclear that the remainder of the population would have a right to prevent the 
secessionists from taking away a piece of territory that was already theirs before the 
political unit was formed. 
In other words, even if Buchanan is correct in arguing that a state‘s territory really 
belongs to the people rather than to the state (in virtue of an agency relationship between 
the two), it does not automatically follow that any group rightfully living on a certain 
territory therefore has the right to take away that territory to form its own independent 
state. Otherwise put, rightful habitation (or the right of habitation) does not necessarily 
entail rightful secession (or the right to secede) – even if the secessionist group would 
otherwise protect basic rights in it new state, i.e. meet Beran‘s (and choice theories‘) 
criterion of political legitimacy. Thus Beran‘s choice account, because it reduces the 
problem of secession to a matter of political legitimacy, falls short with respect to 
territorial justification, and therefore runs the risk of validating unjustified territorial 
claims. These would result in an unjust taking, and thereby likely wrongly interfere with 
some other group‘s ability to flourish. 
Copp, like Beran, argues any ―territorial and political group,‖ that is, any territorially 
concentrated group whose majority has a ―stable and widespread desire‖ to form its own 
independent state, has a right to secede (1997, 278, 293): 
If a part of an existing state has a right to secede, it has a right over the territory in 
which it lives that is of the same nature as the right of the state over the territory; 
in particular, it has a liberty to conduct a plebiscite regarding the establishment of 
a state in that territory and a power to acquire the right to government over the 
territory. (1997, 282) 
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Like Beran, Copp mentions that in order to be able to secede, the group ―must rightfully 
occupy that territory, or have a right of some relevant kind to occupy it‖ (1998, 229). But 
―a right of some relevant kind‖ is rather vague language, and Copp‘s descriptions of that 
right are rather vague as well: a group may rightfully occupy a territory, he guesses, 
―perhaps on the ground that it has long resided there, or perhaps on the ground that it has 
a special claim of some other kind to that part of the state‘s territory, such as that that 
area is the group‘s historical homeland‖ (1998, 227). It is surprising that, while seemingly 
recognizing the importance of territorial justification, given that ―secession involves the 
removal of a proper part of a state‘s territory from the jurisdiction of the state‖ (1998, 
227), Copp should remain so vague with respect to what exactly constitutes a rightful 
territorial claim. His hints that it may have something to do with having occupied the land 
for a certain amount of time, or with having once occupied the land a long time ago, are 
rather unhelpful. Indeed, in light of Copp‘s vague criteria, what are we to make of cases 
such as Israel and Palestine, or the Baltic States and the former USSR, or native 
populations and descendants of European and other immigrants in the entire American 
continent? In all those cases, to cite but them, territorial claims become an issue precisely 
because one part of the population has long resided there and another part of the 
population either has ―always‖ resided there or used to reside there a very long time ago. 
In other words, in all those cases, Copp‘s two criteria are in conflict, since according to 
them, each side of the territorial debate is entitled to the very same territory. Like 
Beran‘s, Copp‘s choice account falls short with respect to territorial justification. 
Philpott‘s account faces the same criticism. 
 77 
 
Philpott explicitly asserts that ―[no] special territorial arguments are needed to establish 
[a case for self-determination through secession]‖ (1995, 355); and asks ―In what sense is 
land an issue beyond the sense in which government is an issue?‖ (1995, 370). For 
Philpott, as for Beran, Buchanan‘s description of the relation between the state and its 
people and territory as one of agency is enough to provide the secessionists with a valid 
territorial claim: 
If a self-determining group, then, justly claims a new government, this 
government (state or regional) becomes the new agent of its land. And just as the 
larger state may not prevent the separatists from governing themselves, neither 
may it prevent them from placing new borders, state or regional, around 
themselves. Land is only an issue because […] the world is such that people 
living under the same government live together. […] Only by asserting some sort 
of illiberal organic connection or mystical tie could a group claim land that is 
justly governed by someone else. It‘s a matter of government, not land. (Philpott 
1995, 370) 
Anticipating the objection that the agency relation between the state and the people ―does 
not show that the group is necessarily entitled to the land on which it lives,‖ Philpott asks 
the objector ―to show why a group may not exercise self-determination on the piece of 
land on which it lives:‖ 
It seems that only a special claim of some other authority to the land could defeat 
its own claim. But as I have argued, beyond the claim to govern justly a piece of 
land, groups and governments have no right to call it theirs in any meaningful 
way. (1995, 370-371, footnote 37) 
Philpott‘s claim, in effect, is that if a group provides adequate protection, i.e. meets the 
condition of political legitimacy, it has a valid claim to the land it occupies. Thus, ―land 
is only relevant to the extent that a people under a common government live on it; and 
self-government, not a legal argument about the history of one‘s land, is the central issue‖ 
(Philpott 1995, 376). 
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Yet from the accurate observation that a state must be territorially defined in order to be 
able to provide adequate protection, it does not follow that (i) the ability to provide 
adequate protection (or political legitimacy) necessarily entails the ability to justify the 
territorial claim, any more than that, conversely, (ii) the ability to justify the territorial 
claim necessarily entails the ability to provide adequate protection. While choice theorists 
would agree that the latter claim (ii) is false, they do hold that the former (i) is true. And 
while Philpott does say that one group‘s exercise of self-determination should not hinder 
another group‘s ability to exercise its own self-determination, that is, that risks of 
injustice can qualify a group‘s exercise of self-determination (1995, 362, 364), he does 
not extend these considerations of justice to territorial claims, since territorial 
justification, in his view, is essentially a non-issue – or at least, territorial justification is 
taken to follow automatically from a group‘s ability to provide adequate protection. 
Thus Wellman and Altman assert that ―a state can rightfully impose itself upon a 
separatist territory if and only if this imposition is required to secure the essential benefits 
of political society, that is, if it is necessary to perform the requisite political functions 
involved in protecting human rights‖ (2009, 46, emphasis added). This means that, if a 
group is able to provide adequate protection of basic rights and does not wish to remain 
part of the larger state, it has a valid claim to the territory it is taking away from the larger 
state. This is because, according to choice theorists, from the fact that state territoriality is 
a necessary condition for the state to be able to provide adequate protection, it follows 
that a group‘s ability to provide adequate protection therefore means that this group is 
entitled to taking away the land from the larger state. Thus Wellman explains that 
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a state‘s claim to jurisdiction over its territory stems from the necessity of the 
state‘s performing its political function. Therefore, when a separatist group is 
politically viable, it is not true that the state as a whole is necessary to create a 
politically secure environment, and thus the state does not have a justification for 
denying the separatist group‘s political self-determination. (2005, 37) 
Wellman compares this way of limiting a state‘s political liberty to the way in which 
one‘s liberty to drive a car is limited, as both liberties, he explains, depend on the ability 
to fulfill a certain function (providing adequate protection; driving safely and 
responsibly). Thus, much like, in order to avoid harming many people, one‘s liberty to 
drive a car is limited by the requirement that one be able to drive safely and responsibly, 
likewise, in order to avoid harming many people, a group‘s liberty to form its own 
independent state is limited by the requirement that the group be able to provide adequate 
protection (Wellman 2005, 37-38). Yet this analogy works only if the ability to drive 
safely and responsibly (the seceding group‘s ability to perform the political function) 
thereby involves the liberty to take someone else‘s car, or a car one has been sharing with 
others (the seceding group‘s liberty to take the territory). But clearly, from the mere fact 
that I can drive your car at least as well as you do (that the seceding group is able to 
provide adequate protection at least as well as the larger state), it hardly follows that I am 
therefore entitled to it (that the seceding group is entitled to the territory it is taking away 
from the larger state). 
Thus choice theorists‘ focus on the question of political legitimacy makes them unable to 
justify the seceding group‘s territorial claim. This is because, in building their case, 
choice theorists emphasize only the value of self-determination, and consider only the 
self-determination of the secessionists. This yields an implausible conception of self-
determination, one that unwarrantedly legitimates interfering with another group‘s 
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exercise of self-determination by appropriating its own territory, which constitutes an 
unjust taking and is likely to hinder this other group‘s ability to flourish.20 Correcting this 
requires equally considering the self-determination of both groups involved, and 
therefore introducing considerations of justice and flourishing. 
5. Conclusion 
The main problem for choice theories is their lack of territorial justification. This problem 
is the result of choice theorists‘ reducing the question of secession to the question of 
political legitimacy, which they associate only with the value of self-determination. In 
doing so, choice theories neglect the other two values of justice and flourishing, and end 
up with an implausible conception of self-determination. This implausible conception of 
self-determination then gives rise to choice theorists‘ lack of territorial justification. 
By focusing solely on the value of self-determination, and more precisely on the self-
determination of the seceding group, choice theorists effectively ignore the self-
determination of the other main group concerned in any case of secession, namely the 
remainder state. But a seceding group taking a territory to which it does not have a 
legitimate claim interferes with another group‘s exercise of self-determination in its 
territory, and also constitutes an unjust appropriation, both of which might hinder this 
other group‘s ability to flourish. This is problematic because it fails to consider this other 
group‘s rights and interests equally. This means two things: (1) Arbitrating between 
conflicting claims of self-determination (between the seceding group and the remainder 
                                                 
20
 This is true even if the remainder state‘s viability is not undermined by the seceding group‘s taking of 
part of its territory, population, and resources. This is because the mere fact that I might not need a 
particular thing that I happen to have to survive does not make it available for everyone else to take 
rightfully. 
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state), i.e. equally considering the rights and interests of all groups exercising self-
determination, requires introducing considerations of justice and flourishing. (2) By 
introducing considerations of justice and flourishing, we reach a more plausible 
conception of the value of self-determination, one that takes into account different 
groups‘ exercise of self-determination, and one that shows that valuing self-determination 
in fact requires territorial justification, because if there is no territorial justification, the 
seceding group is interfering with another group‘s exercise of self-determination, by 
taking its territory. 
Thus in reducing the question of secession to a matter of political legitimacy, choice 
theorists neglect the question of territorial justification, and thereby yield a morally 
implausible answer to the question of secession, one that fails to consider all concerned 
groups‘ rights and interests equally. Avoiding this problem requires introducing 
considerations of justice and flourishing, in addition to considerations of self-
determination. Proceeding in this way yields a more plausible conception of the value of 
self-determination, one that by definition accounts for the condition of territorial 
justification and thereby considers all concerned groups‘ rights and interests equally. In 
other words, reaching a plausible answer to the question of secession requires adopting an 
axiological approach, i.e. starting not from an account of political legitimacy, but directly 
from the three values of self-determination, justice, and flourishing. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Justice 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Chapter 3 showed that choice theorists provide an extremely permissive but also morally 
implausible answer to the normative question of secession, because they reduce the 
question of secession to the question of political legitimacy, which they associate 
primarily with the value of self-determination to the detriment of the values of justice and 
flourishing. 
Interestingly, just-cause theorists rely on the same account of political legitimacy, but 
unlike choice theorists, advance a very restrictive answer to the normative question of 
secession. Thus just-cause theorists also hold that a state is legitimate if it protects its 
citizens‘ basic rights, but from this they conclude not that any group that is able to 
provide such protection is therefore justified in seceding if it so wishes, but rather that as 
long as an existing state provides such protection, i.e. is legitimate, no group can 
justifiably secede from it. This is because central to just-cause theorists‘ normative 
account of secession is not only (i) their definition of political legitimacy in terms of 
basic rights protection, but also (ii) their emphasis on the value of justice understood only 
in those same terms. Otherwise put, (i) is contingent on (ii): that is, as long as a state 
protects its citizens‘ basic rights, it is just and therefore legitimate. What defines 
legitimacy, according to just-cause theorists, is justice, understood as basic rights 
protection. Thus whereas choice theorists, in emphasizing a group‘s self-determination, 
view political legitimacy as a necessary condition to form a new independent state, just-
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cause theorists, in emphasizing an existing state‘s justice, view political legitimacy as a 
sufficient condition not to break up an existing state. 
This chapter examines the way in which just-cause theories, based on their account of 
political legitimacy, have addressed or failed to address the three conditions of territorial 
justification, adequate protection of rights, and economic viability, as well as the way in 
which just-cause theories have thereby conceptualized the value of justice in its relation 
to the question of secession. 
Thus this chapter examines how just-cause theories have conceived the value of justice as 
it relates to secession and the three conditions. It shows that a normative theory of 
secession based exclusively on justice (as just-cause theories are) is too restrictive, 
because relying only on the value of justice when developing a normative theory of 
secession yields an implausible conception of the value of justice, and thereby an 
implausible answer to the normative question of secession.  
In this chapter, I argue that reaching a morally more plausible conception of the value of 
justice (and thereby a more plausible answer to the normative question of secession) 
requires introducing considerations of self-determination and flourishing, in addition to 
considerations of justice. In doing so, I show that balancing the value of justice against 
the other two values of self-determination and flourishing requires starting not from an 
account of political legitimacy (as just-cause theories do), but directly from the three 
values of self-determination, justice, and flourishing. 
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2. Just-cause theories’ normative account of secession 
For just-cause theories, a state is illegitimate if it commits a major injustice, namely, 
severe human rights violations, forcefully seized territory, or discrimination in 
redistribution of resources. Thus according to just-cause theories, a group may secede 
only if it has suffered such an injustice under the larger state, i.e. only if the state from 
which the group wishes to secede is illegitimate. For example, if the Baltic States had 
wanted to secede while they were forcefully included in the former USSR, they would 
have been allowed to do so, because their territory had been forcefully seized by the 
former USSR. Just-cause theories are also called remedial theories because they allow 
secession in order to remedy an unjust situation created by the larger state. Thus just-
cause theories approach the question of secession from the point of view of the remainder 
state, and whether or not it is acting justly. From this we can see that in their account of 
legitimacy, just-cause theories emphasize the value of justice, or the right not to suffer 
tyranny. This is the most restrictive type of theory, as it asserts that only under very 
special circumstances would a group have a right to secede. Contemporary proponents of 
just-cause theories include most prominently Allen Buchanan (1991), and to a certain 
extent Thomas Christiano (2006) and Wayne Norman (1998).
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Based on the criteria of normative support and comprehensiveness laid out in Chapter 1, 
in order to be successful or normatively plausible, a philosophical theory of secession 
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 As I will explain below, Christiano develops a just-cause answer to the normative question of secession 
as a result of his conception of democratic legitimacy. Norman is principally concerned with the question 
of institutionalizing (i.e. legalizing) a right to secede and minimizing risks of violence or chaos, and 
therefore suggests that institutionalizing the remedial right to secede offered by just-cause theories would 
provide an incentive for states to treat their populations justly (otherwise the latter would have a legal right 
to secede). 
 85 
 
must be (1) consistent with the basic principles and values of liberal political philosophy; 
and (2) consistent with what secession involves. 
In light of these criteria, just-cause theories offer two main advantages. First, they 
emphasize the value of justice, understood as respect of human rights (criterion of 
normative support: key principle of liberal political philosophy). Second, they are able to 
justify the territorial claim of the seceding group, by arguing that, because of its injustice, 
the current state loses jurisdiction over the territory (criterion of comprehensiveness: 
consistent with what secession empirically involves, namely taking a territory; and 
criterion of normative support: territorial integrity as key principle of liberal political 
philosophy). The main problems of just-cause theories are (1) their neglect of the 
question of state viability (criterion of comprehensiveness: inconsistent with what 
secession involves, namely the creation of a viable state); and (2) their reliance on a very 
minimal or narrow definition of justice to determine when it is permissible for a group to 
secede. Only when a group has suffered a major injustice (such as major human rights 
violations) is its secession permissible. This means that the secessionist claims of groups 
that have not suffered that kind of injustice (for example, the Québécois) are 
automatically dismissed as unwarranted. Yet to claim that those groups have not suffered 
an injustice is to beg the question, since precisely what is at issue is whether such groups 
might have suffered an injustice in being denied the right to secede. Thus the minimal or 
narrow conception of justice that just-cause theories use is arguably inconsistent with the 
liberal principle of self-determination (criterion of normative support: self-determination 
as key principle of liberal political philosophy). These advantages and problems will 
become clearer in the rest of this chapter. 
 86 
 
In what follows, I look at the way in which just-cause theories, based on their account of 
political legitimacy, have addressed or failed to address the three conditions of territorial 
justification, adequate protection of rights, and economic viability spelled out in Chapter 
2, and at the way in which just-cause theories have thereby conceptualized the value of 
justice as it relates to secession. Because just-cause theorists‘ views on the question of 
territorial justification depend directly on their views on the questions of adequate 
protection and economic viability, I begin with the latter and then turn to the former. 
3. Just-cause theories and the three permissibility conditions 
Given that they have at their core the value of justice, understood as human rights 
protection, one might expect just-cause theories to support, and indeed to require, the 
permissibility conditions of adequate protection of basic rights and economic viability. I 
indeed explained in Chapter 2 that adequate protection of individuals‘ basic rights 
requires economic viability. While they do take into account the question of the 
remainder state‘s viability when assessing the permissibility of secession, just-cause 
theorists surprisingly do not consider the question of the new state‘s viability (and by 
state viability I mean to include both the political and economic aspects of state viability). 
Thus Buchanan, the most prominent just-cause theorist, spends much time examining 
different types of cases regarding the remainder state‘s economic and political viability, 
but never specifies any conditions regarding the new state‘s viability. Likewise, 
Christiano, one of the most prominent contemporary democratic theorists, argues for a 
remedial-right-only theory of secession based on the political viability or democratic 
legitimacy of the existing state, but fails entirely to consider the question of the new 
state‘s political viability or democratic legitimacy. I start by looking at Buchanan‘s 
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account, which focuses first on the economic aspect of state viability, and then turn to 
Christiano‘s account, which focuses mainly on the political aspect of state viability. 
3.1. Economic viability 
Buchanan first considers the argument that the mere fact of affecting the remainder 
state‘s economy in itself constitutes a valid reason against the permissibility of secession, 
or that secession can only be permissible if it does not affect the remainder state‘s pre-
secession economic levels. This argument, Buchanan responds, ―is quite unconvincing 
for the simple reason that there is no right to the economic status quo as such‖ (1991, 92, 
emphasis in original). Buchanan does add that the remainder state may nonetheless be 
due compensation by the secessionist group either if the secessionist group‘s wealth or 
resources are partly the result of certain investments by the remainder state in the territory 
that is now breaking away, or if there somehow was a preexisting agreement regarding 
compensation in case of a break-up of the political union. Aside from these two specific 
types of circumstances, however, Buchanan makes very clear that there is no right to pre-
secession economic levels (1991, 92). Thus Buchanan argues that a secessionist group 
would have no obligation to ensure that such ―adequate level‖ or ―decent minimum‖ is 
preserved in the remainder state (1991, 93). All this is consistent with the condition of 
economic viability spelled out in Chapter 2. 
I indeed argued in Chapter 2 that only in cases where drops in overall levels of wealth are 
such that the remainder state is thereby unable to sustain the institutions required for 
adequate protection should secession be impermissible, at least until arrangements have 
been made to prevent the remainder state‘s non-viability. I then specified an important 
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qualification to the condition of economic viability, in cases where the seceding group 
has suffered a major injustice under the larger state (for example, severe human rights 
violations). In those cases, I suggested that international institutions should play a special 
role if the new state were to be economically non-viable on its own after secession. I 
suggested that one reasonable option would be for international institutions to lend 
economic support appropriately to the new state for a given period of time, during which 
the new state would have to make every effort possible to become economically viable. 
Such a temporary arrangement would avoid forcing the victims of injustice to remain at 
the hands of their abuser, while at the same time securing their economic viability, which 
is crucial since it is necessary for adequate protection of basic rights. 
Buchanan agrees that, in cases where the secessionist group is trying to escape major 
injustice suffered under the larger state, it should not be prevented from seceding even if 
its secession were to undermine the remainder state‘s economic viability, because the 
larger state would then be a ―culpable aggressor:‖ 
[I]f the state violates the rights of a group within its jurisdiction and the members 
of that group seek to secede, the state or those who support it cannot justify 
crushing the secession movement by claiming that they are only exercising the 
right of self-defense, even if it happens to be true that if secession succeeded the 
remainder state would not survive. (1991, 95) 
According to Buchanan, however, even in cases where the secessionist group has not 
suffered any major injustice under the larger state, it should not be prevented from 
seceding even if its secession were to undermine the remainder state‘s economic viability 
(1991, 94).
22
 Buchanan indeed explains that if the remainder state is able to annex itself 
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 Here it might seem as though Buchanan is arguing for more than a merely remedial right of secession. In 
fact, Buchanan is simply reviewing and rejecting competing arguments for why secession might not be 
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to another neighboring state without thereby endangering its citizens‘ basic rights, the 
secessionist group should be allowed to secede, even if its secession directly undermines 
the remainder state‘s economic viability (1991, 94). 
But what if the remainder state were to find itself in exactly the opposite situation? That 
is, what if a group‘s non-remedial secession rendered the remainder state vulnerable to 
annexation by another neighboring state, which would threaten its citizens‘ basic rights? 
Buchanan argues that, unless there was a preexisting agreement between the secessionist 
group and the remainder state to the effect that the two formed a political union for the 
purpose of their common defense (1991, 96), the secessionist group should still be 
allowed to secede, because much like 
there is a very weighty presumption that an individual may not use coercion 
against an innocent individual in order to protect himself against a culpable 
aggressor [likewise] there is at the very least a strong presumption that a state may 
not use force to block an otherwise justified secession in order to secure its own 
survival against a lethal threat from an aggressor. (1991, 95, emphasis in original) 
This type of case is very similar to the type of case, considered in Chapter 2 when 
specifying an important qualification to the condition of political viability, where a 
group‘s secession results in rendering minorities left behind in the remainder state 
particularly vulnerable to oppression by the remainder state. In those cases, I suggested in 
Chapter 2 that if the minority left in the remainder state belongs to the same group as the 
one that seceded, or if there is at least no hostility between the minority and the seceded 
group, then a possible, if not ideal, solution would be for the minority to join the seceded 
                                                                                                                                                 
permissible. In other words, according to Buchanan the reason why secession is impermissible beyond 
remedial cases is not because of any considerations of economic viability, but because non-remedial cases 
of secession go against his functional account of political legitimacy. Even though I reject both Buchanan‘s 
account of legitimacy and his remedial-right-only account of secession, it is still useful in the context of 
this chapter to consider his insights into the question of state viability.  
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group in its new independent state, and thereby escape oppression from the remainder 
state. If, however, there also is hostility between the minority and the seceded group, or if 
the minority is otherwise unable to join the seceded group in its new independent state, 
then I suggested a different type of solution. On the one hand, if the minority‘s situation 
in the remainder state gets worse as a result of the group‘s secession, then it would seem 
that the seceding group is at least indirectly (or causally) responsible for worsening the 
minority‘s situation in the remainder state. On the other hand, however, it would seem 
unjust to prevent a group from seceding because of what the remainder state might do to 
the minority left behind (this would seem to be a problem between the remainder state 
and the minority, not involving the seceding group), especially if the seceding group is 
itself trying to escape oppression in the larger state. 
In such circumstances, I suggested in Chapter 2 that one reasonable option would be that 
it would still be morally permissible for the group to secede (especially if it is trying to 
escape oppression), but that international institutions would have a responsibility to 
ensure that the situation of the minority left behind in the remainder state does not get 
worse.
23
 And perhaps the seceding group, which presumably would be in the 
international spotlight, would have a special obligation to call international attention to 
the situation of the minority in the remainder state. This type of solution would avoid 
forcing the secessionists to remain within a state they wish to leave (especially if they are 
being oppressed) while at the same time securing adequate protection for minorities left 
behind in the remainder state. 
                                                 
23
 This is not to say that the R2P doctrine has been fully worked out or might not be problematic in some 
respects. 
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Thus to Buchanan‘s treatment of this question, described above, we might add that if 
international support would be warranted in cases of remedial secession (where the 
remainder state has committed a severe injustice toward the secessionist group), surely it 
would also be warranted in cases of non-remedial secession (where the remainder state 
has not committed a severe injustice toward the secessionist group). 
Given his concern for the remainder state‘s viability, it is surprising that Buchanan does 
not consider the question of the new state‘s viability. Buchanan‘s neglect of the question 
of the new state‘s viability, moreover, is even more surprising given that he relies on a 
functional account of political legitimacy. According to a functional account, political 
legitimacy depends on the state‘s performing a certain function adequately. What this 
function consists in might of course vary across different conceptions. However, one 
important implication of all functional conceptions of legitimacy is that whenever the 
state does not perform its function adequately, the state commits an injustice toward some 
of its population and becomes illegitimate, i.e. forfeits its authority over that group. This 
in turn opens up the question of secession, or the possibility of remedial secession. 
Just-cause theories by definition rely on a functional account of political legitimacy, 
because they require that any secessionist group have a ―just cause‖ for secession. That 
is, just-cause theories argue that a secessionist group must not only have suffered an 
injustice, but an injustice in virtue of which the state loses its authority over the group, 
i.e. an injustice whereby the state becomes illegitimate – and this requires a functional 
account of legitimacy. Thus according to just-cause theories, a group may secede only if 
it has suffered such an injustice under the larger state, i.e. only if the state from which the 
group wishes to secede is illegitimate. 
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According to Buchanan‘s functional account of political legitimacy, a state has legitimate 
authority over its people as long as it respects human rights, protects all citizens equally, 
and redistributes resources justly. This is why, according to Buchanan‘s just-cause 
theory, it is permissible for a group to secede only if it has suffered a major injustice 
under the larger state, namely, severe human rights violations, forcefully seized territory, 
or discriminatory redistribution of resources. If the secessionist group has not suffered 
such major injustice, then the state retains legitimate political authority over the group, 
and the group‘s secession would not be permissible. 
But if just-cause theorists rely on a functional account of political legitimacy to justify the 
right to secede, then it would seem that they should require the new state to be viable, 
both politically and economically, so that it can protect its citizens‘ basic rights 
adequately, and thereby acquire and maintain its own political legitimacy. Yet just-cause 
theorists do not specify this. Thus there is an asymmetry between the requirement that the 
existing state have political legitimacy and the lack of the same requirement for the new 
state. 
This neglect of the question of the new state‘s viability is not just a problem of internal 
inconsistency; it also runs directly counter to the value of justice understood as protection 
of human rights that just-cause theories have at their core. If the new state turns out not to 
be viable, then adequate protection of human rights will therefore be impossible – and 
this should be unacceptable on a just-cause account: if the reason a group has a remedial 
right to secede in the first place is because it has suffered a severe injustice or major 
human rights violations, which its secession is supposed to remedy, then it must be 
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required that the new state be viable, given that state viability is necessary for justice or 
adequate protection of human rights. 
3.2. Political viability 
As mentioned above, this asymmetry concern applies not only to Buchanan‘s account but 
also to Christiano‘s. Like Buchanan, Christiano answers the normative question of 
secession in terms of political legitimacy. Christiano relies on a somewhat different 
functional conception of political legitimacy, which he construes as democratic authority. 
Like Buchanan, however, Christiano focuses strictly on the legitimacy, or political 
viability, of the existing state and not once considers the legitimacy or political viability 
of the new state. The problem with this asymmetry or neglect of the question of the new 
state‘s political viability is that it results in an incomplete and inconsistent assessment of 
the permissibility of secession. 
According to Christiano, a state is legitimate if it has democratic authority, that is, if it 
realizes public equality or treats all its citizens as equals: 
It is in virtue of the fact that democracy publicly realizes equality that it has 
authority over its citizens. (2006, 89) So the thought is that liberal democratic 
states satisfy certain essential prerequisites of legitimacy where legitimacy is to be 
understood as treating persons publicly as equals in the political society. (2006, 
93) 
So conceived, the (democratic) state is needed to ensure justice: ―I contend that the state 
is a necessary instrument for the establishment of justice among persons […] I also want 
to say for the most part that the state is the only such instrument available‖ (Christiano 
2006, 92, emphasis in original). 
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Because democratic states equally protect their citizens‘ basic rights, they help achieve 
justice and therefore have legitimacy. From this, Christiano concludes that secession is 
permissible only to remedy a severe injustice: ―[T]he territorial boundaries of democratic 
states ought to remain as they are except in the cases of serious injustice‖ (2006, 82). 
Christiano adds that examples of such serious injustice include the disenfranchisement, 
violation of individual basic rights, or severe impoverishment of a portion of the 
population, as well as the production of persistent minorities (2006, 82). In each of these 
cases, Christiano explains, ―the democratic assembly that decides these things loses its 
authority over the abused population […]. Under these circumstances, the population 
acquires a right to alternative political arrangements in order to protect against these 
abuses. The standard kinds of remedies in this context [include] secession […]‖ (2006, 
82). 
But from this conception of democratic legitimacy, why should it follow that seceding 
from a democratic state in the absence of severe injustice is impermissible, rather than 
that as long as the new state is in turn democratic and thereby legitimate, it would be 
permissible for a group to secede from a democratic state regardless of whether the 
seceding group has suffered any major injustice under the existing state? I will come back 
to this question in the next section, when considering the question of territorial 
justification in relation to just-cause theories. For now, let‘s just note that Christiano‘s 
exclusive focus on the question of the political viability or legitimacy of the existing state 
obscures the question of the new state‘s political viability or legitimacy, and therefore 
provides an incomplete and inconsistent picture when assessing the permissibility of 
secession. 
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Given the importance of political and economic viability to the adequate protection of 
individuals‘ basic rights, that is, to just-cause theorists‘ conception of justice and political 
legitimacy, just-cause theorists‘ neglect of the question of the new state‘s political and 
economic viability weakens their argument. In the next section, I look at the implications 
of just-cause theorists‘ conception of justice and political legitimacy for the question of 
territorial justification. 
3.3. Territorial justification 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, in a post-Westphalian state order, a state‘s territory is no 
longer viewed as belonging to the ruler (the king or the prince), but rather to the people 
(Bishai 2004, 74-75). And as Buchanan points out, if the territory really belongs to the 
people and not to the state or ruling entity, the state, with regard to its territory, is only 
acting as the agent of the people (1991, 108-109). In this sense, a state‘s territorial 
integrity should be understood not as the state‘s property right, but as a jurisdictional 
power over the territory, a power granted to the state by the people. In other words, what 
grounds legitimate control over the territory is legitimate authority over the people. This 
is why, according to just-cause theorists, it is morally permissible for a group that has 
suffered a major injustice under the larger state to secede. 
As Buchanan explains, ―failure to satisfy this fundamental condition [to perform its 
function adequately] in effect voids the state’s claim to the territory in which the victims 
reside, whereas the fact that they have no other recourse to avoid this fundamental 
injustice gives them a valid title to it‖ (1991, 44-45, emphasis in original). Thus on just-
cause theories‘ functional account of legitimacy, when the state commits a severe 
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injustice toward a territorially concentrated part of its population, the state fails to fulfill 
its function or to provide adequate protection to that group. It therefore loses legitimate 
political authority over that group, and thus its control over the territory that group 
occupies. The group in turn thereby acquires legitimate control over its territory, and so 
would be able to justify its territorial claim, should it want to secede. 
Thus according to just-cause theorists‘ functional account of political legitimacy, a group 
may secede only if it has suffered a major injustice under the larger state. That is, there is 
only a remedial right to secede. If the existing state has not committed any major 
injustices toward the secessionist group, then the state retains legitimate authority over 
the secessionist group and the group‘s secession would not be permissible. Otherwise put, 
if there is no injustice to remedy, the secessionist group does not have the right to secede 
– even if it were able to fulfill the requirements of the functional account of legitimacy in 
its own state after seceding. 
In other words, just-cause theorists seem to rely implicitly on the following claim: If two 
different governing bodies (one already existing: the existing state; the other potentially 
emerging: the secessionist group) are able to fulfill the requirements of the functional 
account of legitimacy, preference should be given to the status quo, i.e. to the existing 
state rather than to the secessionist group. This claim in turn seems to rely implicitly on a 
political interpretation of Ockham‘s razor: ―Do not multiply states or political entities 
beyond necessity,‖ where necessity is understood as severe injustice or human rights 
violations. But why adopt this narrow understanding of necessity, which seems to amount 
to little less than a strange fetishism of the status quo, to the detriment of considerations 
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of self-determination?
24
 I want to suggest that just-cause theorists‘ functional account of 
legitimacy, which is based on the value of justice, in fact supports other cases of 
secession besides remedial cases, because a more plausible conception of the value of 
justice requires balancing it against the values of self-determination and flourishing. In 
showing this, however, we will see that we start not from an account of political 
legitimacy, but instead from the deeper moral values most salient in the question of 
secession – namely self-determination, justice, and flourishing. To see how, let‘s take a 
closer look at Christiano‘s and Buchanan‘s respective accounts of political legitimacy. 
3.3.1. Christiano’s account of legitimacy 
Christiano‘s view that secession from a democratic state is impermissible except in the 
case of a severe injustice is grounded in two principles: the conservation principle (do not 
alter the current borders of democratic states) and the remedy principle (unless such 
alteration is necessary to remedy injustice). According to the conservation principle, 
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 Here it might be replied that one significant reason to favor a strong presumption against secession is that 
secessions have historically been extremely violent affairs. This is true (at least partly), of course – though 
it is unclear that it is this particular concern that guides just-cause theories (if that were the case, just-cause 
theories would have to allow for non-violent cases of non-remedial secession, yet they do not). Still, several 
things should be noted in response to this objection. First, there have also been instances of peaceful 
secession or partition, such as the secession of Norway from Sweden in 1905, or the partition of 
Czechoslovakia in 1993. In other words, though secession has in some instances led to much violence (as in 
the case of the dissolution of former Yugoslavia), it need not do so. Second, where the risk of violence is 
real, it is unclear that preventing a group from seceding will cause much less violence. Third, the creation 
of new international institutions, or the ascription of new functions to existing ones, would likely largely 
prevent such violence (see for example Copp 1998). That is, the risk of violence is due less to the mere 
possibility of satisfying secessionist claims when warranted than to the lack of appropriate international 
institutions and mechanisms to handle secessionist claims adequately. Fourth, the question of whether a 
group has a right to secede is distinct from the question of whether it would be permissible for that group to 
exercise that right. That is, the right to secede may in certain circumstances be overridden by certain 
considerations that would make it impermissible for the group to exercise that right. Thus even if secession 
is not inherently violent, the risk of violence should be taken into account when determining the 
permissibility of secession. This latter observation, however, does nothing to undermine the claim that just-
cause theories are too restrictive, and might even reinforce it: In cases where the risk of violence is minimal 
or altogether absent (as it would presumably be in the event of Flanders‘ secession from the rest of 
Belgium), opposing secession seems simply to amount to a lack of respect for a group‘s right to self-
determination and becomes much more difficult to justify. 
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―there is a strong moral presumption in favor of the current territorial borders of 
democratic states‖ (Christiano 2006, 82). According to the remedy principle, ―the moral 
presumption in favor of the current territorial boundaries of democratic states can be 
defeated only when the alteration of those boundaries is necessary to remedy serious 
injustice occurring within the democratic state‖ (Christiano 2006, 82). Christiano 
explains that the conservation principle is in turn supported by two main arguments: the 
capacity for justice argument and the common world argument. 
According to the capacity for justice argument, ―the modern democratic state is the only 
current entity we have that includes a capacity to judge the justice or injustice of a social 
and political order in a way that publicly treats persons as equals‖ (Christiano 2006, 91). 
Democratic states, moreover, ―are capable of doing this for the jurisdiction defined by 
their territories.‖ Issues of secession, Christiano explains, would have to be arbitrated by 
international institutions, and the latter, he believes, ―are currently and for the foreseeable 
future not capable of doing this in a defensible and legitimate manner that treats all 
participants as equals.‖ From this, Christiano concludes that ―any attempt to alter 
territorial boundaries […] would therefore be illegitimate‖ (2006, 92). He later adds that 
―To the extent that secession must take place outside of any system of settled law, and the 
only way to establish justice is through settled law, there must be at least a presumption 
against such action as militating against the establishment of justice‖ (2006, 97). 
The capacity for justice argument thus rests on the following claims: (1) The democratic 
state is the only entity on which we can currently rely to adjudicate questions of justice. 
(2) Secession disputes would have to be arbitrated by international institutions, but the 
latter are currently unable to do so in a just manner. (3) Because secession cannot 
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currently be handled through settled law, and the establishment of justice depends on 
settled law, secession by definition goes against justice. In response to the capacity for 
justice argument, let‘s now review each of these three claims. 
It should first be noted that, depending on how the first claim is specified, appealing to 
the democratic state as the only reliable instrument for justice either begs the question 
against the secessionists, or proves too much, at least for the just-cause theorist. If the 
claim is that only the current state can arbitrate the secession dispute justly, then 
Christiano is simply begging the question against the secessionists.
25
 If the claim is rather 
that the democratic state in general is the only reliable instrument for justice within any 
given state, once its boundaries are established, then Christiano is now proving too much 
for a remedial theory of secession.  On the first understanding, appealing to the 
democratic state as the only reliable instrument for justice begs the question against the 
secessionists, because any secessionist claim, including non-remedial ones, is motivated 
by the belief that the current state is, in some way or other, not doing the secessionist 
group justice, or that the group would be better off in its own independent state – for 
example because the group might thereby be able more fully to exercise self-
determination and to flourish. On the second understanding, appealing to the democratic 
state as the only reliable instrument for justice proves too much for the just-cause 
theorist, because the secessionist group might in turn create its own democratic state, 
capable of administering its own territory and population justly. In other words, if 
Christiano‘s concern is that states be democratic in order to achieve justice, the 
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 To be fair, though, Christiano seems to be aware of this, since he also states that secession disputes 
would have to be arbitrated by international institutions – presumably because relying on the current state 
to adjudicate issues of secession would simply beg the question against the secessionists. 
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secessionists might very well be able to achieve just that in creating their own democratic 
state. Thus the first claim in the capacity for justice argument does little to support 
Christiano‘s case. 
The second claim in the capacity for justice argument is twofold: It states that (i) 
secession disputes would have to be arbitrated by international institutions, but that (ii) 
international institutions are currently unable to do so in a just manner. The latter 
statement (ii) may be true as a matter of contingent fact, but there is no reason to believe 
(unless one adopts a realist view) that this is necessarily so. The creation of new 
international institutions or the ascription of new functions to existing ones, for example, 
might alleviate this concern. In other words, the current inability of international 
institutions to arbitrate secession disputes justly has less to do with some inherent or 
permanent feature of those institutions themselves than with the fact that they still lack 
both the form and the content to be able to do so. 
It is unclear, moreover, that the former statement (i) is correct: Why would secession 
disputes have to be arbitrated by international institutions, especially given that, as 
Christiano points out, the latter are not yet equipped to do so, neither in form nor in 
content? Presumably, Christiano suggests international arbitration for secession disputes 
because he realizes that leaving them up to current states would beg the question against 
secessionist groups. But why not consider the possibility of the secessionists negotiating 
with, or peacefully seceding from, the current state? This, after all, happened in the case 
of Norway‘s secession from Sweden in 1905, and in the case of the partition of 
Czechoslovakia in 1993. If this sounds too optimistic, then this only points not to the 
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impermissibility of non-remedial secession, but to the need to develop institutions that 
are able to arbitrate secession disputes both in form and in content. 
In any case, one final point should be noted with regard to the arbitration of secession 
disputes. Christiano‘s account does allow for cases of remedial secession. Christiano 
further makes clear that international institutions are currently unable to arbitrate 
secession disputes justly. Why, then, should the lack of adequate international arbitration 
count against non-remedial cases of secession, but not against remedial ones? Perhaps the 
urgency of the situation in remedial cases sets them apart from non-remedial cases, and 
therefore warrants action (secession) regardless of adequate arbitration. But if anything, 
this suggests that non-remedial cases of secession ought likewise to be permissible. 
Indeed, international mediation would seem to be more urgently needed in remedial cases 
of secession than in non-remedial cases. If the former cases are nonetheless permissible 
in the absence of adequate international arbitration, then the same should be true of the 
latter cases. Thus the second claim in the capacity for justice argument does not do much 
to help Christiano‘s case. 
The third claim in the capacity for justice argument asserts that because secession cannot 
currently be handled through settled law, and the establishment of justice depends on 
settled law, secession by definition goes against justice. This claim is obviously false if 
one considers cases of remedial secession. In those cases, the establishment of justice 
requires acting (seceding) outside of settled law. The same may be true, however, in 
cases of non-remedial secession. Secessionists indeed often invoke the right of peoples to 
self-determination to justify their claims, and as will be argued below, central 
international texts such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 
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International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as well as the Charter 
of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights all suggest that the 
right of peoples to self-determination is a human right. If that is the case, then cases of 
non-remedial of secession either become remedial, in light of the fact that justice requires 
respect of human rights, including the right of peoples to self-determination; or likewise 
warrant secession outside of settled law for the establishment of justice, understood as 
including respect of the human right of peoples to self-determination. Thus the third 
claim in the capacity for justice argument does little to bolster Christiano‘s case. 
Upon closer examination, then, the capacity for justice argument is not as compelling as 
might at first appear. What about the second argument supporting Christiano‘s 
conservation principle? According to the common world argument, 
Modern democratic states and many other states, for the most part, constitute 
common worlds for their participants. A common world for a group of individuals 
is a world in which all or nearly all the individuals‘ fundamental interests are 
intertwined with each other. What happens in this common world overall affects 
the fundamental interests of all the members. […] The main idea behind the 
importance of a common world is the idea that in a common world individuals 
have roughly equal stakes in the world they live in. Their interests are roughly 
equally at stake in such a world as a result of the idea that all or nearly all of their 
fundamental interests are at stake for each person. […] The common world 
consideration provides support for the principle of conservation of the territorial 
boundaries of liberal democratic states because only in the case of a common 
world can the principle of equality have a clear and defensible public realization. 
Only when the stakes people have in a particular association are roughly equal 
can the principle of public equality have a clear hold. (Christiano 2006, 97-98) 
The common world argument thus rests on the following claims: (1) A common world is 
one in which all participants have roughly equal stakes with regard to their fundamental 
interests.  (2) A common world is needed for the public realization of equality. (3) The 
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territorial boundaries of a common world should not be altered. In response to the 
common world argument, let‘s now review each of these three claims. 
The conflict between the idea of a common world and the context of secession is not that 
secession would result in breaking up a common world, but rather that the very presence 
of secessionist claims signals, precisely, that there is no common world to begin with 
between the secessionist group and the rest of the state. Indeed, if a group seeks to secede 
from an existing state, this is presumably because it deems that its interests are not being 
given due weight or protection within the current state, i.e. that its stakes are unequal. 
Thus even if we adopt Christiano‘s idea of a common world, appealing to this idea as 
providing a reason against the permissibility of secession simply does not make sense. 
Here it might be objected that the remainder state should have an equal say in 
determining the permissibility of the group‘s secession in virtue of the fact that its 
―fundamental interests are equally intertwined‖ with those of the secessionist group, i.e. 
that there actually is a common world between the secessionist group and the remainder 
state. But this would be like claiming that a person seeking to divorce or to break up with 
her partner should not be allowed to do so unless her partner has an equal say in the 
decision on the grounds that, after all, two partners‘ ―fundamental interests are equally 
intertwined‖ with each other. Yet this clearly seems mistaken.  
What this shows, then, is that even if we granted that there might be such a common 
world between the secessionist group and the remainder state, the idea of a common 
world, in the context of secession, becomes irrelevant altogether. Thus Buchanan‘s point 
that in cases of remedial secession, the culpable aggressor (the current state) should not 
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have a say in determining the permissibility of secession (1991, 159) extends to the case 
of non-remedial secession. As Wellman and Altman further illustrate, if Germany wanted 
to annex Poland, it would be absurd to claim that in order to determine the permissibility 
of the annexation, Germany‘s population should be polled as well as Poland‘s, because 
Germany‘s ―fundamental interests are equally intertwined‖ with Poland‘s: as they 
explain, ―without Polish consent, the preferences of the Germans about annexing Poland 
simply do not count; they are irrelevant‖ (2009, 52-53). Here it might be objected that 
annexation of an already existing legitimate state is not on a par with non-remedial 
secession, because the secessionist group is only potentially a legitimate state. I will 
respond to this objection below, when I turn to Buchanan‘s account of legitimacy. 
For now, let‘s look at the second claim in the common world argument, namely that a 
common world is needed for the public realization of equality. This second claim may be 
correct, but it does nothing to undermine the permissibility of non-remedial secession. On 
the contrary, it would seem to provide an argument in favor of this type of cases. Though 
Christiano specifies that a common world does not necessarily depend on a common 
culture or nationality (2006, 98), in the reverse a common culture or nationality, or some 
other form of collective identity, might nonetheless strengthen a common world. Indeed, 
sharing a collective identity would make it more likely that all citizens‘ ―fundamental 
interests are equally intertwined with each other‖ and that all citizens will ―have roughly 
equal stakes in the world in which they live.‖ Because secessionists usually do share such 
a collective identity in virtue of which they wish to form their own independent state, and 
because such a collective identity would only strengthen a common world, the claim that 
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a common world is needed for the public realization of equality seems to support, rather 
than undermine, the permissibility of non-remedial secession. 
Christiano‘s concern with the public realization of equality, moreover, also seems to 
provide a reason in favor of the permissibility of cases of non-remedial secession. Indeed, 
treating all citizens as equals would seem to require that the secessionist group have the 
right to decide who will govern it, or to select its political representatives. Treating all 
citizens as equals in the type of democratic state that Christiano has in mind would 
further seem to require allowing citizens to advocate secession, to form secessionist 
parties, and to have these parties form local governments and hold democratic referenda. 
If allowing all of this is not only consistent with, but required by, the public realization of 
equality, then it is difficult to justify why, in the case of a significant majority favoring 
secession, negotiation of secession should not be granted to the secessionist group. Not to 
grant secessionists negotiations after allowing all previous steps would be to make a 
mockery of the democratic process (Norman 2003, 207). Thus once again, the claim that 
a common world is needed for the public realization of equality seems to support, rather 
than undermine, the permissibility of non-remedial secession. In other words, the second 
claim in the common world argument proves too much for the just-cause theorist. 
Given that the first two claims (a common world as one of equal stakes, needed for the 
public realization of equality) do not undermine the permissibility of non-remedial 
secession, the third claim that the territorial boundaries of a common world should not be 
altered likewise does not undermine the permissibility of non-remedial secession. In other 
words, if secession is consistent with the idea of a common world, then the claim that the 
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territorial boundaries of a common world should not be altered does nothing to 
undermine the permissibility of secession. 
To review, then, Christiano‘s view that secession from a democratic state is 
impermissible except in the case of a severe injustice is grounded in two principles: the 
conservation principle (do not alter the current borders of democratic states), and the 
remedy principle (unless such alteration is necessary to remedy injustice). The 
conservation principle is in turn supported by two main arguments: the capacity for 
justice argument and the common world argument. But the critical assessment of those 
two arguments showed that they bolster, rather than undermine, the permissibility of non-
remedial secession. What this means, then, is that Christiano‘s account of legitimacy in 
fact supports other cases of secession besides remedial cases. I now want to argue that the 
same is true of Buchanan‘s account of legitimacy. Doing so will also address Christiano‘s 
remedy principle. 
3.3.2. Buchanan’s account of legitimacy 
Buchanan defines political legitimacy in terms of three conditions. In order to be 
legitimate, a state must respect its citizens‘ fundamental rights both in content 
(substantially) and in form (procedurally), and must not be a usurper (Buchanan 2002, 
703). Yet this third condition is necessary but non-sufficient. Buchanan indeed defines a 
usurper as an entity ―wrongly deposing a legitimate wielder of political power‖ (2002, 
703). Presumably, the problem with a usurper is that it coercively substitutes a therefore 
illegitimate wielder of political power to a legitimate one, i.e. that it prevents a legitimate 
one from wielding power. If this is correct, then the third condition also needs to include 
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as illegitimate attempts to maintain an existing wielder of power when another potential 
legitimate one questions its legitimacy, i.e. the third condition needs to include as 
illegitimate attempts to prevent a legitimate power wielder from wielding power. Such 
prevention indeed turns a previously legitimate power wielder into an illegitimate one. 
In other words, if what is ultimately problematic is the prevention of legitimate power 
wielding, then it is simply irrelevant whether the legitimate power wielder is actual or 
potential, i.e. whether it is already in existence when the illegitimate one takes over, or 
whether the legitimate one is merely emerging (or trying to emerge) when the other one 
is stifling it and thereby becoming illegitimate. Thus I am suggesting that the case of the 
former USSR forcibly integrating the Baltic States is, in the relevant respects, on a par 
with, for example, Canada opposing the secession of Quebec. In both cases, a legitimate 
power wielder is prevented from wielding power by a competing power wielder which 
thereby becomes illegitimate. 
It might be objected, of course, that the Baltic States would have been justified in 
seceding from the former USSR because they were suffering a fundamental injustice, 
whereas Quebec is not. But note that to claim that the Baltic States were suffering an 
injustice whereas Quebec is not, simply begs the question against Quebec: what is at 
issue is precisely whether Canada‘s opposition to the secession of Quebec constitutes a 
violation of Quebec‘s right to self-determination, that is, constitutes an injustice. Article 
21 (3) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights does state that ―The will of the 
people shall be the basis of the authority of government‖ (Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights), and Article 1 of both the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights states 
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that ―All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development‖ (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights). Articles 1 (2) and 55 of the U.N. 
Charter likewise both refer to ―the principle of equal rights and self-determination of 
peoples‖ (Charter of the United Nations). These texts suggest that a group‘s right to 
political self-determination is a human right, and therefore that Canada‘s opposition to 
the secession of Quebec might constitute a violation of human rights – something that 
just-cause theorists such as Buchanan and Christiano should be concerned about. 
What this means, then, is that a concern for justice requires taking into account 
considerations of self-determination, whose exercise directly contributes to a group‘s 
flourishing. Thus a territorially concentrated part of a state‘s population that has suffered 
none of the injustices listed under the just-cause account, but that nonetheless deems that 
it should no longer be included in the larger state (for example, Flanders in Belgium) 
might have a right to secede, in virtue of the fact that it would better flourish if it had its 
own independent state, because independent statehood would allow the group more fully 
to enjoy self-determination. 
If what grounds legitimate control over the territory is legitimate authority over the 
people, then self-determination is prior to territorial integrity, or territorial integrity is 
grounded in self-determination. As I argued in Chapter 2, if secessionists can show that 
they already occupied that portion of territory before they entered the political union, then 
it is unclear that the remainder of the population would have a right to prevent the 
secessionists from taking away a piece of territory that was already theirs before the 
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political unit was formed.
26
 Secessionists, then, would have a valid claim to the territory, 
and would thus be able to meet the condition of territorial justification.
27
 In this case, the 
seceding group has a valid claim to the territory it occupies (and already occupied before 
the political unit was formed) not because the state committed a major injustice, but 
because that portion of territory was ―always‖ that group‘s to begin with. 
Thus a closer look at Buchanan‘s functional account of legitimacy shows that it, like 
Christiano‘s, in fact also supports non-remedial cases of secession, when it is defined not 
merely in terms of the value of justice minimally or narrowly construed, but in terms of 
the value of justice balanced against the values of self-determination and flourishing. 
 
 
                                                 
26
 This of course would only apply to cases where it is relatively clear which group occupies (and has 
occupied) which part of the territory – for example, the Québécois occupy the province of Quebec, the 
Flemish the region of Flanders (and the same was true of Norway before it seceded from Sweden in 1905, 
or of the Czechs and the Slovaks before they parted ways in 1993). Such groups already occupied their 
territory before the larger country in which they were included was formed, and have continuously 
occupied the same territory, which makes those territorial claims much easier to justify. In cases where 
populations are intermingled, or where more ancient and more recent occupants each claim to have a valid 
claim to the same territory, matters become more complicated. If possible, the two groups might try to 
divide the territory as fairly as possible, perhaps through the help of international mediation. Where 
territorial division is no longer feasible (as in the case of the entire American continent), compensation or 
reparation toward the native populations is probably the next best option. This is not to say that the native 
group does not have a valid claim to the territory it once occupied, but simply that its claim is overridden 
by the interests of the people who currently live on the land, namely, all the descendants of European and 
other migrants for whom that land is the only home they know and have. This in turn is not to say that the 
injustice the group suffered is thereby superseded, or that it no longer warrants compensation or reparation; 
but rather that restitution of the exact territory is, for better or worse, no longer a feasible option. Thus 
Buchanan‘s objection to the secession of Québec on the grounds that Québec does not necessarily have a 
rightful claim to its territory given that Native Canadians also live on it (Buchanan 1991, 64) is flawed, 
because it proves too much: if his objection is the rule, then Canada – and all other current states in the 
entire American continent and many other parts of the world – also fails to have a rightful claim to its 
territory. Yet Canada does have a rightful claim to its territory according to Buchanan, and so he should 
extend the same logic to Québec, should it want to secede. For more on this question, see Buchanan 1991, 
87-91, and Waldron 1992. 
27
 Of course, as in the case of marriage, any assets acquired in common during the political union should be 
divided as fairly as possible, and if the political unit as a whole invested many resources in the territory that 
is now breaking away, compensation arrangements should be made for secession to be permissible. 
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4. Conclusion 
The main problems for just-cause theories are their neglect of the new state‘s viability 
and their lack of regard for non-remedial claims. These problems are the result of just-
cause theorists‘ reducing the question of secession to the question of political legitimacy, 
which they associate only with the value of justice. In doing so, just-cause theories 
neglect the other two values of self-determination and flourishing, and end up with an 
implausible conception of justice. This implausible conception of justice then gives rise 
to just-cause theorists‘ neglect of the new state‘s viability and lack of regard for non-
remedial claims. 
One problem for just-cause theories is their inattention to the question of the new state‘s 
viability. But if we understand justice as the adequate protection of citizens‘ basic rights 
(as just-cause theories do), then justice requires state viability, since a non-viable state 
would be unable to adequately protect its citizens‘ basic rights, and those citizens‘ ability 
to exercise self-determination and to flourish would thereby be seriously hindered. The 
other problem for just-cause theories is their failure to account for non-remedial cases of 
secession (like Quebec, which has not suffered any major human rights violations). This 
is because, in their account of legitimacy, just-cause theories adopt a very narrow or 
minimal conception of justice, which focuses solely on justice, and more precisely on the 
justice of the remainder state. Only when the remainder state has committed a major 
injustice (such as major human rights violations) is a group‘s secession permissible. This 
means that the secessionist claims of groups that have not suffered that kind of injustice 
(for example, the Québécois) are automatically dismissed as unwarranted. This is 
problematic because in practice it might hinder certain groups‘ (like Quebec) ability to 
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exercise self-determination and to flourish, which would be unjust. Thus introducing 
considerations of self-determination and flourishing allows us to arbitrate between 
conflicting claims of justice (of the secessionists and the remainder state) and to reach a 
more plausible conception of justice, one that shows that valuing justice requires 
respecting other groups‘ right to self-determination, which contributes to their 
flourishing. 
Thus in reducing the question of secession to a matter of political legitimacy, just-cause 
theorists neglect non-remedial claims, and thereby yield a morally implausible answer to 
the question of secession, one that fails to consider all concerned groups‘ rights and 
interests equally. Avoiding this problem requires introducing considerations of self-
determination and flourishing, in addition to considerations of justice. Proceeding in this 
way yields a more plausible conception of the value of justice, one that by definition 
accounts for non-remedial claims and thereby considers all concerned groups‘ rights and 
interests equally. In other words, reaching a plausible answer to the question of secession 
requires adopting an axiological approach, i.e. starting not from an account of political 
legitimacy, but directly from the three values of self-determination, justice, and 
flourishing. 
 
 
 
 
 112 
 
CHAPTER 5 
Flourishing 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Chapter 3 showed that choice theorists provide an extremely permissive but also morally 
implausible answer to the normative question of secession, because they reduce the 
question of secession to the question of political legitimacy, which they associate 
primarily with the value of self-determination to the detriment of the values of justice and 
flourishing. Chapter 4 showed that just-cause theorists provide an extremely restrictive 
but likewise morally implausible answer to the normative question of secession, because 
they reduce the question of secession to the question of political legitimacy, which they 
associate primarily with the value of justice to the detriment of the values of self-
determination and flourishing. 
Nationalist likewise reduce the question of secession to the question of political 
legitimacy, though they rely on a different account of political legitimacy, which relies 
primarily on the value of national flourishing. According to nationalist theorists, 
―members of a group are best placed to judge whether their group‘s prosperity will be 
jeopardized if it does not enjoy political independence‖ (Margalit and Raz 1990, 457), 
such that, for example, even though ―the English may have an interest in being part of 
Great Britain, rather than mere Englanders […] that interest can be justified only with the 
willing cooperation of, e.g., the Scots‖ (Margalit and Raz 1990, 460). This gives rise to 
the duty on behalf of the larger state ―not to impede groups in their attempts to decide 
whether appropriate territories should be independent […]‖ (Margalit and Raz 1990, 
460). In other words, nationalist theorists argue that ―differences in nationality provide a 
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valid basis for determining the location and function of boundaries‖ (Kymlicka 2001, 
265) and that ―the boundaries of nation-states […] define a body of citizens—a political 
community—which is seen as the bearer of sovereignty, and whose will and interests 
form the standards of political legitimacy‖ (Kymlicka 2001, 254). Otherwise put, 
nationalist theorists contend that a state is legitimate if its national group(s) can 
sufficiently identify with it in terms of nationality, or if those groups deem that they are 
able to flourish within it. Thus the right to secede is grounded in the increased group 
flourishing (and thereby increased individual flourishing) that independent statehood 
based on nationality is said to bring. According to nationalist theorists, then, as long as a 
majority within it so wishes, and as long as it has a valid territorial claim, any national 
group has the right to secede. 
This chapter examines the way in which nationalist theories, based on their account of 
political legitimacy, have addressed or failed to address the three conditions of territorial 
justification, adequate protection of rights, and economic viability, as well as the way in 
which nationalist theories have thereby conceptualized the value of flourishing in its 
relation to the question of secession. 
Thus this chapter examines how nationalist theories have conceived the value of 
flourishing as it relates to secession and the three conditions. It shows that a normative 
theory of secession based exclusively on flourishing (as nationalist theories are) is too 
permissive, because relying only on the value of flourishing when developing a 
normative theory of secession yields an implausible conception of the value of 
flourishing, and thereby an implausible answer to the normative question of secession.  
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In this chapter, I argue that reaching a morally more plausible conception of the value of 
flourishing (and thereby a more plausible answer to the normative question of secession) 
requires introducing considerations of self-determination and justice, in addition to 
considerations of flourishing. In doing so, I show that balancing the value of flourishing 
against the other two values of self-determination and justice requires starting not from 
an account of political legitimacy (as nationalist theories do), but directly from the three 
values of self-determination, justice, and flourishing. 
2. Nationalist theories’ normative account of secession 
For nationalist theories, a state is legitimate if the state and its citizens share a common 
national identity. Thus according to nationalist theories, any national group
28
 that wishes 
to do so may secede, in order to create a state whose cultural and political boundaries 
coincide, i.e. to create a legitimate state. For example, if Quebec wanted to secede from 
Canada, it would be allowed to do so, because the Québécois share a national identity. 
From this we can see that in their account of legitimacy, nationalist theories emphasize 
the value of flourishing, which national identity is said to foster. Thus nationalist theories 
approach the question of secession from the point of view of the seceding group. 
Nationalist theories are more restrictive than choice theories (because they ground 
secessionist claims specifically in nationality) but they are more permissive than just-
cause theories (because they regard some secessionist claims as legitimate even in the 
absence of major injustice). Contemporary proponents of nationalist theories include 
                                                 
28
 Nationalist theories offer several definitions of a national group; but some overlap may be captured by 
understanding a national group as a group that shares a common language, culture, history, territory – 
though all of these elements may not be exhaustive or sufficient, and each of these elements may not be 
necessary. Examples of national groups include the Québécois in Canada, the Flemish in Belgium, or the 
Catalans in Spain. 
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Avishai Margalit and Jospeh Raz (1990), Daniel Kofman (1998), David Miller (1998, 
2000), and Will Kymlicka (2001). 
Based on the criteria of normative support and comprehensiveness laid out in Chapter 1, 
in order to be successful or normatively plausible, a philosophical theory of secession 
must be (1) consistent with the basic principles and values of liberal political philosophy; 
and (2) consistent with what secession involves. 
In light of these criteria, nationalist theories offer two main advantages. First, they 
emphasize the value of flourishing (criterion of normative support: widely recognized 
value). Second, they are able to justify the territorial claim of the seceding group, by 
legitimating acquisition of the land on the grounds of having lived on it and shaped it 
(criterion of comprehensiveness: consistent with what secession involves, namely taking 
a territory; and criterion of normative support: territorial integrity as key principle of 
liberal political philosophy). The main problems of nationalist theories are: First, their 
neglect of the question of economic viability, which undermines a group‘s ability to 
flourish, for example through the creation or maintenance of cultural or political 
institutions (criterion of comprehensiveness: inconsistent with what secession involves, 
namely the creation of a viable state; and criterion of normative support: flourishing as 
key principles of liberal political philosophy). Second, nationalist theories risk 
encouraging nationalist extremism, for example ethnic cleansing or forced assimilation of 
minorities – both of which violate the principle of protection of universal human rights 
(criterion of normative support: human rights as key principle of liberal political 
philosophy). These advantages and problems will become clearer in the rest of this 
chapter. 
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In what follows, I look at the way in which nationalist theories, based on their account of 
political legitimacy, have addressed or failed to address the three conditions of territorial 
justification, adequate protection of rights, and economic viability spelled out in Chapter 
2, and at the way in which nationalist theories have thereby conceptualized the value of 
flourishing as it relates to secession. 
3. Nationalist theories and the three permissibility conditions 
3.1. Territorial justification 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, in a post-Westphalian state order, a state‘s territory is no 
longer viewed as belonging to the ruler, but rather to the people (Bishai 2004, 74-75). 
The state, then, with regard to its territory, is acting merely as the agent of the people 
(Buchanan 1991, 108-109). In this sense, territorial integrity should be understood not as 
a state‘s property right, but as a state‘s jurisdictional power over its territory, a power 
granted to the state by the people. Thus what grounds legitimate control over the territory 
is legitimate authority over the people. In other words, if a state does not have legitimate 
authority over some of its people, it also does not have legitimate control over some of its 
territory. If it can be shown that the state does not have legitimate authority over some of 
its people, then it would seem that this group should be able to leave with its territory if it 
so wishes. I then offered two different justifications for taking part of a state‘s territory, 
each corresponding to one way in which a state does not have legitimate political 
authority over some of its population: the argument from injustice and the argument from 
self-determination and flourishing. 
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According to the argument from injustice, when the state commits a severe injustice 
toward a territorially concentrated part of its population, the state fails to fulfill its 
function or to provide adequate protection to that group. The state therefore loses 
legitimate political authority over that group, and thus its control over the territory that 
this group occupies. Because the territory really belongs to the people, the group in turn 
acquires or recovers legitimate control over its territory, and so would be able to justify 
its territorial claim, should it want to secede (Buchanan 1991, 44-45). 
According to the argument from self-determination and flourishing, the state may not 
have legitimate authority over groups that have not suffered a major injustice. The 
argument pointed to an important similarity between the situation of such groups and that 
of colonized peoples: namely, being prevented from fully exercising political self-
determination because of questionable boundaries. In other words, both types of groups 
are being prevented from exercising the fullest degree of political self-determination 
because of the way boundaries were drawn. In light of this analogy between non-remedial 
secessionists and colonized peoples, the secessionist group might have a valid claim to 
the territory it currently occupies if it already occupied it before the current political unit 
was formed.
29
 In this case, the state loses its authority over the territory not because of a 
major injustice, but because that portion of territory was ―always‖ that group‘s to begin 
                                                 
29
 Here one might ask what makes a secessionist group the ―same‖ group over time. The individual 
members of a group may of course change without thereby affecting the existence of the group over time. 
This is clear if one looks at the continuity of various groups over time, such as states (the United States), 
universities (the University of Colorado), corporations (AT&T), or sports teams (the Rockies). These 
groups persist despite the changing composition of their membership. The same is true of secessionist 
groups (Quebec or Flanders). Now one might point out that membership in a state, university, corporation, 
or sport team depends on certain objective criteria or relations such as living in, studying at, working for, or 
playing for; and ask what the equivalent criteria or relations would be for secessionist groups. I want to 
suggest that the relevant criterion or relation in this case is mutual recognition as members of group X 
(ancestry, birth, residence, or cultural identity may be additional factors, but I believe that none of them are 
necessary or sufficient to determine membership in a group through time). 
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with, and that group now wishes to be self-governing in that territory. This is the 
principle that the territory really belongs to the people, rather than to the state (Bishai 
2004, 74-75; Buchanan 1991, 108-109). 
Nationalist theorists likewise rely on the principle that the territory belongs to the people, 
rather than to the state, but they specifically justify the territorial claim of the seceding 
(national) group on the grounds that the group has lived on it and shaped it over time. 
(Note that this Lockean argument is different from the argument from self-determination 
and flourishing I offered above, because (1) the former argument does not necessarily 
require that the group had already occupied the territory before the political unit was 
formed, though this might of course often also be the case; and (2) the latter argument 
does not necessarily require any shaping of the land, though this will of course almost 
always be the case.) 
Let‘s now unpack the principle that the territory belongs to the people, in the context of 
nationalist theories of secession. I begin with the notion of people, then turn to that of the 
relevant portion of land or territory, and finally to that of belonging. 
For nationalist theories, the ―people‖ is specifically a national group. Though nationalist 
theorists offer different definitions of a national group (Margalit and Raz 1990; Kofman 
1998; Miller 1998, 2000; Kymlicka 2001), my present goal is not to provide a review or a 
critique of those definitions. Rather, my aim for the purposes of this chapter is simply to 
offer a working definition of national group that might nonetheless be useful in 
discussing nationalist theories of secession. Thus one might roughly capture nationalist 
theorists‘ definitions in a working definition of a national group as a group of individuals 
 119 
 
(1) sharing over time a common language, history, culture, territory, race, ethnicity, or 
religion, and (2) mutually identifying as members of group X in virtue of some set of 
those factors – though none of those factors taken individually or jointly are necessary or 
sufficient for a group to qualify as a nation. The relative vagueness of this working 
definition need not be worrisome as, fortunately for the theorist of secession, her task is 
not to go about in the world and identify the groups that might qualify as national groups 
according to a set list of objective criteria. Rather, the subjective self-identification of 
national groups as such will usually be sufficient to theorize about the permissibility of 
secession. With all this in mind, examples of national groups include the Québécois, the 
Flemish, the Catalans, or the South Sudanese. 
Having clarified the notion of people, how might one determine what portion of land 
belongs to it? As mentioned above, nationalist theorists adopt a Lockean (or ―mix one‘s 
labor‖) view of land acquisition. Thus the portion of land that belongs to the group is that 
portion of land which the group has occupied and shaped over time. 
This notion of the relevant portion of land also gives us some insight into the notion of 
(rightful) belonging. That the land belongs to the people means not that the people owns 
it as private property, but rather that the people has collectively acquired it over time by 
living on it and shaping it. Thus Kymlicka suggests that ―the claim that the state and its 
territory belong to the titular nation is not a claim about the allocation of private property 
rights, but about control over public space‖ (2001, 257). Similarly, Miller argues that to 
say that a territory belongs to a people does not mean that the people owns the territory as 
property but rather that the people has a valid claim to exercise political authority over 
the territory (1998, 68). Miller specifies what corresponds to such legitimate political 
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authority by suggesting that such a claim comes from the group‘s shaping of the territory 
that it inhabits (1998, 68). 
But what if a usurper forcefully seizes a certain territory and subsequently lives on it and 
shapes it? Relying solely on the nationalist Lockean criterion would make it impossible 
in controversial territorial disputes to know whether the land rightly belongs to more 
ancient occupants or to more recent occupants. Thus the Lockean criterion needs to be 
used in tandem with the principles of restitution and prescription. According to the 
principle of restitution, in cases of territorial disputes between more ancient and more 
recent occupants, the land should be given back to the more ancient occupants (as in the 
case of the Baltic Republics, which were forcefully annexed by the former USSR). 
According to the principle of prescription, in cases of territorial disputes between more 
ancient and more recent occupants, the land belongs to the more recent occupants (as in 
the case of the entire American continent). There is no neat algorithm to determine which 
of the two (diametrically opposed) principles should apply in any given case. Time and 
numbers, however, both seem to come into play. Thus Margalit and Raz write: 
Do historical ties make a difference? […] Suppose that the group was unjustly 
removed from the country. In that case, the general principle of restitution applies, 
and the group has a right to self-determination and control over the territory it was 
expelled from, subject to the general principle of prescription. Prescription 
protects the interests of the current inhabitants. It is based on several deep-seated 
concerns. It is meant to prevent the revival of abandoned claims, and to protect 
those who are not personally to blame from having their life unsettled by claims 
of ancient wrongs, on the ground that their case now is as good as that of the 
wronged people or their descendants. Prescription, therefore, may lose the 
expelled group the right even though its members continue to suffer the effects of 
the past wrong. (1990, 459) 
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This passage suggests that both time and numbers are doing some work. The idea that 
―prescription protects the interests of the current inhabitants‖ points to an underlying 
utilitarian rationale, in virtue of which there are so many current inhabitants, with 
interests in the land, that the land therefore rightly belongs to them. Numbers, however, 
cannot be the only factor at play in determining whether restitution or prescription 
applies. To see why, imagine that the entire population of China suddenly moved to 
Canada. In terms of numbers alone, the new Chinese occupants would overwhelmingly 
outweigh the Canadian occupants. Yet it would be implausible to claim that, in virtue of 
numbers, Canada now rightly belongs to China. Indeed, this example illustrates a clear 
case calling for restitution, whereby Canada should rightly recover authority over its 
territory.  
Thus time must also be at play in determining whether restitution or prescription applies. 
In the case of the entire American continent, very few people will deny that the land was 
initially unjustly seized by European colonists and settlers, against the will of the native 
or indigenous populations. A few centuries later, however, just as few people would 
argue that current occupants (descendants of European and other migrants) should be 
expelled and that the land should be fully restituted to native populations. The Lockean 
criterion of having lived on and shaped the land might partly be reentering the equation at 
this point, in favor of current occupants. But the question of where current occupants 
would (have a right to) go also seems to be guiding the intuition that prescription should 
apply, so that current occupants are not expelled. 
Thus in cases of territorial disputes between more ancient and more recent occupants, the 
nationalist Lockean criterion should be complemented by the principles of restitution and 
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prescription, keeping in mind that no neat formula exists to determine whether restitution 
or prescription should apply. The argument from self-determination and flourishing 
presented in Chapter 2 and summarized at the beginning of this section, provides one way 
in which a national group might have a valid territorial claim. Thus Kymlicka asks: 
What are the legitimate grounds or principles for determining the locations of 
boundaries? For liberals, the most obvious candidate here—as with any other 
issue—is freedom of choice, constrained by respect for the rights of others. If the 
majority on any particular territory does not wish to remain part of a larger state—
perhaps because they were unjustly included in that state in the first place—why 
shouldn‘t they be allowed to secede […]? (2001, 251) 
Indeed, Kymlicka argues that liberal principles might in fact require satisfying nationalist 
secessionist claims, because doing so would foster democracy. This brings me to the next 
section. 
3.2. Adequate protection 
As mentioned above, one of the main problems nationalist theories of secession face is 
that they risk encouraging nationalist extremism, for example in the form of ethnic 
cleansing or forced assimilation of minorities. This would run directly counter to the 
condition of adequate protection of individuals‘ basic rights. In other words, nationalist 
ideals (if they involve extreme means such as ethnic cleansing or forced assimilation of 
minorities) may conflict with basic human rights or liberal democratic principles. 
What do nationalist theorists have to say about human rights and democracy? Here 
nationalist theorists‘ appeal to the value of flourishing becomes interesting. On the one 
hand, nationalist theorists admittedly seem concerned with both human rights and 
democracy, which they suggest contribute to a national group‘s flourishing (Margalit and 
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Raz 1990; Kofman 1998; Miller 1998, 2000; Kymlicka 2001). On the other hand, 
however, their concern with human rights and democracy does not always go as far as 
their emphasis on the value of flourishing would seem to require. To see this, let‘s start 
with the nationalist argument for self-determination or secession, which is grounded in 
the value of flourishing. 
3.2.1. The nationalist argument 
Margalit and Raz put the nationalist argument for secession or self-determination as 
follows: 
A group‘s right to self-determination is its right to determine whether a territory 
be self-governing (1990, 454). The right to self-determination derives from the 
value of membership in encompassing groups. It is a group right, deriving from 
the value of a collective good […] (456). The right of self-determination so 
understood is not ultimate, but is grounded in the wider value of national self-
government, which is itself to be only instrumentally justified (441). The point 
needs to be made to connect concern with the prosperity of the group with 
concern for the well-being of individuals. This tie between the individual and the 
collective is at the heart of the case for self-determination (444). [T]he key to the 
explanation [of the right to self-determination] is the importance of these 
[national] groups to the well-being of their members (448). [M]embership of such 
groups is of great importance to individual well-being, for it greatly affects one‘s 
opportunities, one‘s ability to engage in the relationships and the pursuits marked 
by the culture (449). 
The nationalist argument can thus be summarized as: 
(1) Independent statehood is instrumental to national flourishing.  
(2) National flourishing is instrumental to individual flourishing.  
(3) Independent statehood is instrumental to individual flourishing.  
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Thus according to nationalist theorists, nations have the right to secede or form their own 
independent state because of the human flourishing they are said to foster. Let‘s look 
more closely at the first and second premises. 
3.2.2. Independent statehood and national flourishing 
Premise one states that national groups are (generally) better able to flourish when they 
have their own independent state. National groups usually invoke the right of peoples to 
self-determination to justify their claims, as secession, they argue, constitutes one way of 
exercising self-determination. The right is expressed as follows in article 1 of both the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: ―1. All peoples have the right of self-
determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development‖ (International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights; International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights). 
It is important to note that the right of peoples to self-determination thus has both a 
political and a cultural aspect, as indicated by the conjunctive formulation and by the fact 
that the right is listed as the first article of both a covenant concerning political rights and 
a covenant concerning cultural rights. Though nationalist theorists of secession typically 
argue that cultural self-determination requires political self-determination, these two 
aspects of the right to self-determination are conceptually distinct and independent from 
each other (as briefly mentioned in Chapter 3). 
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Political self-determination refers to a group‘s ability to decide freely30 its political status. 
Political self-determination is a matter of degree, and does not necessarily require full 
political independence or sovereignty: political self-determination may also be exercised 
within the borders of a larger state. This is the case in federalism, whereby different 
regional units within the larger state enjoy some degree of self-government regionally 
(for example, the different states within the United States, or the different provinces in 
Canada). Thus for a group to exercise political self-determination is for that group to 
determine the degree of political autonomy it will enjoy. 
Cultural self-determination refers to a group‘s ability to set and pursue freely31 its cultural 
aspirations. Cultural self-determination might take the form of certain cultural events, 
celebrations, holidays, and symbols, as well as the language in which official 
administration and business are conducted, and the primary language used and taught in 
education and the media (for example, the three different linguistic-cultural communities 
in Belgium). Thus for a group to exercise cultural self-determination is for that group to 
determine the degree of cultural autonomy it will enjoy. 
Here it is important to note that to speak of cultural self-determination is not at all to 
presume that cultural identities are fixed or unalterable. On the contrary, part of the point 
of cultural self-determination is precisely that it recognizes that cultural identities are 
                                                 
30 For a group to exercise (political or cultural) self-determination freely means (1) that the group has a 
reasonable range of available options, and (2) that the group is not coerced to choose one option over 
another. By (1), I mean that in the case of political self-determination, the group should be able to choose 
between different levels of government (e.g. central, regional, or both); and that in the case of cultural self-
determination, the group should be able to benefit from a certain degree of cultural protection (e.g. minority 
or cultural rights). By (2), I mean that the group further should not have to choose between more (political 
or cultural) autonomy and, for example, a continued exchange of goods and services between the region 
and the rest of the state. This would simply amount to a form of blackmail by the central government, and 
would compromise the group‘s ability to exercise self-determination freely. 
31
 See previous footnote. 
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malleable, in flux, and changing over time. In this respect, making cultural and political 
boundaries coincide, contingent on the democratic requirement mentioned above and 
spelled out below, means that all members of the national group can, if they so wish, 
participate in the articulation and revision of their national identity.    
Political self-determination (for example, more autonomy achieved through federalism or 
devolution) constitutes one possible means to promote cultural self-determination (for 
example, the language used in public education or the amount of resources accorded 
cultural events). But this does not mean that cultural self-determination requires 
independent statehood, or that independent statehood is the necessary telos or natural end 
of all national groups. Just as political self-determination does not necessarily require 
independent statehood, neither does cultural self-determination. For example, a national 
group might decide, in exercising political self-determination, to create a regional 
government within an existing state; and a national group might likewise decide, in 
exercising cultural self-determination, to institute minority rights to protect its culture 
within the larger state. In both cases, the national group is freely exercising self-
determination (political and cultural, respectively), but it is not claiming independent 
statehood, and indeed does not deem that exercising political or cultural self-
determination requires independent statehood. To clarify, even if a national group 
claimed that cultural self-determination did require independent statehood, achieving 
independent statehood would be the result of political self-determination, even though 
this highest degree of political autonomy might in turn bring about the highest degree of 
cultural autonomy. 
 127 
 
Having distinguished between the political and cultural aspects of self-determination, 
let‘s go back to the first premise, or the claim that independent statehood promotes 
national flourishing. I understand flourishing as encompassing two components: one 
objective, the other subjective. The objective component of flourishing corresponds to a 
set of basic human rights such as having access to food, clothes, shelter and not being 
exposed to violent assault, without which one would fall below a basic threshold under 
which it would objectively become very difficult to live. The subjective component of 
flourishing goes much further than these minimal objective requirements, to the extent 
that it consists in being able to pursue certain ends or goals one has chosen for oneself. 
Thus the objective component of flourishing consists merely in being able to live, 
whereas the subjective component consists in being able to live a fulfilling life. Here it is 
important to note two things. First, I am deliberately leaving open the question of what 
constitutes a fulfilling life. I am indeed wary of setting ―strong‖ objective criteria (such as 
the full development of one‘s talents or abilities), or endorsing a thick eudaimonistic 
account (such as capabilities), to define fulfilling.
32
 Second, and relatedly, the objective 
component of flourishing does set ―weak‖ objective criteria on which a fulfilling life 
depends and which the subjective component must therefore respect.  
Thus the objective and subjective components of flourishing are connected: without 
meeting the basic threshold of certain objective criteria, it becomes impossible to pursue 
the subjective component of flourishing; and therefore, conversely, the subjective 
component must ensure that it does not run counter to the objective component. 
Moreover, because it is the case for everyone that the subjective component depends on 
                                                 
32
 Such strong or thick accounts tend to carry a huge burden of proof, and to raise more questions than they 
solve, including problems of cultural imperialism. 
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the objective component, my own ends and goals (whose pursuing I consider makes for a 
fulfilling life) should not only not undermine my own ability to meet the objective 
component, but also not undermine others‘ ability to meet the objective component. 
A national group flourishes when it is able to meet both the objective and the subjective 
components of flourishing spelled out above. Thus in order to flourish, a national group 
must first have access to food, clothes, shelter and not be exposed to violent assault. But 
there is nothing nationally specific about meeting this objective component: nations are 
much more than groups of fed and sheltered individuals. National self-determination is 
indeed more importantly about the subjective component of flourishing, namely about the 
national group‘s ability to pursue the ends and goals it has chosen for itself (for example, 
protecting its language or its cultural heritage), which the group deems important for its 
identity or source of meaningfulness. Thus it appears that national self-determination is 
instrumentally valuable for national flourishing, which nationalist theorists argue is in 
turn instrumentally valuable for a group‘s (and arguably its members‘) identity or source 
of meaningfulness (Margalit and Raz 1990; Kymlicka 1995, 2001). 
Otherwise put, much as individual self-determination is valuable for the flourishing of 
individuals, that is, for those individuals to be able ―to shape their circumstances to suit 
their aims and ambitions,‖ likewise national self-determination is valuable for the 
flourishing of national groups, that is, for those national groups to be able ―to organize 
their internal affairs and to dispose of their resources‖ (Miller 2000, 164). It is important 
to note that setting ends or goals automatically generates certain interests or means to 
achieve those ends or goals. For example, promoting a national group‘s culture and 
language (the national group‘s end or goal) might require establishing a public education 
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system, which in turn would require securing the appropriate funds (the national group‘s 
interest or means to achieve that end or goal). Thus flourishing, because it involves being 
able to pursue certain chosen ends or goals, requires fulfilling certain interests: 
The value of national self-government is the value of entrusting the general 
political power over a group and its members to the group. If self-government is 
valuable then it is valuable that whatever is a proper matter for political decision 
should be subject to the political decision of the group in all matters concerning 
the group and its members. The idea of national self-government, in other words, 
speaks of groups determining the character of their social and economic 
environment, their fortunes, the course of their development, and the fortunes of 
their members by their own actions, i.e., by the actions of those groups […]. 
(Margalit and Raz 1990, 440) 
It is useful to point out that making cultural and political boundaries coincide, as 
nationalist secessionists attempt to do, is a common practice, even among democratic 
states: 
If we examine the actual practice of liberal democracies, we see that questions 
about the function and location of boundaries are often resolved by reference to 
principles of nationhood. That is, the location of boundaries is intended to 
demarcate discrete national political communities, and the function of these 
boundaries is, in part, to protect national cultures. As a general rule, both the 
location and function of boundaries are determined by principles of nationality—
that is, by the goal of creating, recognizing, empowering, and protecting 
―nations.‖ (Kymlicka 2001, 253, emphasis in original) 
Of course, the question at hand is not whether this effort toward cultural-political 
coincidence does happen, but whether it should happen, or at least whether it is morally 
permissible, that is, whether a moral case can be made for it. Kymlicka and Miller 
suggest that such a moral case can be made, because making cultural and political 
boundaries coincide can foster democracy, to the extent that such cultural-political 
coincidence facilitates the realization of equality of opportunity, solidarity among 
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citizens, freedom of choice, and political participation (Kymlicka 2001, 265, 266, 269; 
Miller 2000, 62, 89, 105, 140). Speaking the language of dominant institutions will 
clearly advance the realization of equality of opportunity, for example by making it easier 
to have equal access to education and employment, which function in the dominant 
language. Likewise, belonging to the same national group and thus sharing a common 
language, ethnicity, culture, and history seems to provide a strong basis for solidarity 
among citizens, especially in welfare states (in this respect, the case of Belgium is quite 
telling).
33
 Because one‘s national culture further forms the background which gives 
particular meanings to one‘s choices, discrimination against or atrophy of that culture 
means that ―the options and opportunities open to its members will shrink, become less 
attractive, and their pursuit less likely to be successful‖ (Margalit and Raz, quoted in 
Kymlicka 2001, 266). Thus making cultural and political boundaries coincide can protect 
national flourishing and thereby foster the freedom of choice of its members. Finally, 
speaking the language of dominant institutions makes equal political participation more 
likely, and belonging to the same national group also makes trust between the participants 
in political deliberation more likely. Thus it appears that a moral case can be made for 
making cultural and political boundaries coincide, because doing so can foster 
democracy, to the extent that such cultural-political coincidence facilitates the realization 
of equality of opportunity, solidarity among citizens, freedom of choice, and political 
participation (Kymlicka 2001, 265, 266, 269; Miller 2000, 62, 89, 105, 140). Thus 
Kymlicka concludes: 
                                                 
33
 Indeed, in Belgium, Flemish nationalist secessionist claims are fueled both by long-standing tensions 
between the two main linguistic communities (Flemish- and French-speaking) and by the fact that the 
currently more well-off Flemish-speaking community feels as though it is subsidizing the welfare benefits 
of the entire country, including that of the French-speaking community, which has recently been struggling 
with a higher rate of unemployment. 
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[T]he principle would […] be to create political units, wherever possible, which 
share a common national identity, since such units are likely to provide the best 
context for the achievement of people‘s interests in freedom, justice, and 
democracy.  (2001, 267) 
 
3.2.3. National and individual flourishing 
Premise two states that the collective flourishing of a national group promotes the 
individual flourishing of its members. Recall that Margalit and Raz contend: 
The point needs to be made to connect concern with the prosperity of the group with 
concern for the well-being of individuals. This tie between the individual and the 
collective is at the heart of the case for self-determination (1990, 444). [T]he key to the 
explanation [of the right to self-determination] is the importance of these [national] 
groups to the well-being of their members (448). [M]embership of such groups is of great 
importance to individual well-being, for it greatly affects one‘s opportunities, one‘s 
ability to engage in the relationships and the pursuits marked by the culture (449). 
Likewise, Kymlicka asserts: 
[T]he nation […] is seen as having instrumental value. The nation is primarily 
valuable not in and of itself, but rather because it provides the context within 
which we pursue the things which truly matter to us as individuals—our family, 
faith, vocation, pastimes, and projects. (2001, 260) 
Connecting the collective flourishing of a national group with the individual flourishing 
of its members raises the question of whether the flourishing of a national group is 
automatically conducive to that of its members. A national group may be able to flourish 
as a whole while some of its members do not so flourish. Indeed, it might even be the 
case that the flourishing of the group as a whole depends on or involves some of its 
members not flourishing. For example, a group‘s flourishing might involve the 
assignment of some of its members to a certain role or function that those members to do 
not wish to perform or fulfill. This would be the case, for example, in a slave society. In 
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this case, the (illiberal) group as a whole might be flourishing, but clearly some of its 
members would not be flourishing. Thus the flourishing of a national group does not 
automatically entail that of its members, as the case of this illiberal group illustrates. 
Here one might ask whether this implies that only liberal peoples have a right to secede. 
According to the nationalist argument, a group‘s right to secede rests on the claim that 
national flourishing is instrumental to individual flourishing. Thus the secessionists‘ case 
rests on a reasonable expectation that the group‘s secession would not hinder its 
individual members‘ ability to flourish. It seems clear that an outright illiberal group 
(which would severely violate some of its members‘ basic rights) would not foster the 
individual flourishing of all its members. However, non-liberal but yet decent peoples (to 
borrow Rawls‘ taxonomy) might qualify as plausible candidates for secession on the 
nationalist account. Rawls indeed defines a decent people as a non-liberal society whose 
―basic institutions meet certain specified conditions of political right and justice and lead 
its people to honor a reasonable and just law‖ (1999, 59-60). Decent peoples are not 
liberal because their public institutions do not recognize ―the liberal idea that persons are 
citizens first and have equal basic rights as equal citizens‖ (66) nor do they recognize 
reasonable pluralism (i.e. they may be religious institutions) (64). Decent peoples are 
nonetheless ―decent‖ because they recognize and protect human rights and allow their 
members to participate in political decisions through representatives, even though the 
society may be hierarchically organized and some members may be excluded from 
holding public office (64-65). 
According to the nationalist argument, whether a decent people would have a right to 
secede depends on whether the people would be able to foster the individual flourishing 
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of its members.
34
 As was suggested above, flourishing involves both an objective 
component (basic human rights) and a subjective component (personally set goals). By 
protecting human rights, decent peoples foster the objective component of flourishing. 
Determining whether decent peoples would likewise foster the subjective component 
depends on the type of specific possible goals one includes in one‘s account of the 
subjective component of flourishing. If, for example, one limits those goals to pursuing 
an education, then decent peoples would foster the subjective component, as nothing in 
their institutions precludes this possibility. If, however, those goals include holding 
public office, then decent peoples would not foster the subjective component, as they 
may explicitly exclude certain members from such functions. 
To the extent that national self-determination fosters the flourishing of the national group, 
it will be difficult to make a moral case for national self-determination if the group‘s 
flourishing relies on morally problematic principles, such as that some of its members are 
not fully equals. Thus making a morally more plausible case for national self-
determination might require, on the part of the national group, a commitment to equality 
between the members of that national group. If such a commitment exists, then arguably 
the flourishing of the national group will foster the flourishing of its members.  
Indeed, such a commitment would mean that the group has as one of its goals the 
realization or preservation of equality. This means it will be one of the group‘s interests 
to ensure that social arrangements and institutions do not run counter to this goal (for 
example, by adopting a policy of equal opportunity in education and employment). This 
                                                 
34
 On the nationalist account, the group would also have to have a valid territorial claim, i.e. have occupied 
and shaped the land over time. 
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in turn seems to make it possible for members of the national group to determine and 
achieve their own ends or goals (for example, pursuing a certain education or career), and 
thereby to flourish. In this case, the respective goals of the national group (realizing or 
preserving equality) and of its members (pursuing a certain education or career) are 
different, but they are nonetheless aligned with each other: the former makes the latter 
possible. In other cases, the goals of the national group and of its members might be the 
same: for example, to be able to speak and live in the national group‘s language. In this 
case, the group‘s flourishing will directly coincide with its members‘ flourishing. What 
matters is that, in either case, the flourishing of the national group entails that of its 
members. This means that, to the extent that flourishing means being able to pursue 
certain chosen ends or goals, which in turn requires fulfilling certain interests, the 
national group and its members will share common interests. 
To review, national self-determination allows and fosters the flourishing of the national 
group. Making a morally more plausible case for national self-determination requires, on 
the part of the national group, a commitment to equality between the members of that 
national group. This commitment in turn implies that the flourishing of the national group 
will foster the flourishing of its members. This in turn means that the national group and 
its members will share common interests. Thus, on this analysis, the moral case for 
national self-determination requires two things: a commitment to equality (the moral 
element) and the fulfillment of certain interests (the flourishing or national self-
determination element). I now want to argue that democracy is particularly well suited to 
fulfill these two requirements, that is, that national self-determination requires a 
democratic commitment on the part of the national group. 
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With regard to the first requirement (equality), democracy by definition implies equality 
between the members of the demos as equal participants in the political decision-making 
process. With regard to the second requirement (interests), democracy further 
corresponds to government of the people, by the people, for the people, which means that 
the people and its interests will be represented and protected. Thus national self-
determination, which fosters the flourishing of a national group and that of its members, 
requires a commitment to equality and the fulfillment of certain interests, and therefore 
requires democracy. This democratic requirement, moreover, puts to rest concerns 
regarding the risk of ethnic cleansing and forced assimilation of minorities.  
To sum up, making a morally more plausible case for national self-determination 
requires, on the part of the national group, a commitment to equality between the 
members of the national group. This commitment in turn implies that the flourishing of 
the national group will foster the flourishing of its members. This in turn means that the 
national group and its members will share common interests, which need to be 
represented and protected. Democracy is particularly well suited to fulfill these two 
requirements. This democratic requirement puts to rest concerns regarding the risk of 
ethnic cleansing and forced assimilation of minorities, which is also required if a moral 
case for national self-determination is to be made. 
In other words, the nationalist argument only works if it is supported by a serious and 
solid democratic commitment. Yet the democratic concern shown by current nationalist 
theorists does not seem sufficient to bolster their argument. In other words, current 
nationalist theorists do not recognize the extent of the democratic commitment required 
by the flourishing argument on which they rely. For example, Margalit and Raz, the most 
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prominent nationalist theorists, hold that if the seceding national group did not respect its 
members‘ basic rights, its case for secession in the name of national flourishing would be 
―weakened‖ and ―may disappear altogether‖ (1990, 449), while Kofman holds that it 
would be ―reasonable‖ to expect the new state to have democratic institutions (1998, 35). 
(Such lack of any real reservations toward secession despite the possible ill-treatment of 
the seceding national group‘s own members is surprising given that normative theories of 
secession in general – that is, not just nationalist ones – often raise the concern of the 
vulnerability of new national minorities within the remainder state or the new state as a 
clear reason to oppose secession.) 
Yet this democratic concern is too weak, as the flourishing of the national group and that 
of its members, on which the nationalist argument relies, requires a democratic 
commitment (not merely that such a commitment would be ―reasonable‖). That is, if the 
seceding national group did not respect its members‘ basic rights, its case for secession in 
the name of national flourishing would be obliterated (not merely ―weakened‖) and thus 
would (not merely ―may‖) disappear altogether. 
Having reviewed the first problem nationalist theories face, related to the question of 
political viability, I now turn to the second problem these theories face, related to the 
question of economic viability. 
3.3. Economic viability 
As was argued in Chapter 2, adequate protection of basic rights requires economic 
viability. Moreover, national self-determination would importantly require economic 
means, both to secure the democratic commitment on which the nationalist argument 
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ultimately relies, and to facilitate the creation of political and cultural institutions on 
which a group‘s ability to exercise political and cultural self-determination directly 
depends. 
Surprisingly, however, nationalist theorists tend to neglect the question of economic 
viability, failing to see that it is required for their argument to hold. Miller is the only 
nationalist theorist even to mention that secession is permissible only if both new and 
remainder states are viable, though he does not say much more about the question (2000, 
37). Kofman formulates the somewhat puzzling condition that ―the secessionists cannot 
be aiming to deprive the former state of its most important resource base‖ (1998, 36, 
emphasis added). If, as was argued in Chapter 2, economic viability of both new and 
remainder states is a necessary condition for secession to be permissible, it seems hardly 
to matter whether economic non-viability of either state is an intentional or an incidental 
result of the other state‘s actions. Though it seems to signal some awareness of the 
question of economic viability, Kofman‘s condition falls short of what the nationalist 
argument would require for it to hold. 
Margalit and Raz, for their part, are concerned about the economic viability of the 
remainder state, but against all expectations do not extend the same concern for the new 
state. Regarding the remainder state‘s economic viability, Margalit and Raz require that 
the creation of the new state not substantially damage the remainder state, and that, where 
this is likely to be the case, secession be permissible only contingent upon appropriate 
economic arrangements (1990, 459-460). By contrast, when it comes to the new state, 
Margalit and Raz paradoxically declare that ―[Secessionists] may sacrifice their economic 
or other interests for the sake of group self-respect and prosperity. But such a sacrifice is, 
 138 
 
given the circumstances of this world, often not unreasonable‖ (1990, 457), as if there 
were no link between group prosperity and economic viability. 
In sum, whether they formally pay lip service to or neglect altogether the question of 
economic viability for both new and remainder states, nationalist theorists do not nearly 
show the concern that they should for their argument to be successful. 
4. Conclusion 
The main problems for nationalist theories are their lack of regard for the new state‘s 
viability and their neglect of human rights. These problems are the result of nationalist 
theorists‘ reducing the question of secession to the question of political legitimacy, which 
they associate only with the value of flourishing. In doing so, nationalist theories neglect 
the other two values of self-determination and justice, and end up with an implausible 
conception of flourishing. This implausible conception of flourishing then gives rise to 
nationalist theorists‘ lack of regard for the new state‘s viability and neglect of human 
rights. 
One problem for nationalist theories is their omission of the question of the new state‘s 
state viability. But if we understand flourishing as directly related to national identity (as 
nationalist theories do), then flourishing requires state viability, for example to create or 
maintain cultural and political institutions, on which a group‘s national identity depends. 
The other problem for nationalist theories is that they neglect human rights, or risk 
encouraging ethnic cleansing and forced assimilation of minorities. This is because, in 
their account of legitimacy, nationalist theories focus primarily on the value of 
flourishing, and more precisely on the flourishing of the seceding group; thus they 
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effectively ignore the flourishing of the remainder state or other national groups. Yet 
major human rights violations would make it impossible for those other groups to 
exercise self-determination and to flourish in just circumstances. A more plausible 
conception of flourishing requires the ability to exercise self-determination and to live in 
circumstances of justice, including the adequate protection of basic rights. Thus again, by 
introducing considerations of self-determination and justice, we are able to reach a more 
plausible conception of flourishing, one that takes into account the flourishing of all 
groups involved, and one that shows that valuing flourishing precludes the risk of 
extremism. 
Thus in reducing the question of secession to a matter of political legitimacy, nationalist 
theorists neglect human rights, and thereby yield a morally implausible answer to the 
question of secession, one that fails to consider all concerned groups‘ rights and interests 
equally. Avoiding this problem requires introducing considerations of self-determination 
and justice, in addition to considerations of flourishing. Proceeding in this way yields a 
more plausible conception of the value of flourishing, one that by definition accounts for 
human rights and thereby considers all concerned groups‘ rights and interests equally. In 
other words, reaching a plausible answer to the question of secession requires adopting an 
axiological approach, i.e. starting not from an account of political legitimacy, but directly 
from the three values of self-determination, justice, and flourishing. 
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CHAPTER 6 
A Democratic Axiological Theory of Secession 
 
 
1. The axiological approach 
In Chapter 2, I argued that it is morally permissible for a group to secede if and only if it 
has a valid territorial claim and is able to protect its citizens‘ basic rights and to be 
economically viable, without undermining the remainder state‘s ability to protect its 
citizens‘ basic rights and to be economically viable. I showed that these three conditions 
of territorial justification, adequate protection of basic rights, and economic viability are 
grounded in the three values of self-determination, justice, and flourishing. That is, if we 
do not require those three conditions, we will end up with a theory that hinders certain 
groups‘ ability to exercise self-determination and to flourish in just circumstances, as 
current theories do. In other words, the three values of self-determination, justice, and 
flourishing are logically prior to, or motivate, the three conditions of territorial 
justification, adequate protection of basic rights, and economic viability. 
Because the normative question of secession should thus be analyzed primarily in terms 
of those three values, Chapters 3, 4, and 5 focused primarily on the values of self-
determination (choice theories), justice (just-cause theories), and flourishing (nationalist 
theories) as they relate to the normative question of secession. These three chapters 
showed that adequately conceptualizing each value, in order to offer a morally plausible 
answer to the normative question of secession, requires balancing it against the other two, 
so that no one value is ever prioritized over the other two. More precisely, these three 
chapters showed that focusing on any one of the three values without also considering the 
other two results in the unequal treatment of certain groups or people.  
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For example, choice theorists‘ primary focus on the value of self-determination, and more 
precisely on the self-determination of the seceding group, pushes them to neglect the 
question of territorial justification, and thereby the self-determination of the other main 
group concerned in any case of secession, namely the remainder state. Yet a seceding 
group taking a territory to which it does not have a legitimate claim interferes with 
another group‘s exercise of self-determination in its territory, and also constitutes an 
unjust appropriation, both of which might hinder this other group‘s ability to flourish. 
Thus arbitrating between conflicting claims of self-determination, i.e. treating all 
concerned groups‘ rights and interests equally, requires introducing considerations of 
justice and flourishing. In other words, balancing the value of self-determination against 
the other two values of justice and flourishing yields a morally more plausible conception 
of the value of self-determination. 
Likewise, just-cause theorists‘ primary focus on the value of justice, and more precisely 
on the justice of the remainder state, pushes them to neglect non-remedial claims (such as 
Flanders, for example), and thereby justice for non-remedial secessionist groups. Yet this 
might hinder certain groups‘ (like Flanders) ability to exercise self-determination and to 
flourish, which would be unjust. Thus arbitrating between conflicting claims of justice, 
i.e. treating all concerned groups‘ rights and interests equally, requires introducing 
considerations of self-determination and flourishing. In other words, balancing the value 
of justice against the other two values of self-determination and flourishing yields a 
morally more plausible conception of the value of justice. 
Similarly, nationalist theorists‘ primary focus on the value of flourishing, and more 
precisely on the flourishing of the seceding group, pushes them to neglect human rights, 
 142 
 
and thereby the flourishing of other groups involved. Yet major human rights violations 
would make it impossible for those other groups to exercise self-determination and to 
flourish in just circumstances. Thus arbitrating between conflicting claims of flourishing, 
i.e. treating all concerned groups‘ rights and interests equally, requires introducing 
considerations of self-determination and justice. In other words, balancing the value of 
flourishing against the other two values of self-determination and justice yields a morally 
more plausible conception of the value of flourishing. 
Thus self-determination, justice, and flourishing, in the context of secession, are most 
adequately conceived as requiring equal consideration of different groups‘ rights and 
interests. In this final chapter, I sketch a democratic axiological theory of secession, i.e. 
suggest that a democratic framework, because of its fundamental commitment to 
equality, seems most promising to give due weight to the three values that justify 
secession, as they are conceptualized in the previous chapters. 
2. A democratic framework 
In this section, I look at the conceptual and empirical connections between democracy 
and the three values of self-determination, justice, and flourishing. The concept of 
democracy indeed seems to centrally involve the notions of self-determination, justice, 
and flourishing. More precisely, democracy seems both to be grounded in and to promote 
those three values. First, the question of who the relevant demos should be when settling 
issues of secession seems to be most adequately answered by appealing to those values. 
That is, taking into account groups‘ ability to exercise self-determination and to flourish 
in just circumstances, when determining when a particular group is justified in seceding, 
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seems to yield a morally more plausible answer to the normative question of secession. 
Second, democracy in turn seems to cultivate those values. Indeed, as the rule of the 
people, by the people, and for the people, democracy seems by definition to foster self-
determination; as the political instantiation of the idea of equality, it seems to be meant to 
foster justice; and as a decision-making process defined as equal participation and 
consideration, it seems most likely to foster flourishing. Thus my hypothesis is that 
adopting a democratic framework, i.e. drawing from democratic theory, when developing 
a normative theory of secession will most successfully give due weight to the three values 
of self-determination, justice, and flourishing. Democracy, equality, self-determination, 
justice, and flourishing, however, are essentially contested concepts. Testing my 
hypothesis, therefore, requires exploring the following questions: 
1. In what specific ways are self-determination, justice, and flourishing, i.e. the most 
salient values in the normative question of secession, connected to democracy? This 
connection can be approached both ideally or conceptually as well as non-ideally or 
empirically: 
2. Ideally or conceptually: How might a democratic perspective allow us, in developing a 
normative theory of secession, to give due weight to all three values, or to balance them 
against each other so as not to treat certain groups of people unequally, i.e. so as to reach 
a morally plausible conception of equality? 
3. Non-ideally or empirically: How might the decision-making process about the 
possibility of a group‘s secession be handled democratically, for example through the use 
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of referenda? Can the process of redrawing boundaries, or determining who the demos 
should be, be done democratically? 
Question 1 will be answered by looking at questions 2 and 3. In the next three 
subsections, I turn to question 2 by looking at the connection between democracy and 
self-determination (2.1), democracy and justice (2.2), and democracy and flourishing 
(2.3). In the fourth subsection, I turn to question 3 by looking at how boundaries might be 
democratically redrawn (2.4). 
2.1. Democracy and self-determination 
Secession is the result of a group exercising political self-determination. Democracy, 
likewise, is grounded in the value of political self-determination. Indeed, ―Democracy, it 
is said, extends the idea that each ought to be master of his or her life to the domain of 
collective decision-making‖ (Christiano 2008b). This extension of personal self-
determination to political self-determination can be understood in two different ways. 
First, it can mean that to the extent that ―each person's life is deeply affected by the larger 
social, legal and cultural environment in which he or she lives […], only when each 
person has an equal voice and vote in the process of collective decision-making will each 
have control over this larger environment‖ (Christiano 2008b). Second, it can mean that 
the demos is the self that is exercising political self-determination. It is with the 
modification of who the demos should be that secessionist claims are concerned, as 
modifying the territorial boundaries of an existing state and creating a new one entails 
modifying an existing demos and creating a new one. In the next two sections, I look at 
each of these two possible understandings in turn. 
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2.1.1. Democracy and personal autonomy  
The first link between democracy and political self-determination attempts to justify 
democracy by appealing to personal autonomy, or by claiming that personal autonomy 
requires an equal say in collective decision-making, that is, that in order to have control 
over her own life, a person ought to have an equal say in the decisions that affect the 
larger environment in which she lives. There are several problems with this claim. First, 
as Buchanan points out, a person is not self-governing simply in virtue of the fact that she 
has an equal say in the voting process, because of the principle of majority rule: 
[I]t is simply false to say that an individual who participates in a democratic 
decision-making process is self-governing; he or she is governed by the majority. 
Unless one (unpersuasively) defines self-government as government by the 
majority (perhaps implausibly distinguishing between the individual‘s apparent 
will and her ‗real‘ will, which the majority is said to express), an individual can 
be self-governing only if he or she dictates political decisions. Far from 
constituting self-government for individuals, majority rule, under conditions in 
which each individual‘s vote counts equally, excludes self-government for every 
individual. (1998, 17-18) 
Certain theorists attempt to justify a right to secede by drawing a parallel between 
political self-determination and democracy as required by individual autonomy (Philpott 
1998). These theorists claim that, just as democracy is grounded in respect of individual 
autonomy, the right to political self-determination, including the right to secede, is 
likewise grounded in individual autonomy. As Buchanan points out, however, those 
theorists‘ argument is unsuccessful because democracy as defined by the principle of 
majority rule does not in effect necessarily result in individual autonomy. 
Second, as Buchanan further points out, many things that importantly affect a person‘s 
environment and life (for example, the Constitution or market forces) are beyond the 
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scope of democratic voting, but this lack of control does not therefore signify a lack of 
equal respect of persons (1998, 21). Thus theorists who attempt to justify a right to 
secede by arguing that both political self-determination and democracy are required by 
equal respect of persons (Copp 1997) are unsuccessful in their attempt, because equal 
respect for persons is compatible with the fact that many factors that have significant 
consequences for a person‘s environment and life (including the drawing of boundaries) 
may not be decided democratically. 
Of course, just because an argument for the right to secede cannot successfully invoke 
personal autonomy or equal respect for persons does not mean that there is no such right, 
or that its justification shares no commonalities with the justification of democracy. 
Likewise, the mere observation that not everything is democratically decided does not by 
itself tell us anything about whether the drawing of boundaries should be among those 
things that are, or among those things that are not, the object of a democratic vote. Thus 
the fact that not everything is democratically decided does not settle the question at hand, 
namely whether the drawing of boundaries can appropriately become the object of a 
democratic vote. In the next section, I consider one promising justification of the right to 
secede that is grounded in democracy. 
2.1.2. Democracy and group self-determination 
One compelling justification of a right to secede establishes a link between democracy 
and political self-determination that invokes group self-determination rather than 
personal autonomy. Wellman indeed argues that the right to democracy and the right to 
secede have the same justification, namely, the right people have to choose who will 
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politically represent them and make the laws to which they will be subject. Thus 
Wellman argues that because, in a democracy, it is the group as a whole, rather than each 
individual, that determines who the representatives will be, ―what ultimately grounds 
democracy is group self-determination‖ (2005, 179, emphasis in original). 
In this argument the entity that exercises self-determination is not the individual but 
rather the demos, or a group, as a collective exercising self-determination. This idea, the 
argument goes, is common to both democracy and secession. That is, democracy and 
secession are both about collective political self-determination. Indeed, secession consists 
in redefining the demos. Thus if one accepts the above justification of democracy, one 
must further accept a right to secede, as both are grounded in the very same right to 
collective political self-determination, or the right people have to choose who will 
politically represent them. Mill, in his Considerations on Representative Government, 
nicely captured this right: ―One hardly knows what any division of the human race should 
be free to do, if not to determine with which of the various collective bodies of human 
beings they choose to associate themselves‖ (1972 (1862), 392). 
Wellman points out that his own deontological justification of democracy (and of the 
right to secede) is further reinforced when one considers the cases of colonization, 
annexation, or benevolent monarchy (2005, 179). The reason why most contemporary 
political philosophers unambiguously reject these three types of rule as illegitimate is not 
because they typically yield bad outcomes. Indeed, one might imagine that, having 
established their rule, the colonizers, annexing forces, or beneficent monarchs do many 
things from which the population directly benefits, such as respecting and protecting each 
person and her basic rights equally, developing the economy, building roads, hospitals, 
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schools, etc. Rather, the reason for rejecting these three types of rule is that these rulers 
impose themselves on an unconsenting population, that is, that they violate that 
population‘s right to choose who represents them and makes the laws by which they have 
to abide. Thus, Wellman concludes, the right to secede and the right against colonization 
and annexation are both grounded in the democratic principle that a group has the right to 
choose its political representatives. These considerations of colonization and annexation 
bring me to the next section, which looks at the connection between democracy and 
justice. 
2.2. Democracy and justice 
As I argued in Chapter 2, justice requires the equal protection of individuals‘ basic rights. 
This protection requirement is grounded in the equal moral value of individuals. It is the 
equal moral value of individuals that grounds their basic rights, and these rights warrant 
protection. Because each individual deserves to have her rights protected, justice requires 
the equal protection of all individuals‘ basic rights. 
Because democracy is premised on equality, as a political system it seems particularly 
well suited to realize justice. Buchanan, for example, even argues that justice requires 
democracy. Indeed, according to Buchanan, equal concern and respect for persons 
requires the existence of institutions to protect their fundamental rights, which are 
grounded in the moral value of human beings. Such institutions are thus a matter of 
justice: failing to help prevent the violation of persons‘ fundamental rights, when the cost 
of doing so would not be ―excessive‖ or ―unacceptable,‖ is to fail to treat them with 
appropriate concern and respect, and therefore to wrong them. Thus Buchanan concludes: 
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―If justice requires recognizing the fundamental equality of persons and if this in turn 
requires that persons have an equal say over the most important decisions that determine 
the characteristics of the public order under which they live together, then justice requires 
democracy‖ (2002, 717). 
If justice requires the protection of individuals‘ basic rights, such as the right to physical 
security and to manage their own affairs, then, by the same token, justice would seem to 
require the protection of groups‘ basic rights, such as the right to physical security and to 
manage their own affairs – indeed, a group‘s right to determine who its political 
representatives will be, for which Wellman argues, is chief to that group‘s ability to 
manage its own affairs. It is clear that the cases of colonization and annexation mentioned 
in the previous section violate a group‘s right to select its political representatives and to 
manage its own affairs, which is one of a group‘s basic rights. To the extent that a 
secessionist group‘s efforts to exercise political self-determination by choosing its own 
political representatives are opposed and resisted, it too suffers a violation of one of its 
basic rights.  
At this point, an important clarification is in order. The analogy between secessionist 
groups and colonized or annexed populations rests on their being similarly hindered in 
their ability to exercise the fullest degree of political self-determination. Though it is true 
that the situation of some national minorities in existing multinational states is sometimes 
strikingly similar to that of colonized peoples under alien rule prior to decolonization – 
domination by a foreign government, lack of political autonomy and control, economic 
exploitation, and human rights violations (Buchheit 1978, 18) – it would be absurd to 
claim that all secessionist groups in general (even when they are prevented from creating 
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their own independent state) suffer the same kind of oppression as many colonized or 
annexed peoples. For example, the current Québécois and Flemish may share with the 
Congolese under Belgian rule or the native Canadians under British and French rule 
certain limits on their ability to exercise political self-determination, but it would be 
preposterous to claim that the current Québécois and Flemish are deprived of self-
determination or suffer injustice to the same degree as the Congolese under Belgian rule 
or the native Canadians under British and French rule. Thus the claim that all groups 
should have the right to select their political representatives in no way entails the separate 
claim that any group that is prevented from doing so through secession therefore suffers 
the same kind of oppression. 
These observations, however, should not in any way weaken the argument that the main 
reason that prompts us to reject colonization or annexation as illegitimate types of rule 
(namely, the violation of a group‘s right to select its political representatives) is the same 
reason that supports a right to secede. Even if further violations of basic rights (such as 
physical security) might certainly add to the gravity of the situation, it is not those 
additional rights violations that make colonization and annexation illegitimate (though 
they are admittedly common occurrences in cases of colonization and annexation) – 
otherwise we would be committed to the implausible claim that beneficent colonizers or 
annexing forces are legitimate. 
This point can be reinforced by looking at Buchanan‘s account of political legitimacy, 
introduced in Chapter 4. Buchanan sets forth the following three conditions. In order to 
be legitimate, a state must respect its citizens‘ fundamental rights both in content 
(substantially) and in form (procedurally) and must not be a usurper (Buchanan 2002, 
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703). Yet as I argued in Chapter 4, this third condition is necessary but non-sufficient. 
Buchanan indeed defines a usurper as an entity ―wrongly deposing a legitimate wielder of 
political power.‖ Presumably, the problem with a usurper is that it coercively substitutes 
a therefore illegitimate wielder of political power to a legitimate one, that is, that it 
prevents a legitimate one from wielding power. If this is correct, then the third condition 
also needs to include as illegitimate attempts to maintain an existing wielder of power 
when another potential legitimate one questions its legitimacy. That is, the third condition 
needs to include as illegitimate attempts to prevent a legitimate power wielder from 
wielding power. Such prevention indeed turns a previously legitimate power wielder into 
an illegitimate one.  
Thus I argued in Chapter 4 that the case of the former USSR forcibly integrating the 
Baltic States is, in the relevant respects, on a par with, for example, Canada opposing the 
secession of Quebec. In both cases, a legitimate power wielder is prevented from 
wielding power by a competing power wielder which thereby becomes illegitimate. In 
response to the objection that the Baltic States had suffered an injustice whereas Quebec 
has not, I argued that this objection simply begs the question against Quebec: what is at 
issue is precisely whether Canada‘s opposition to the secession of Quebec constitutes a 
violation of Quebec‘s right to self-determination, that is, constitutes an injustice. The 
argument presented above that a group has a fundamental right to select its political 
representatives suggests that such an opposition in fact is an injustice.  
As it is formulated, Buchanan‘s third condition for political legitimacy accounts for the 
case of the Baltic States, but not for that of Quebec. Yet including the latter is just as 
fundamental to respecting a group‘s basic right to choose who its political representatives 
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will be. Thus in order to take democracy and its commitment to equality and justice 
seriously, Buchanan needs to modify his third condition for political legitimacy. 
The moral significance of a group‘s right to select its political representatives can be 
further illuminated by looking at the problem of persistent minorities. This problem 
occurs when certain polity members‘ participation and consideration in the majoritarian 
decision-making process are systematically unequal. As Christiano explains: 
Though this problem is often connected with majority tyranny, it is distinct from 
the problem of majority tyranny because it may be the case that the majority 
attempts to treat the minority well, in accordance with its conception of good 
treatment. It is just that the minority never agrees with the majority on what 
constitutes proper treatment. Being a persistent minority can be highly oppressive 
even if the majority does not try to act oppressively. […] The conception of 
democracy as grounded in public equality can shed light on this problem. It can 
say that the existence of a persistent minority violates public equality [because] 
that minority is being treated publicly as an inferior because it is clear that its 
fundamental interests are being set back. Hence to the extent that violations of 
public equality undercut the authority of a democratic assembly, the existence of a 
persistent minority undermines the authority of the democracy at least with 
respect to the minority. This suggests that certain institutions ought to be 
constructed so that the minority is not persistent. (2008b) 
These institutions can take the form of nonmajoritarian mechanisms (for example, 
disproportionate representation or veto rights), but also, I would argue, of a secession 
process. 
What is useful in Christiano‘s description of the phenomenon of persistent minorities is 
that even when the majority attempts to treat the minority well, the latter might still have 
a valid secessionist case. This is because being a persistent minority corresponds to a 
violation of a group‘s right to select its political representatives and thereby the laws to 
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which it will be subject.
35
 In other words, being a persistent minority constitutes an 
injustice that undercuts the authority of the democratic assembly, which might warrant 
secession, or the formation of a new demos. This in effect allows us to broaden the 
category of injustice (pace, for example, Buchanan‘s account of political legitimacy). 
Thus the right to secede is grounded in the same democratic principle of a group‘s right 
to choose its political representatives as is the right not to be colonized, annexed, or a 
persistent minority. And because democracy is committed to equality or justice as the 
equal protection of individuals‘ and groups‘ basic rights, a commitment to democracy 
and justice would prevent the violation of a group‘s right to select its political 
representatives. 
2.3. Democracy and flourishing 
I argued in Chapter 5 that a national group flourishes when it is able to meet both the 
objective and the subjective components of flourishing. That is, in order to flourish, a 
national group must first have access to food, clothes, shelter and not be exposed to 
violent assault; but it must also be able to pursue the ends and goals it has chosen for 
itself (for example, protecting its language or its cultural heritage), which the group 
deems important for its identity or source of meaningfulness. Thus national self-
determination is instrumentally valuable for national flourishing, which nationalist 
theorists argue is in turn instrumentally valuable not only for a group‘s but also for its 
members‘ identity and source of meaningfulness (Margalit and Raz 1990; Kymlicka 
1995, 2001). Considering the case of illiberal groups and decent peoples, I suggested that 
                                                 
35
 Even if the minority were able to elect representatives, the problem of persistent minorities might still 
remain if those representatives were systematically outvoted in parliament. 
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to the extent that national self-determination fosters the flourishing of the national group, 
it will be difficult to make a moral case for national self-determination if the group‘s 
flourishing relies on morally problematic principles, such as that some of its members are 
not (fully) equals. Thus I suggested that making a morally more plausible case for 
national self-determination might require, on the part of the national group, a 
commitment to equality between the members of that national group. If such a 
commitment exists, then arguably the flourishing of the national group will foster the 
flourishing of its members. To the extent that flourishing means being able to pursue 
certain chosen ends or goals, which in turn requires fulfilling certain interests, the 
national group and its members will share common interests. 
Thus as explained in Chapter 5, on this analysis, the moral case for national self-
determination requires two things: a commitment to equality (the moral element) and the 
fulfillment of certain interests (the flourishing or national self-determination element). I 
then suggested that democracy is particularly well suited to fulfill these two 
requirements, that is, that national self-determination requires a democratic commitment 
on the part of the national group. With regard to the first requirement (equality), 
democracy by definition implies equality between the members of the demos as equal 
participants in the political decision-making process. With regard to the second 
requirement (interests), democracy further corresponds to government of the people, by 
the people, for the people, which means that the people and its interests will be 
represented and protected. Thus national self-determination, which fosters the flourishing 
of a national group and that of its members, requires a commitment to equality and the 
fulfillment of certain interests, and therefore requires democracy. 
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I now want to suggest that a further implication of the national group‘s democratic 
commitment is that the secession process should be democratically determined: that is, 
the decision to secede should be the result of a majority vote in a referendum or plebiscite 
in the territory occupied by the national group that wishes to secede (Beran 1998, 38-39). 
Indeed, all members (say, of at least eighteen years of age) of the national group should 
be able to voice their opinion in determining whether the flourishing of the national group 
requires independent statehood, that is, in determining the political status of their national 
group. But what about the larger state from which the national group wishes to secede: 
should its population not also get a say in this decision, which clearly will affect it as 
well? In other words, the secession process can be democratically determined only after it 
has been determined who the demos is in the first place (Jennings 1956, 56). 
Thus, when democratically determining the secession process, one must first determine 
who the demos is, keeping in mind that defining the demos as the national minority 
seeking to secede might seem like begging the question against the larger state, much like 
defining the demos as the larger state might seem like begging the question against the 
national minority seeking to secede. If one is inclined to argue, as I am, that the demos is 
the national minority, simply in virtue of the fact that, as Mill says, ―the question of 
government ought to be decided by the governed‖ (1972 (1862), 392), one must answer 
the charge that this seems to undermine the democratic principle of majority rule: the 
minority can use the threat of seceding as a way of undermining majority rule. But it 
seems fair to say that the principle of majority rule is justified only in those cases where 
the definition of the demos (or the boundaries of the political unit) is legitimate to begin 
with. Yet this is exactly what is in question in the case of secessionist claims; so the 
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majority rule objection would not hold. Moreover, nonmajoritarian mechanisms are 
already in place in many democracies (for example, special representation or veto rights), 
precisely to protect minorities, which protection, as will be suggested below, is required 
by democracy. In other words, nonmajoritarian mechanisms do not necessarily run 
counter to democracy, and might indeed be required by it. In any case, what should be 
noted here is that for the secession process to be democratically determined means that 
the decision to secede should be the result of a majority vote in a referendum or plebiscite 
in the territory occupied by the national group that wishes to secede. 
Because another national group may also be living on the territory occupied by the 
national group wishing to secede (for example, the Anglophones living in Quebec), the 
referendum or plebiscite will also be an opportunity for the members of this other 
national group to voice their opinion about a potential secession. At the same time, 
however, because they form a minority on that territory (though they might actually 
belong to the main national group within the larger state, as with the Anglophones in 
Canada), the odds of having an actual impact on the decision to secede might be against 
them from the start (at least in cases where a very large majority of the main national 
group occupying the territory is in favor of secession). This means that, unless that other 
national group moves out of that territory, it will form a national minority within the new 
state, if secession actually occurs.  
Of course, this national minority will be part of the demos of the new state, but unless 
certain nonmajoritarian mechanisms are put into place (such as special representation or 
veto rights), that national minority and its interests will not be properly represented and 
protected, as with its lack of impact on the decision to secede in the first place. Here it is 
 157 
 
important to note that such nonmajoritarian mechanisms would not necessarily be 
antidemocratic, and indeed might be required by the democratic commitment of treating 
all members of the demos, including the members of the national minority, as equal 
members of the demos and thus as equal participants in political decision-making. Thus 
the very same equality requirement that applied with regard to the members of the main 
national group (that is, the group seeking to secede) also applies to the members of 
national minorities that would find themselves trapped in the new state after the main 
national group had achieved independent statehood. And fulfilling this equality 
requirement, that is, treating all members as equals, may in practice require unequal 
treatment (special representation or veto rights). 
To sum up, making a moral case for national self-determination and flourishing requires 
that the democratic element be present throughout. First, it requires, on the part of the 
national group, a commitment to equality between the members of the national group. 
This commitment in turn implies that the flourishing of the national group will foster the 
flourishing of its members. This in turn means that the national group and its members 
will share common interests, which need to be represented and protected. Democracy is 
particularly well suited to fulfill these two requirements. A further implication of the 
national group‘s democratic commitment is that the secession process should be 
democratically determined through a referendum or plebiscite in the relevant territorial 
unit. Moreover, the very same equality requirement that applied with regard to the 
members of the main national group (that is, the group seeking to secede) also applies to 
the members of national minorities that would find themselves trapped in the new state 
after the main national group had achieved independent statehood. 
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2.4. Democratically redrawing boundaries 
The claim that boundaries should be democratically redrawn strikes many as a mistaken 
or confused one, as illustrated by Jennings‘ oft cited words: ―On the surface [self-
determination] seemed reasonable: let the people decide. It was in fact ridiculous because 
the people cannot decide until somebody decides who are the people‖ (1956, 56). 
Territorial boundaries, however, can and should be democratically redrawn by using 
referenda in settling questions of secession. Beran nicely explains how this might be 
done: 
The reiterated use of the majority principle seems to be the only method of 
resolving such [secessionist] conflicts that is consistent with the voluntary 
association principle. According to this method, a separatist movement can call 
for a referendum, within a territory specified by it, to determine whether there 
should be a change in this territory‘s political status, e.g. whether it should secede 
from its state. If there is a majority in the territory as a whole for secession, then 
the territory‘s people may exercise its right of self-determination and secede. But 
there may be people within this territory who do not wish to be part of the newly 
dependent state. They could show, by majority vote within their territory, that this 
is so, and then become independent in turn, or remain within the state from which 
the others wish to secede. This use of the majority principle may be continued 
until it is applied to a single community (i.e. a community which is not composed 
of a number of communities) to determine its political status.  
The reiterated use of the majority principle to settle disputes about 
political borders always yields a determinate result. […] It also maximizes the 
number of individuals who live in mutually-desired political association, an ideal 
implicit in the right of freedom of association. (1998, 38-39) 
Not everyone, however, is convinced by Beran‘s proposal. A strong opponent of applying 
the majority principle to determine territorial boundaries is Buchanan (2003, 245-247). 
Buchanan indeed argues that there is an important difference between using the majority 
principle once boundaries have been settled and using it to determine those very 
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boundaries; and that to use it for the latter when it was intended for the former is to make 
inappropriate use of a procedure meant for other purposes. Buchanan explains that there 
are two types of justification for the use of democratic procedures to make decisions 
within existing borders, neither of which applies to decisions about changing those 
borders.  
The first, deontological, justification of a democratic decision-making procedure is the 
principle of equal respect for persons and consideration of their interests, which translates 
into having an equal say on the basic rules of the polity. The second, consequentialist, 
justification, is that a procedure that gives each citizen a vote is more likely to produce 
better results than a constitutional amendment. Buchanan then contends that the first 
justification cannot be invoked to redraw boundaries because, if anything, equality 
requires that all the citizens of the existing state, not just the secessionist group, be given 
an equal say in the question of secession. Likewise, the second justification, Buchanan 
asserts, cannot be invoked to redraw boundaries because opening up the question of 
secession to a vote would not be more likely to produce better results than a 
constitutional amendment. 
In response to Buchanan‘s rejection of the first justification, I would reiterate the point 
made earlier that the principle of majority rule is justified only in those cases where the 
definition of the demos (or the boundaries of the political unit) is legitimate to begin with. 
Yet this is exactly what is in question in the case of secessionist claims; so Buchanan‘s 
argument simply begs the question. As for Buchanan‘s rejection of the second 
justification, it is mostly unsupported: unless Buchanan is simply begging the question 
again by assuming that opening up the question of secession to a vote would 
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automatically produce worse results than a constitutional amendment, we are given no 
reason to believe that this would actually be the case. 
3. Conclusion 
In developing the axiological approach, Chapters 3, 4, and 5 showed that the values of 
self-determination, justice, and flourishing, in the context of secession, are most 
adequately conceived as requiring equal consideration of different groups‘ rights and 
interests. Because democracy is fundamentally committed to equality, in this final 
chapter I sketched a democratic axiological theory of secession. I looked at the 
conceptual and empirical connections between democracy and the three values of self-
determination, justice, and flourishing. Doing so showed how drawing from democratic 
theory might bolster the axiological approach for which I have argued in this project. 
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